section 1 limitation in North Carolina

2022Id. at 89-90, 405 S.E.2d at 127 . ¶ 372 Additionally, the trial court stated that the county’s failure to provide adequate court facilities violated the constitutional limitation under Article IV, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from “depriving the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction rightfully pertaining to it as a coordinate department of government.” Id. at 90 , 405 S.E.2d at 127 .

2022Id. at 89-90, 405 S.E.2d at 127 . ¶ 372 Additionally, the trial court stated that the county’s failure to provide adequate court facilities violated the constitutional limitation under Article IV, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from “depriving the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction rightfully pertaining to it as a coordinate department of government.” Id. at 90 , 405 S.E.2d at 127 .

1919R. v. Holden , 63 N.C. 410 , and was affirmed at the last term by the unanimous opinion of the Court in Parvin v. Comrs. , 177 N.C. 509 , in which the Court says, after referring to the Cherokee case: "In that case the tax was intended to *Page 485 provide for past deficits in the revenues for ordinary and necessary county expenses, and fell directly within Art.

1919R. v. Holden, 63 N. C., 410 , and was affirmed at the last term by the unanimous opinion of the Court in Parvin v. Comrs., 177 N. C., 509 , in which the Court says, after referring to the Cherokee case: “In that case the tax was intended to provide for past deficits in the revenues for ordinary and necessary county expenses, and fell directly within Art.

1919The first is Williams v. Comrs. , 119 N.C. 520 , approved in Herring v. Dixon , 122 N.C. 423 , in which it was held that a statute authorizing a special county tax for the purpose of maintaining public ferries, building roads, and meeting other current expenses was not for a "special purpose" within the meaning of section 6 of Article V of the Constitution, and that a tax levied thereunder in excess of the constitutional limitation of section 1 was void; and the second, Bennett v. Comrs. , 173 N.C. 629 , which says that a statute "conferring on county commissioners the power to borrow money fo

1919The first is Williams v. Comrs., 119 N. C., 520 , approved in Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C., 423 , in which it was held that a statute authorizing a special county tax for the purpose of maintaining public ferries, building roads, and meeting other current expenses was not for a “special purpose” within the meaning of section 6 of Article Y of the Constitution, and that a tax levied thereunder in excess of the constitutional limitation of section 1 was void; and the second, Bennett v. Comrs., 173 N. C., 629 , which says that a statute “conferring on county commissioners the power to borrow money

2024We hold that the 7 April 2008 Notice contained “clear and unequivocal” - 10 - language “as to leave no doubt as to the holder’s intention[,]” Vreede, 94 N.C. App. at 527 ; “If the default is not cured on or before May 12, 2008, the mortgage payments will be accelerated with the full amount remaining accelerated and becoming due and payable in full[.]” Thus, we determine that petitioner filed this non-judicial foreclosure action outside the applicable 10-year statute of limitations under § 1- 47(3).

2023Id. at 583 , 339 S.E.2d at 858-59 .

2023Id. at 583 , 339 S.E.2d at 858-59 .

2016For example, the State argues that, since this case is governed by the boundary fixing provision of Article VII, Section 1 rather than the limitations upon the enactment of local legislation contained in Article II, Section 24, it is clearly distinguishable from the cases in which municipalities have been allowed to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, such as Town of Spruce Pine v. Avery County, 346 N.C. 787 , 488 S.E.2d 144 (1997), and Town of Emerald Isle, each of which involved the imposition of a new obligation on a local government.

2016For example, the State argues that, since this case is governed by the boundary fixing provision of Article VII, Section 1 rather than the limitations upon the enactment of local legislation contained in Article II, Section 24, it is clearly distinguishable from the cases in which municipalities have been allowed to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, such as Town of Spruce Pine v. Avery County, 346 N.C. 787 , 488 S.E.2d 144 (1997), and Town of Emerald Isle, each of which involved the imposition of a new obligation on a local government.

2016Similarly, this case is deemed to be distinguishable from City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven County Board of Education, 328 N.C. 557 , 402 S.E.2d 623 (1991) (New Bern T), given that New Bern I did not stem from an action brought by a municipality against the State and given that the challenged legislation involved the removal of the city’s authority to enforce the State Building Code within, rather than outside, its own municipal boundaries, coupled with a grant of authority to the county to enforce the building code within the municipal boundary contained in a local, rather than a general, l

2016Similarly, this case is deemed to be distinguishable from City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven County Board of Education, 328 N.C. 557 , 402 S.E.2d 623 (1991) (New Bern T), given that New Bern I did not stem from an action brought by a municipality against the State and given that the challenged legislation involved the removal of the city’s authority to enforce the State Building Code within, rather than outside, its own municipal boundaries, coupled with a grant of authority to the county to enforce the building code within the municipal boundary contained in a local, rather than a general, l

2009App. at 515 , 571 S.E.2d at 240-41 .

2009"The one-year time limitation in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) is an explicit requirement which our Court cannot ignore." Davis, 153 N.C.

2002App. 134, 141-43 , 258 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1979) (finding no authority that would allow the tolling of the one-year limitation in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)), rev’d on other grounds, 299 N.C. 715 , 264 S.E.2d 101 (1980).

2002App. 134, 141-43 , 258 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1979) (finding no authority that would allow the tolling of the one-year limitation in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)), rev’d on other grounds, 299 N.C. 715 , 264 S.E.2d 101 (1980).

1916Under this article, and giving effect to section 6 of Article V, the counties could not levy double the State tax for ordinary expenses, and within the limitation of section 1 no taxes could be levied for special purposes, although it would seem the General Assembly thought it had authority to authorize this to be done. *Page 488 If none of these positions can be maintained, the tax provided in the statute is valid, as counties as well as cities and towns are embraced in Article VII, section 7, of the Constitution, and it was so held in Pritchard v. Comrs. , 159 N.C. 636 , in which there was a

1916If none of these positions can be maintained, the tax provided in the statute is valid, as- counties as well as cities and towns are embraced in Article VII, section 7, of the Constitution, and it was so held in Pritchard v. Comrs., 159 N. C., 636 , in which there was a levy on polls and property for roads; and corporations within that article of the Constitution may exceed the limitation on the poll and property when authorized so to do by thei General Assembly, as was held in Perry v. Comrs., supra, and in other eases.

1916R. v. Comrs. , 148 N.C. 220 , seems to have reached this conclusion, and also that the equation and limitation in section 1 do not apply to taxes levied for special purposes, as he says in the valuable work on the Constitution by Connor and Cheshire, page 258, commenting on Article V, section 1: "This equation and this limitation on taxation have no application to taxes levied for a special purpose under Article V, section 6, nor to taxes necessary to meet an obligation assumed under Article (438) VII, section 7.

1916R. v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 220 , seems to have reached this conclusion, and also that the equation and limitation in section 1 do not apply to taxes levied, for special purposes, as he says in the valuable work on the Constitution by Connor and Cheshire, page 258, commenting on Article V, section 1: “This equation and this, limitation on taxation have no application to taxes levied for a special purpose under Article Y, section 6, nor to taxes necessary to meet an obligation assumed under Article YII, section 7.

1916Board of Education v. Comrs. , 137 N.C. 310 ; Jones v. Comrs. , 107 N.C. 248 ; R.

1916Board of Education v. Comrs., 137 N. C., 310 ; Jones v. Comrs., 107 N. C., 248 ; R.

1916Board of Education v. Comrs. , 137 N.C. 310 ; Jones v. Comrs. , 107 N.C. 248 ; R.

1916Board of Education v. Comrs., 137 N. C., 310 ; Jones v. Comrs., 107 N. C., 248 ; R.