Trowbridge rule in New York

2021In analyzing the effect of a bolstering error, the Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he standard of harmlessness in a Trowbridge error case is whether 'the evidence of identity is so strong that there is no substantial issue on the point'" ( People v Mobley , 56 NY2d 585 , 585, quoting People v Malloy , 22 NY2d 559, 567 ).

2021In analyzing the effect of a bolstering error, the Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he standard of harmlessness in a Trowbridge error case is whether 'the evidence of identity is so strong that there is no substantial issue on the point'" ( People v Mobley , 56 NY2d 585 , 585, quoting People v Malloy , 22 NY2d 559, 567 ).

1984Moreover, a Trowbridge error cannot be deemed harmless unless the evidence of identity is “ ‘so strong that there is no substantial issue on the point’ ”, e.g., that the evidence of identification is “ ‘clear and strong’ ” (People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584,585; People v Napoletano, 58 AD2d 83, 91 ).

1984Moreover, a Trowbridge error cannot be deemed harmless unless the evidence of identity is “ ‘so strong that there is no substantial issue on the point’ ”, e.g., that the evidence of identification is “ ‘clear and strong’ ” (People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584,585; People v Napoletano, 58 AD2d 83, 91 ).

1989However, in light of the strength of those in-court identifications, this Trowbridge error was clearly harmless (see, People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969 ; People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584 ; People v Taylor, 134 AD2d 543 ; People v Williams, 109 AD2d 906 ; cf., People v Grubbs, 112 AD2d 104,104-106 ).

1989However, in light of the strength of those in-court identifications, this Trowbridge error was clearly harmless (see, People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969 ; People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584 ; People v Taylor, 134 AD2d 543 ; People v Williams, 109 AD2d 906 ; cf., People v Grubbs, 112 AD2d 104,104-106 ).

1985(See, People v Nival, supra; People v Lagana, 36 NY2d 71 [1975].) The Trowbridge rule is only applicable where the witness makes a positive in-court identification; to allow third-party testimony under those circumstances could improperly bolster an identification.

1985(See, People v Nival, supra; People v Lagana, 36 NY2d 71 [1975].) The Trowbridge rule is only applicable where the witness makes a positive in-court identification; to allow third-party testimony under those circumstances could improperly bolster an identification.

1992Clearly, the Trowbridge error was harmless (see, People v Burgess, 66 AD2d 667 ).

1992Clearly, the Trowbridge error was harmless (see, People v Burgess, 66 AD2d 667 ).

1990(Cf., People v Morales, 37 NY2d 262 ; but see, People v Wharton, 74 NY2d 921 .) Though not suffering from the hearsay impediment that affects a Trowbridge violation, testimony regarding the identifications made at the showup may well create the illusory impression that much more by way of accurate evidence going to the question of identification was adduced than actually exists.

1990(Cf., People v Morales, 37 NY2d 262 ; but see, People v Wharton, 74 NY2d 921 .) Though not suffering from the hearsay impediment that affects a Trowbridge violation, testimony regarding the identifications made at the showup may well create the illusory impression that much more by way of accurate evidence going to the question of identification was adduced than actually exists.

1989However, in light of the strength of those in-court identifications, this Trowbridge error was clearly harmless (see, People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969 ; People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584 ; People v Taylor, 134 AD2d 543 ; People v Williams, 109 AD2d 906 ; cf., People v Grubbs, 112 AD2d 104,104-106 ).

1989However, in light of the strength of those in-court identifications, this Trowbridge error was clearly harmless (see, People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969 ; People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584 ; People v Taylor, 134 AD2d 543 ; People v Williams, 109 AD2d 906 ; cf., People v Grubbs, 112 AD2d 104,104-106 ).

1989However, in light of the strength of those in-court identifications, this Trowbridge error was clearly harmless (see, People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969 ; People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584 ; People v Taylor, 134 AD2d 543 ; People v Williams, 109 AD2d 906 ; cf., People v Grubbs, 112 AD2d 104,104-106 ).

1989However, in light of the strength of those in-court identifications, this Trowbridge error was clearly harmless (see, People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969 ; People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584 ; People v Taylor, 134 AD2d 543 ; People v Williams, 109 AD2d 906 ; cf., People v Grubbs, 112 AD2d 104,104-106 ).

1985(See, People v Nival, supra; People v Lagana, 36 NY2d 71 [1975].) The Trowbridge rule is only applicable where the witness makes a positive in-court identification; to allow third-party testimony under those circumstances could improperly bolster an identification.

1985(See, People v Nival, supra; People v Lagana, 36 NY2d 71 [1975].) The Trowbridge rule is only applicable where the witness makes a positive in-court identification; to allow third-party testimony under those circumstances could improperly bolster an identification.

1984Thus, we conclude that the evidence of identity neither was so overwhelming, nor so “ ‘clear and strong’ ” that it can be said that the Trowbridge error was rendered harmless (People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584, 585 ; People v Ross, 79 AD2d 666, 667 ; People v Napoletano, 58 AD2d 83, 91 ).

1984Thus, we conclude that the evidence of identity neither was so overwhelming, nor so “ ‘clear and strong’ ” that it can be said that the Trowbridge error was rendered harmless (People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584, 585 ; People v Ross, 79 AD2d 666, 667 ; People v Napoletano, 58 AD2d 83, 91 ).

1975Defendant’s appeal is principally predicated on his contentions that a statement with reference to his ownership of a jacket was inadmissible in evidence as a result of police violation of the Miranda rule (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ) and that the admission of police testimony to bolster the identification of the complainant was violative of the Trowbridge rule (People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 ) as limited by People v Lagana ( 43 AD2d 834 , revd 36 NY2d 71 ) and People v Nival ( 41 AD2d 777 , affd 33 NY2d 391 ).

1975Defendant’s appeal is principally predicated on his contentions that a statement with reference to his ownership of a jacket was inadmissible in evidence as a result of police violation of the Miranda rule (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ) and that the admission of police testimony to bolster the identification of the complainant was violative of the Trowbridge rule (People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 ) as limited by People v Lagana ( 43 AD2d 834 , revd 36 NY2d 71 ) and People v Nival ( 41 AD2d 777 , affd 33 NY2d 391 ).

2017Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, alleging a “Trowbridge violation,” but without specifically alleging any violation of the defendant’s right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]; People v Fairweather, 69 AD3d 876 [2010]).

2017Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, alleging a “Trowbridge violation,” but without specifically alleging any violation of the defendant’s right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]; People v Fairweather, 69 AD3d 876 [2010]).

2008These errors were not harmless (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241 [1975]). “[A] Trowbridge error cannot be deemed harmless unless the evidence of identity is ‘so strong that there is no substantial issue on the point’ ” (People v Walston, 99 AD2d 847 [1984], quoting People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584, 585 [1982]; see People v Lee, 22 AD3d 602 [2005]).

2007The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding the chain of custody of evidence, Rosario material (see People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 [1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]), and an alleged Trowbridge violation (see People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 [1953]), are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, are without merit.

2007The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding the chain of custody of evidence, Rosario material (see People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 [1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]), and an alleged Trowbridge violation (see People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 [1953]), are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, are without merit.

2007The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding the chain of custody of evidence, Rosario material (see People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 [1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]), and an alleged Trowbridge violation (see People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 [1953]), are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, are without merit.

2007The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding the chain of custody of evidence, Rosario material (see People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 [1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]), and an alleged Trowbridge violation (see People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 [1953]), are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, are without merit.

1992This testimony constituted improper, inferential bolstering of the identification testimony, in violation of the Trowbridge rule (see, People v Holt, 67 NY2d 819, 821 ; People v Faison, 126 AD2d 739 ).

1992This testimony constituted improper, inferential bolstering of the identification testimony, in violation of the Trowbridge rule (see, People v Holt, 67 NY2d 819, 821 ; People v Faison, 126 AD2d 739 ).

1992This testimony constituted improper, inferential bolstering of the identification testimony, in violation of the Trowbridge rule (see, People v Holt, 67 NY2d 819, 821 ; People v Faison, 126 AD2d 739 ).

1992This testimony constituted improper, inferential bolstering of the identification testimony, in violation of the Trowbridge rule (see, People v Holt, 67 NY2d 819, 821 ; People v Faison, 126 AD2d 739 ).

1992Defendant did not preserve for review the arguments that the officers’ testimony concerning the five men pointing him out was improper hearsay with respect to the three friends who did not testify in court, and Trowbridge error (People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 ) with respect to complainant and the friend who identified defendant at the trial (CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bolling, 166 AD2d 203 , lv granted 77 NY2d 836 ), and we decline to reach the issues raised.

1992If we were to consider same in the interest of justice, we would find the first merit-less because the gesturing was not offered at trial for the truth of the fact asserted, i.e., defendant’s identity, and the second insufficient by itself to warrant a new trial, because, assuming there was impermissible bolstering, there is no reasonable danger that the jury may have used the testimony as a substitute for the identification made by complainant and the other eyewitnesses (People v Jones, 170 AD2d 360 , lv denied 77 NY2d 996 ).

1991The rationale behind the Trowbridge rule is two-fold: first, such evidence is hearsay, and, second, "[t]he mere repetition of the identification by a third party has the potential of placing disproportionate emphasis on the identification and to influence the jury unduly with respect to its reliability” (People v Rosario, 127 AD2d 209, 214 ; see, People v Caserta, 19 NY2d 18, 21 ).

1991The defendant’s claim that a Trowbridge error was committed when a photograph of the lineup viewed by the complainant was received into evidence is without merit (see, People v Rawlings, 144 AD2d 500 ).

1991The defendant’s claim that a Trowbridge error was committed when a photograph of the lineup viewed by the complainant was received into evidence is without merit (see, People v Rawlings, 144 AD2d 500 ).

1991The defendant’s other claims of improper bolstering are unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Brown, 161 AD2d 777 ).

1991The defendant’s other claims of improper bolstering are unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Brown, 161 AD2d 777 ).

1991(People v Tention, 162 AD2d 355 , lv denied 76 NY2d 991 .) Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial due to the Trowbridge error (see, People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 ), which occurred when the arresting officer testified that he knew he had arrested the right men because of the undercover officer’s confirmatory identification.

1991(People v Tention, 162 AD2d 355 , lv denied 76 NY2d 991 .) Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial due to the Trowbridge error (see, People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 ), which occurred when the arresting officer testified that he knew he had arrested the right men because of the undercover officer’s confirmatory identification.