section 901.151 stop in Florida

1990This court has not addressed the issue decided in Spann v. State, 529 So.2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), of whether drugs or other evidence thrown down by a suspect after being ordered by police to "stop" or "freeze," should be suppressed because the police lack a founded suspicion sufficient to allow an investigative stop pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1989).

1990In view of the unlawful stop, and based upon the parties' stipulation that the defendant dropped the cocaine packet as a result of the officer's order to stop, the court rejected the state's abandonment theory and reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. 529 So.2d at 826 .

1994A number of cases decided by the Florida courts have held that a "founded suspicion" which is necessary for a Terry stop or a stop pursuant to section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (1989), does not arise from the fact that a person is in a high crime area, [3] nor does flight from an officer in a high crime area constitute founded suspicion, [4] nor are suspicious movements of a person combined with flight sufficient. [5] That is basically all the officers had to go on in this case. *100 In Robinson v. State, 556 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the police had more, but the court concluded it was

1994In Robinson v. State, 556 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the police had more, but the court concluded it was insufficient to constitute a “founded suspicion.” In Robinson , the police received an anonymous radio tip that an individual exactly fitting Robinson’s description, 6 was selling drugs at a specific location.

2021As our sister court explained in Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009), while “the misdemeanor had not occurred in his presence and he could not effect an immediate arrest of [the suspect], we conclude that under these circumstances the officer did have authority to conduct a Terry stop pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2006), to investigate the offense.” Id. at 311 & n.2 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 11 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2021As our sister court explained in Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009), while “the misdemeanor had not occurred in his presence and he could not effect an immediate arrest of [the suspect], we conclude that under these circumstances the officer did have authority to conduct a Terry stop pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2006), to investigate the offense.” Id. at 311 & n.2 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 11 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2021As our sister court explained in Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009), while “the misdemeanor had not occurred in his presence and he could not effect an immediate arrest of [the suspect], we conclude that under these circumstances the officer did have authority to conduct a Terry stop pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2006), to investigate the offense.” Id. at 311 & n.2 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 11 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2021As our sister court explained in Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009), while “the misdemeanor had not occurred in his presence and he could not effect an immediate arrest of [the suspect], we conclude that under these circumstances the officer did have authority to conduct a Terry stop pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2006), to investigate the offense.” Id. at 311 & n.2 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 11 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

1999“A hunch is not enough.” Estep v. State, 597 So.2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

1991Peabody v. State, 556 So.2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); State v. Hoover, 520 So.2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). *877 A stop based upon an officer's observation of a black person in a high crime area leaning into a white person's car and then walking away after seeing a police officer approach does not give rise to a founded suspicion justifying a temporary detention.

1991Peabody v. State, 556 So.2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); State v. Hoover, 520 So.2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). *877 A stop based upon an officer's observation of a black person in a high crime area leaning into a white person's car and then walking away after seeing a police officer approach does not give rise to a founded suspicion justifying a temporary detention.

1990The court granted the motion to suppress on the authority of Monahan v. State, 390 So.2d 756 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, 399 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 1981), and Spann v. State, 529 So.2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), reasoning that the abandonment of the firearm in the alleyway was a product of the officers' effort to make an illegal stop.

1986GLICKSTEIN, Judge, concurring specialty- As a result of this case, I took a long look at the “laundry list” in State v. Stevens, 354 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), wherein the court said in discussing an officer’s right to make a stop pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes: There will be borderline cases, of course, in which reasonable men might differ as to whether the circumstances witnessed by an officer gave an objective foundation to his suspicion.

1984In State v. Levin, 452 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1984), the supreme court disapproved this court's holding in Boal v. State, 368 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), making it abundantly clear that these two factors, standing alone, are insufficient to justify even an investigative stop under section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1983).

1984In State v. Levin, 452 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1984), the supreme court disapproved this court's holding in Boal v. State, 368 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), making it abundantly clear that these two factors, standing alone, are insufficient to justify even an investigative stop under section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1983).