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14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Neff v. McGee.green2 sentences2021A defendant may establish that a conditional privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 applies if he shows “good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in its scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons.” Neff v. McGee, 346 Ga. App. 522, 526 (816 SE2d 486) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 31 from the blog post’s author, Erika Basurto (a paralegal for the federal case), and its editors, Andrea Woods (the lead attorney for the federal case) and Ryan Karerat (an ACLU communications strategist), saying that they had consulted filings in the federal case to ensu 2021A defendant may establish that a conditional privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 applies if he shows “good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in its scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons.” Neff v. McGee, 346 Ga. App. 522, 526 (816 SE2d 486) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 31 from the blog post’s author, Erika Basurto (a paralegal for the federal case), and its editors, Andrea Woods (the lead attorney for the federal case) and Ryan Karerat (an ACLU communications strategist), saying that they had consulted filings in the federal case to ensu | 2 | 2 |
Meyer v. Ledfordgreen2 sentences2016See Meyer v. Ledford, 170 Ga. App. 245, 246-247 (1) ( 316 SE2d 804 ) (1984) (holding that the defendant established the applicability of a conditional privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 where the defamatory statement was given at the request of speaker’s superior officer in the course of an official investigation concerning improper conduct by a fire department official). 2016See Meyer v. Ledford, 170 Ga. App. 245, 246-247 (1) ( 316 SE2d 804 ) (1984) (holding that the defendant established the applicability of a conditional privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 where the defamatory statement was given at the request of speaker’s superior officer in the course of an official investigation concerning improper conduct by a fire department official). | 2 | 2 |
Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridgegreen2 sentences2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when 2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when | 2 | 2 |
Layfield v. Turner Advertising Co.green2 sentences1996As such, the communication clearly falls within the purview of OCGA § 51-5-7 (3) which bestows privilege on communications ‘made with a good faith intent on the part of the speaker to protect his interest in a matter in which it is concerned.’ [Cit.] There is no evidence in the record to support an allegation that appellee acted with actual malice.” Layfield v. Turner Advertising Co., 181 Ga. App. 824, 826 ( 354 SE2d 14 ) (1987). 1996As such, the communication clearly falls within the purview of OCGA § 51-5-7 (3) which bestows privilege on communications ‘made with a good faith intent on the part of the speaker to protect his interest in a matter in which it is concerned.’ [Cit.] There is no evidence in the record to support an allegation that appellee acted with actual malice.” Layfield v. Turner Advertising Co., 181 Ga. App. 824, 826 ( 354 SE2d 14 ) (1987). | 2 | 2 |
Lamb v. Fedderwitzgreen2 sentences2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when 2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when | 1 | 2 |
Lawton v. Georgia Television Co.green2 sentences2025See also Lawton v. Ga. Television Co., 216 Ga. App. 768, 772 (1) ( 456 SE2d 274 ) (1995) (stating “[t]he substantial accuracy required for a fair report means that the fair report must have the same gist as the proceedings reported” in case involving privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7) (citation and punctuation omitted); Mathews v. Atlanta Newspapers Inc., 116 Ga. App. 337, 340 (4) ( 157 SE2d 300 ) (1967) (“As long as facts are not misstated, distorted or arranged as to convey a false and defamatory meaning, there is no liability for a somewhat less than complete report of the truth, even if the ne 2025See also Lawton v. Ga. Television Co., 216 Ga. App. 768, 772 (1) ( 456 SE2d 274 ) (1995) (stating “[t]he substantial accuracy required for a fair report means that the fair report must have the same gist as the proceedings reported” in case involving privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7) (citation and punctuation omitted); Mathews v. Atlanta Newspapers Inc., 116 Ga. App. 337, 340 (4) ( 157 SE2d 300 ) (1967) (“As long as facts are not misstated, distorted or arranged as to convey a false and defamatory meaning, there is no liability for a somewhat less than complete report of the truth, even if the ne | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. ATLANTA NEWSPAPERS INC.green2 sentences2025See also Lawton v. Ga. Television Co., 216 Ga. App. 768, 772 (1) ( 456 SE2d 274 ) (1995) (stating “[t]he substantial accuracy required for a fair report means that the fair report must have the same gist as the proceedings reported” in case involving privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7) (citation and punctuation omitted); Mathews v. Atlanta Newspapers Inc., 116 Ga. App. 337, 340 (4) ( 157 SE2d 300 ) (1967) (“As long as facts are not misstated, distorted or arranged as to convey a false and defamatory meaning, there is no liability for a somewhat less than complete report of the truth, even if the ne 2025See also Lawton v. Ga. Television Co., 216 Ga. App. 768, 772 (1) ( 456 SE2d 274 ) (1995) (stating “[t]he substantial accuracy required for a fair report means that the fair report must have the same gist as the proceedings reported” in case involving privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7) (citation and punctuation omitted); Mathews v. Atlanta Newspapers Inc., 116 Ga. App. 337, 340 (4) ( 157 SE2d 300 ) (1967) (“As long as facts are not misstated, distorted or arranged as to convey a false and defamatory meaning, there is no liability for a somewhat less than complete report of the truth, even if the ne | 1 | 1 |
Oskouei v. Matthewsgreen2 sentences2025See Neff v. McGee, 346 Ga. App. 522, 525-528 (1) ( 816 SE2d 486 ) (2018), overruled in part on other grounds, Oskouei, supra, 321 Ga. at 26 (4) (2025) (attorney’s statements in an article about a case were privileged under OCGA § 51-5-7 (7) because the statements were related to the litigation and the record showed that the statements were made in good faith in reliance on a police report, the interest sought to be upheld was the public’s attention to the matter, the statements were limited in scope and made days after the complaint, and were made to the public, who was a proper audience). 12 2025See Neff v. McGee, 346 Ga. App. 522, 525-528 (1) ( 816 SE2d 486 ) (2018), overruled in part on other grounds, Oskouei, supra, 321 Ga. at 26 (4) (2025) (attorney’s statements in an article about a case were privileged under OCGA § 51-5-7 (7) because the statements were related to the litigation and the record showed that the statements were made in good faith in reliance on a police report, the interest sought to be upheld was the public’s attention to the matter, the statements were limited in scope and made days after the complaint, and were made to the public, who was a proper audience). 12 | 1 | 1 |
Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coblegreen2 sentences2008See Stiefel v. Schick, 260 Ga. 638, 639 (1) ( 398 SE2d 194 ) (1990) (listing the elements of fraud, including scienter); Community Newspapers v. Baker, 198 Ga. App. 680, 682 ( 402 SE2d 545 ) (1991) (“ ‘bona fide’ ... has been defined as ‘(i)n or with good faith ...; without deceit or fraud,’ [cit.]”); Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble, 102 Ga. App. 106, 115 (2) ( 115 SE2d 852 ) (1960). 2008See Stiefel v. Schick, 260 Ga. 638, 639 (1) ( 398 SE2d 194 ) (1990) (listing the elements of fraud, including scienter); Community Newspapers v. Baker, 198 Ga. App. 680, 682 ( 402 SE2d 545 ) (1991) (“ ‘bona fide’ ... has been defined as ‘(i)n or with good faith ...; without deceit or fraud,’ [cit.]”); Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble, 102 Ga. App. 106, 115 (2) ( 115 SE2d 852 ) (1960). | 1 | 1 |
Community Newspapers, Inc. v. Bakergreen2 sentences2008See Stiefel v. Schick, 260 Ga. 638, 639 (1) ( 398 SE2d 194 ) (1990) (listing the elements of fraud, including scienter); Community Newspapers v. Baker, 198 Ga. App. 680, 682 ( 402 SE2d 545 ) (1991) (“ ‘bona fide’ ... has been defined as ‘(i)n or with good faith ...; without deceit or fraud,’ [cit.]”); Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble, 102 Ga. App. 106, 115 (2) ( 115 SE2d 852 ) (1960). 2008See Stiefel v. Schick, 260 Ga. 638, 639 (1) ( 398 SE2d 194 ) (1990) (listing the elements of fraud, including scienter); Community Newspapers v. Baker, 198 Ga. App. 680, 682 ( 402 SE2d 545 ) (1991) (“ ‘bona fide’ ... has been defined as ‘(i)n or with good faith ...; without deceit or fraud,’ [cit.]”); Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble, 102 Ga. App. 106, 115 (2) ( 115 SE2d 852 ) (1960). | 1 | 1 |
Stiefel v. Schickgreen2 sentences2008See Stiefel v. Schick, 260 Ga. 638, 639 (1) ( 398 SE2d 194 ) (1990) (listing the elements of fraud, including scienter); Community Newspapers v. Baker, 198 Ga. App. 680, 682 ( 402 SE2d 545 ) (1991) (“ ‘bona fide’ ... has been defined as ‘(i)n or with good faith ...; without deceit or fraud,’ [cit.]”); Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble, 102 Ga. App. 106, 115 (2) ( 115 SE2d 852 ) (1960). 2008See Stiefel v. Schick, 260 Ga. 638, 639 (1) ( 398 SE2d 194 ) (1990) (listing the elements of fraud, including scienter); Community Newspapers v. Baker, 198 Ga. App. 680, 682 ( 402 SE2d 545 ) (1991) (“ ‘bona fide’ ... has been defined as ‘(i)n or with good faith ...; without deceit or fraud,’ [cit.]”); Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble, 102 Ga. App. 106, 115 (2) ( 115 SE2d 852 ) (1960). | 1 | 1 |
King v. Massongreen2 sentences2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when 2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Browngreen2 sentences2004See Sanders v. Brown, 257 Ga. App. 566, 569 (a) ( 571 SE2d 532 ) (2002) (statement made before the Cobb County Board of Commissioners pursuant to a rezoning request was separate from the litigation over the land and not subject to the absolute privilege of OCGA§ 51-5-8). 2004See Sanders v. Brown, 257 Ga. App. 566, 569 (a) ( 571 SE2d 532 ) (2002) (statement made before the Cobb County Board of Commissioners pursuant to a rezoning request was separate from the litigation over the land and not subject to the absolute privilege of OCGA§ 51-5-8). | 1 | 1 |
Skoglund v. Durhamgreen2 sentences2004(Footnote omitted.) Skoglund v. Durham, 233 Ga. App. 158, 159 (a) ( 502 SE2d 814 ) (1998) (physical precedent only). 2004(Footnote omitted.) Skoglund v. Durham, 233 Ga. App. 158, 159 (a) ( 502 SE2d 814 ) (1998) (physical precedent only). | 1 | 1 |
JarAllah v. Schoengreen2 sentences2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when 2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when | 1 | 1 |
Baskin v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when 2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when | 1 | 1 |
Brewer v. Schachtgreen2 sentences2002See Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 318 (4) (b) ( 509 SE2d 378 ) (1998) (public duty — OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)); NationsBank v. SouthTrust Bank, 226 Ga. App. 888, 892 (1) (A) (1) ( 487 SE2d 701 ) (1997) (speaker’s interest — OCGA § 51-5-7 (3)). 2002See Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 318 (4) (b) ( 509 SE2d 378 ) (1998) (public duty — OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)); NationsBank v. SouthTrust Bank, 226 Ga. App. 888, 892 (1) (A) (1) ( 487 SE2d 701 ) (1997) (speaker’s interest — OCGA § 51-5-7 (3)). | 1 | 1 |
Nationsbank, N.A. v. Southtrust Bank of Georgia, N.A.green2 sentences2002See Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 318 (4) (b) ( 509 SE2d 378 ) (1998) (public duty — OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)); NationsBank v. SouthTrust Bank, 226 Ga. App. 888, 892 (1) (A) (1) ( 487 SE2d 701 ) (1997) (speaker’s interest — OCGA § 51-5-7 (3)). 2002See Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 318 (4) (b) ( 509 SE2d 378 ) (1998) (public duty — OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)); NationsBank v. SouthTrust Bank, 226 Ga. App. 888, 892 (1) (A) (1) ( 487 SE2d 701 ) (1997) (speaker’s interest — OCGA § 51-5-7 (3)). | 1 | 1 |
Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyalgreen2 sentences2001Savannah News-Press v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App. 203, 209-210 ( 138 SE2d 173 ) (1964); Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 68 Ga. App. 233 ( 22 SE2d 657 ) (1942), aff’d, 195 Ga. 691 ( 25 SE2d 414 ) (1943); see also Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 328-330 (2), (3) ( 60 SE2d 802 ) (1950). 2001Savannah News-Press v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App. 203, 209-210 ( 138 SE2d 173 ) (1964); Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 68 Ga. App. 233 ( 22 SE2d 657 ) (1942), aff’d, 195 Ga. 691 ( 25 SE2d 414 ) (1943); see also Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 328-330 (2), (3) ( 60 SE2d 802 ) (1950). | 1 | 1 |
Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greenegreen2 sentences1998Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene, 231 Ga. App. 130, 132 (2) ( 498 SE2d 537 ) (1998) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (3)). 1998Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene, 231 Ga. App. 130, 132 (2) ( 498 SE2d 537 ) (1998) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (3)). | 1 | 1 |
Fly v. Kroger Co.green2 sentences1998Although Brewer asserts that appellees did not act in good faith, he “has not pointed to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fly v. Kroger Co., 209 Ga. App. 75, 78 (2) ( 432 SE2d 664 ) (1993) (good faith statement in performance of public duty under OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)). 1998Although Brewer asserts that appellees did not act in good faith, he “has not pointed to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fly v. Kroger Co., 209 Ga. App. 75, 78 (2) ( 432 SE2d 664 ) (1993) (good faith statement in performance of public duty under OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)). | 1 | 1 |
Elder v. Cardosogreen2 sentences1993Our cases have said, in accord with the statute, that the jury need consider only the speaker’s good faith intention (see Kennedy v. Johnson, 205 Ga. App. 220, 223 ( 421 SE2d 746 ); Elder v. Cardosa, 205 Ga. App. 144, 146-147 ( 421 SE2d 753 ); Layfield v. Turner Advertising Co., 181 Ga. App. 824, 826 ( 354 SE2d 14 )), which necessarily requires an inquiry into the presence of malice. 1993Our cases have said, in accord with the statute, that the jury need consider only the speaker’s good faith intention (see Kennedy v. Johnson, 205 Ga. App. 220, 223 ( 421 SE2d 746 ); Elder v. Cardosa, 205 Ga. App. 144, 146-147 ( 421 SE2d 753 ); Layfield v. Turner Advertising Co., 181 Ga. App. 824, 826 ( 354 SE2d 14 )), which necessarily requires an inquiry into the presence of malice. | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1993Our cases have said, in accord with the statute, that the jury need consider only the speaker’s good faith intention (see Kennedy v. Johnson, 205 Ga. App. 220, 223 ( 421 SE2d 746 ); Elder v. Cardosa, 205 Ga. App. 144, 146-147 ( 421 SE2d 753 ); Layfield v. Turner Advertising Co., 181 Ga. App. 824, 826 ( 354 SE2d 14 )), which necessarily requires an inquiry into the presence of malice. 1993Our cases have said, in accord with the statute, that the jury need consider only the speaker’s good faith intention (see Kennedy v. Johnson, 205 Ga. App. 220, 223 ( 421 SE2d 746 ); Elder v. Cardosa, 205 Ga. App. 144, 146-147 ( 421 SE2d 753 ); Layfield v. Turner Advertising Co., 181 Ga. App. 824, 826 ( 354 SE2d 14 )), which necessarily requires an inquiry into the presence of malice. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fedderwitz v. Lamb
green
2 sentences2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when 2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when | 2 | 2001–2004 |
Cook v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when 2004See JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) ( 531 SE2d 778 ) (2000) (the comments-of-counsel privilege (OCGA § 51-5-7 (7)) is conditional and must be made in good faith and is waived by actual malice); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga. App. 250, 253 (4) ( 493 SE2d 728 ) (1997) (privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2), (3) does not extend to reports which are not made in good faith and are not fair and honest); King v. Masson, 148 Ga. App. 229, 231 (1) (B) ( 251 SE2d 107 ) (1978) (privileged communications status of bona fide statements in performance of public duty (OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)) may be lost when | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Atlanta News Publishing Co. v. Medlock
green
2 sentences1992Co. v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714 ( 51 SE 756 ) (1905); see also Bishop v. Intl. 1992Co. v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714 ( 51 SE 756 ) (1905); see also Bishop v. Intl. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sherwood v. Boshears
green
2 sentences1987As such, the communication clearly falls within the purview of OCGA § 51-5-7 (3) which bestows privilege on communications “made with a good faith intent on the part of the speaker to protect his interest in a matter in which it is concerned.” See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981). 1987As such, the communication clearly falls within the purview of OCGA § 51-5-7 (3) which bestows privilege on communications “made with a good faith intent on the part of the speaker to protect his interest in a matter in which it is concerned.” See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.