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14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co.green2 sentences1996See Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 256 Ga. 255, 256 ( 347 SE2d 568 ) (1986); Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 659 ( 238 SE2d 361 ) (1977); Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573 ( 212 SE2d 373 ) (1975), for a history of the development of this concept in this state.) “There are three general categories of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and marketing/packaging defects. [Cit.] . . . [Center Chemical Co. v.] Parzini[, 234 Ga. 868 ( 218 SE2d 580 ) (1975)] addressed manufacturing and packaging defects and did not recognize the existence of design defects, i.e., thos 1996See Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 256 Ga. 255, 256 ( 347 SE2d 568 ) (1986); Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 659 ( 238 SE2d 361 ) (1977); Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573 ( 212 SE2d 373 ) (1975), for a history of the development of this concept in this state.) “There are three general categories of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and marketing/packaging defects. [Cit.] . . . [Center Chemical Co. v.] Parzini[, 234 Ga. 868 ( 218 SE2d 580 ) (1975)] addressed manufacturing and packaging defects and did not recognize the existence of design defects, i.e., thos | 2 | 2 |
Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Manngreen2 sentences1990If a `product is designed so that it is reasonably safe for the use intended, the product is not defective even though capable of producing injury where the injury results from an obvious or patent peril.' Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 847 (2) ( 321 SE2d 353 ) (1984) (affirmed Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 254 Ga. 201 ( 326 SE2d 436 ) (1985)), where it was observed that with regards [to] a product-design case `only semantics distinguishes' between a cause of action for negligence and liability under OCGA § 51-1-11. 1990If a `product is designed so that it is reasonably safe for the use intended, the product is not defective even though capable of producing injury where the injury results from an obvious or patent peril.' Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 847 (2) ( 321 SE2d 353 ) (1984) (affirmed Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 254 Ga. 201 ( 326 SE2d 436 ) (1985)), where it was observed that with regards [to] a product-design case `only semantics distinguishes' between a cause of action for negligence and liability under OCGA § 51-1-11. | 2 | 2 |
Griffin v. CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM COMPANYgreen2 sentences1990See Griffin v. Crown Central Petroleum Co., 171 Ga. App. 534 ( 320 SE2d 383 ) (1984)." Honda Motor Co. v. Kimbrel, 189 Ga. App. 414, 418 ( 376 SE2d 379 ). 1990See Griffin v. Crown Central Petroleum Co., 171 Ga. App. 534 ( 320 SE2d 383 ) (1984)." Honda Motor Co. v. Kimbrel, 189 Ga. App. 414, 418 ( 376 SE2d 379 ). | 2 | 2 |
Center Chemical Co. v. Parzinigreen2 sentences1994In the seminal case in Georgia, Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868 ( 218 SE2d 580 ) (1975), this Court held that OCGA § 51-1-11 imposes strict liability for defective products and concluded that a product that is "properly prepared, manufactured, packaged and accompanied with adequate warnings and instructions ... can not be said to be defective." Id. at 870 (4). 1994In the seminal case in Georgia, Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868 ( 218 SE2d 580 ) (1975), this Court held that OCGA § 51-1-11 imposes strict liability for defective products and concluded that a product that is "properly prepared, manufactured, packaged and accompanied with adequate warnings and instructions ... can not be said to be defective." Id. at 870 (4). | 1 | 3 |
Ellis v. Rich's, Inc.green2 sentences2025Speaking generally, OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1) imposes strict liability on manufacturers of products that cause in- jury because of their “condition when sold.” See Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 577 (1975) (explaining that the predecessor to § 51-1- 6 11(b)(1) imposes strict liability on product manufacturers). 1996See Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 256 Ga. 255, 256 ( 347 SE2d 568 ) (1986); Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 659 ( 238 SE2d 361 ) (1977); Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573 ( 212 SE2d 373 ) (1975), for a history of the development of this concept in this state.) “There are three general categories of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and marketing/packaging defects. [Cit.] . . . [Center Chemical Co. v.] Parzini[, 234 Ga. 868 ( 218 SE2d 580 ) (1975)] addressed manufacturing and packaging defects and did not recognize the existence of design defects, i.e., thos | 1 | 2 |
Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpegreen2 sentences1998Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 745 ( 353 SE2d 340 ) (1987). 1998Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 745 ( 353 SE2d 340 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Ream Tool Co. v. Newtongreen2 sentences1997"OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1) provides for strict liability with respect to the manufacturer of personal property sold as new." (Emphasis in original.) Buford v. Toys R' Us, 217 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1), 458 S.E.2d 373 (1995); Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga.App. 226, 227 (3)(a), 433 S.E.2d 67 (1993). 1997"OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1) provides for strict liability with respect to the manufacturer of personal property sold as new." (Emphasis in original.) Buford v. Toys R' Us, 217 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1), 458 S.E.2d 373 (1995); Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga.App. 226, 227 (3)(a), 433 S.E.2d 67 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Buford v. Toys R' US, Inc.green2 sentences1997"OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1) provides for strict liability with respect to the manufacturer of personal property sold as new." (Emphasis in original.) Buford v. Toys R' Us, 217 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1), 458 S.E.2d 373 (1995); Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga.App. 226, 227 (3)(a), 433 S.E.2d 67 (1993). 1997"OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1) provides for strict liability with respect to the manufacturer of personal property sold as new." (Emphasis in original.) Buford v. Toys R' Us, 217 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1), 458 S.E.2d 373 (1995); Ream Tool Co. v. Newton, 209 Ga.App. 226, 227 (3)(a), 433 S.E.2d 67 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Colt Industries Operating Corp. v. Colemangreen2 sentences1996Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 560 , 272 S.E.2d 251 (1980)), and that the Georgia rule of lex loci delicti governs the decision as to whether Virginia or Georgia substantive law applies to the strict liability claim. 1996Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 560 , 272 S.E.2d 251 (1980)), and that the Georgia rule of lex loci delicti governs the decision as to whether Virginia or Georgia substantive law applies to the strict liability claim. | 1 | 1 |
Risdon Enterprises, Inc. v. Colemill Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences1996See Risdon Enterprises v. Colemill Enterprises, 172 Ga. App. 902, 903 (1), 324 S.E.2d 738 . 1996See Risdon Enterprises v. Colemill Enterprises, 172 Ga. App. 902, 903 (1), 324 S.E.2d 738 . | 1 | 1 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Cartergreen2 sentences1996See Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 256 Ga. 255, 256 ( 347 SE2d 568 ) (1986); Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 659 ( 238 SE2d 361 ) (1977); Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573 ( 212 SE2d 373 ) (1975), for a history of the development of this concept in this state.) “There are three general categories of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and marketing/packaging defects. [Cit.] . . . [Center Chemical Co. v.] Parzini[, 234 Ga. 868 ( 218 SE2d 580 ) (1975)] addressed manufacturing and packaging defects and did not recognize the existence of design defects, i.e., thos 1996See Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 256 Ga. 255, 256 ( 347 SE2d 568 ) (1986); Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 659 ( 238 SE2d 361 ) (1977); Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573 ( 212 SE2d 373 ) (1975), for a history of the development of this concept in this state.) “There are three general categories of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and marketing/packaging defects. [Cit.] . . . [Center Chemical Co. v.] Parzini[, 234 Ga. 868 ( 218 SE2d 580 ) (1975)] addressed manufacturing and packaging defects and did not recognize the existence of design defects, i.e., thos | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Fordhamgreen2 sentences1994If the injury occurs [within] that period, it is . . . actionable. [Cit.]” Hill v. Fordham, supra at 357 (2). 1994If the injury occurs [within] that period, it is . . . actionable. [Cit.]" Hill v. Fordham, supra at 357 (2). | 1 | 1 |
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Kimbrelgreen2 sentences1990See Griffin v. Crown Central Petroleum Co., 171 Ga. App. 534 ( 320 SE2d 383 ) (1984)." Honda Motor Co. v. Kimbrel, 189 Ga. App. 414, 418 ( 376 SE2d 379 ). 1990See Griffin v. Crown Central Petroleum Co., 171 Ga. App. 534 ( 320 SE2d 383 ) (1984)." Honda Motor Co. v. Kimbrel, 189 Ga. App. 414, 418 ( 376 SE2d 379 ). | 1 | 1 |
Barry v. Stevens Equipment Co.green2 sentences1986Co., 176 Ga. App. 27, 28-29 ( 335 SE2d 129 ) (1985). 1986Co., 176 Ga. App. 27, 28-29 ( 335 SE2d 129 ) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp.
green
2 sentences1990If a `product is designed so that it is reasonably safe for the use intended, the product is not defective even though capable of producing injury where the injury results from an obvious or patent peril.' Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 847 (2) ( 321 SE2d 353 ) (1984) (affirmed Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 254 Ga. 201 ( 326 SE2d 436 ) (1985)), where it was observed that with regards [to] a product-design case `only semantics distinguishes' between a cause of action for negligence and liability under OCGA § 51-1-11. 1990If a `product is designed so that it is reasonably safe for the use intended, the product is not defective even though capable of producing injury where the injury results from an obvious or patent peril.' Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 847 (2) ( 321 SE2d 353 ) (1984) (affirmed Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 254 Ga. 201 ( 326 SE2d 436 ) (1985)), where it was observed that with regards [to] a product-design case `only semantics distinguishes' between a cause of action for negligence and liability under OCGA § 51-1-11. | 2 | 1988–1990 |
HNTB Georgia, Inc. v. Hamilton-King
green
2 sentences2013AGLC and Tinker filed motions to exclude Buchan’s testimony, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to show that Buchan was qualified as an expert in the specific areas at issue in this case or that his opinions were reliable under OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (b)6 or the Supreme Court of the United State’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.7 Although the trial court denied the defendants’ motions to exclude Buchan’s testimony, it subsequently granted their motions for reconsideration, relying upon a recent ruling by the Supreme Court of Georgia in HNTB Ga., Inc. v. Hamilton- King, 287 Ga 2013AGLC and Tinker filed motions to exclude Buchan’s testimony, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to show that Buchan was qualified as an expert in the specific areas at issue in this case or that his opinions were reliable under OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (b)6 or the Supreme Court of the United State’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.7 Although the trial court denied the defendants’ motions to exclude Buchan’s testimony, it subsequently granted their motions for reconsideration, relying upon a recent ruling by the Supreme Court of Georgia in HNTB Ga., Inc. v. Hamilton- King, 287 Ga | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996Assn., 252 Ga. 465, supra. While neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals explains in Abee why the doctrine of assumption of the risk barred the plaintiff’s negligence claims while not barring the plaintiff’s strict liability claim under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b), such a rule is consistent with the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732 ( 450 SE2d 671 ), where the primary focus of a manufacturer’s liability under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) was not the conduct of the parties but the characteristic of the product as measured by a risk-utility analysis. 1996Assn., 252 Ga. 465, supra. While neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals explains in Abee why the doctrine of assumption of the risk barred the plaintiff’s negligence claims while not barring the plaintiff’s strict liability claim under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b), such a rule is consistent with the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732 ( 450 SE2d 671 ), where the primary focus of a manufacturer’s liability under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) was not the conduct of the parties but the characteristic of the product as measured by a risk-utility analysis. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins
green
2 sentences1996Viewing the evidence on S K’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in favor of Lowman under Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991), the evidence was that Lowman worked for a landscaper as a mechanic in charge of servicing equipment. 1996Viewing the evidence on S K’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in favor of Lowman under Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991), the evidence was that Lowman worked for a landscaper as a mechanic in charge of servicing equipment. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Abee v. Stone Mountain Memorial Ass'n
green
2 sentences1996Assn., 169 Ga. App. 167 ( 312 SE2d 142 ), that assumption of the risk does not — as a matter of law — bar an action against an alleged manufacturer based on strict liability under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b). 1996Assn., 169 Ga. App. 167 ( 312 SE2d 142 ), that assumption of the risk does not — as a matter of law — bar an action against an alleged manufacturer based on strict liability under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Abee v. Stone Mountain Memorial Ass'n
green
2 sentences1996I respectfully dissent because I believe the case sub judice is controlled by Abee v. Stone Mountain Memorial Association, 252 Ga. 465 , 314 S.E.2d 444 , wherein the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding in Abee v. Stone Mountain Memorial Association, 169 Ga.App. 167 , 312 S.E.2d 142 , that assumption of the risk does not—as a matter of law—bar an action against an alleged manufacturer based on strict liability under OCGA § 51-1-11(b). 1996Assn., 252 Ga. 465, supra. While neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals explains in Abee why the doctrine of assumption of the risk barred the plaintiff’s negligence claims while not barring the plaintiff’s strict liability claim under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b), such a rule is consistent with the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732 ( 450 SE2d 671 ), where the primary focus of a manufacturer’s liability under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) was not the conduct of the parties but the characteristic of the product as measured by a risk-utility analysis. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.