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13 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1989–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rangolan v. County of Nassaugreen2 sentences2012We, therefore, respectfully disagree with Justice Tom’s dissent insofar as it posits that “the statutory language [of article 16] clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend apportionment to be predicated on obligations that are . . . nondelegable.” To be sure, the Rangolan Court held that “a municipality that delegates a duty for which the municipality is legally responsible, such as the maintenance of its roads, to an independent contractor remains vicariously liable for the contractor’s negligence, and cannot rely on CPLR 1601 (1) to apportion liability between itself and its cont 2012Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here (see CPLR 1602), CPLR 1601 (1) limits the liability that can be imposed upon a defendant that is jointly and severally liable for noneconomic loss in instances where that defendant’s liability is found to be 50% or less of the total liability assigned to all persons liable (see Rangolan v County of Nassau, 96 NY2d 42, 45 [2001]). | 3 | 3 |
Dorkin v. American Express Co.green2 sentences2012However, the fundamental difference here is that HHM, like any other agent, is not responsible to third parties for the tortious acts of its principal, the City (see Rusyniak v Gensini, 629 F Supp 2d 203 , 222 and n 41 [ND NY 2009]; Dorkin v American Express Co., 74 Misc 2d 673, 674 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1973], affd 43 AD2d 877 [3d Dept 1974]). 2012However, the fundamental difference here is that HHM, like any other agent, is not responsible to third parties for the tortious acts of its principal, the City (see Rusyniak v Gensini, 629 F Supp 2d 203 , 222 and n 41 [ND NY 2009]; Dorkin v American Express Co., 74 Misc 2d 673, 674 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1973], affd 43 AD2d 877 [3d Dept 1974]). | 2 | 2 |
Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2012Under such circumstances, the joint and several liability of such a defendant shall not exceed its proportionate share of the total liability for the noneconomic loss (see CPLR 1601 [1]; Rangolan v County of Nassau, 96 NY2d at 46 ; Cole v Mandell Food Stores, 242 AD2d 552 , 554 [1997], affd 93 NY2d 34 [1999]). 2004The motion was properly denied where plaintiff did not plead an exception to CPLR 1601 limiting defendants’ liability to their respective equitable shares of fault, and never sought leave to amend his pleadings to include such exception until after the verdict was rendered and the jury was discharged (see Cole v Mandell Food Stores, 93 NY2d 34, 39-40 [1999]; Morales v County of Nassau, 94 NY2d 218, 224 [1999]). | 1 | 2 |
Morales v. County of Nassaugreen1 sentence2004The motion was properly denied where plaintiff did not plead an exception to CPLR 1601 limiting defendants’ liability to their respective equitable shares of fault, and never sought leave to amend his pleadings to include such exception until after the verdict was rendered and the jury was discharged (see Cole v Mandell Food Stores, 93 NY2d 34, 39-40 [1999]; Morales v County of Nassau, 94 NY2d 218, 224 [1999]). | 1 | 1 |
Rezucha v. Garlock Mechanical Packing Co.green1 sentence2002Packing Co., 159 Misc 2d 855, 860 [Sup Ct, Broome County 1993] [holding that, although State of New York was immune from suit in court, plaintiff could obtain “jurisdiction” over State within the meaning of CPLR 1601 (1)]; Dominguez v Fixrammer Corp., 172 Misc 2d 868, 869-870 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1997] [when plaintiff had served corporate defendant which then dissolved before trial, “jurisdiction” had been obtained pursuant to article 16].) Inasmuch as Duffy’s coworkers had never shown that they could not obtain personal jurisdiction over him by serving his estate, the CPLR 1601 (1) proviso d | 1 | 1 |
Dominguez v. Fixrammer Corp.green1 sentence2002Packing Co., 159 Misc 2d 855, 860 [Sup Ct, Broome County 1993] [holding that, although State of New York was immune from suit in court, plaintiff could obtain “jurisdiction” over State within the meaning of CPLR 1601 (1)]; Dominguez v Fixrammer Corp., 172 Misc 2d 868, 869-870 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1997] [when plaintiff had served corporate defendant which then dissolved before trial, “jurisdiction” had been obtained pursuant to article 16].) Inasmuch as Duffy’s coworkers had never shown that they could not obtain personal jurisdiction over him by serving his estate, the CPLR 1601 (1) proviso d | 1 | 1 |
Duffy v. County of Chautauquagreen2 sentences2002(Duffy, 225 AD2d at 265-266 .) The Fourth Department held that the negligence of plaintiffs decedent John Duffy, the truck’s driver, could be included when apportioning the tortfeasors’ liability share under CPLR 1601, although Duffy’s coworker plaintiffs were barred from suing him under the statutory “fellow servant” rule. {See Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11, 29 [6].) 15 The Court found that “the statutory bar of the Workers’ Compensation Law does not constitute the inability to obtain jurisdiction as intended by CPLR 1601,” because the term “jurisdiction” in CPLR 1601 (1) “refers to persona 2002(Duffy, 225 AD2d at 265-266 .) The Fourth Department held that the negligence of plaintiffs decedent John Duffy, the truck’s driver, could be included when apportioning the tortfeasors’ liability share under CPLR 1601, although Duffy’s coworker plaintiffs were barred from suing him under the statutory “fellow servant” rule. {See Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11, 29 [6].) 15 The Court found that “the statutory bar of the Workers’ Compensation Law does not constitute the inability to obtain jurisdiction as intended by CPLR 1601,” because the term “jurisdiction” in CPLR 1601 (1) “refers to persona | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Niskegreen1 sentence1997If the settling defendant had not been found to be 50% or less liable, then this case would have presented the least complicated scenario contemplated by General Obligations Law § 15-108, i.e., where there is only one settling defendant and the settlement amount exceeds the settling defendant’s equitable share, then "the nonsettling defendants pay only the difference between the settlement and the verdict, equitably apportioned among them.” (Williams v Niske, 81 NY2d 437, 440 [1993].) However, since both distributor and manufacturer were found less than 50% liable, CPLR 1601 triggers a liabili | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Faragiano v. Town of Concord
green
2 sentences2012We, therefore, respectfully disagree with Justice Tom’s dissent insofar as it posits that “the statutory language [of article 16] clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend apportionment to be predicated on obligations that are . . . nondelegable.” To be sure, the Rangolan Court held that “a municipality that delegates a duty for which the municipality is legally responsible, such as the maintenance of its roads, to an independent contractor remains vicariously liable for the contractor’s negligence, and cannot rely on CPLR 1601 (1) to apportion liability between itself and its cont 2012We, therefore, respectfully disagree with Justice Tom’s dissent insofar as it posits that “the statutory language [of article 16] clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend apportionment to be predicated on obligations that are . . . nondelegable.” To be sure, the Rangolan Court held that “a municipality that delegates a duty for which the municipality is legally responsible, such as the maintenance of its roads, to an independent contractor remains vicariously liable for the contractor’s negligence, and cannot rely on CPLR 1601 (1) to apportion liability between itself and its cont | 3 | 2001–2012 |
Dorkin v. American Express Co.
green
2 sentences2012However, the fundamental difference here is that HHM, like any other agent, is not responsible to third parties for the tortious acts of its principal, the City (see Rusyniak v Gensini, 629 F Supp 2d 203 , 222 and n 41 [ND NY 2009]; Dorkin v American Express Co., 74 Misc 2d 673, 674 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1973], affd 43 AD2d 877 [3d Dept 1974]). 2012However, the fundamental difference here is that HHM, like any other agent, is not responsible to third parties for the tortious acts of its principal, the City (see Rusyniak v Gensini, 629 F Supp 2d 203 , 222 and n 41 [ND NY 2009]; Dorkin v American Express Co., 74 Misc 2d 673, 674 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1973], affd 43 AD2d 877 [3d Dept 1974]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Rusyniak v. Gensini
green
2 sentences2012However, the fundamental difference here is that HHM, like any other agent, is not responsible to third parties for the tortious acts of its principal, the City (see Rusyniak v Gensini, 629 F Supp 2d 203 , 222 and n 41 [ND NY 2009]; Dorkin v American Express Co., 74 Misc 2d 673, 674 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1973], affd 43 AD2d 877 [3d Dept 1974]). 2012However, the fundamental difference here is that HHM, like any other agent, is not responsible to third parties for the tortious acts of its principal, the City (see Rusyniak v Gensini, 629 F Supp 2d 203 , 222 and n 41 [ND NY 2009]; Dorkin v American Express Co., 74 Misc 2d 673, 674 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1973], affd 43 AD2d 877 [3d Dept 1974]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Zakshevsky v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2011This enhanced responsibility arises because the relative culpability of nonparties must now be considered by the trier of the facts in apportioning liability under CPLR 1601, unless the plaintiff is able to prove that he or she was unable, despite the exercise of due diligence, to obtain personal jurisdiction over the nonparty (see, Zakshevsky v City of New York, 149 Misc 2d 52 ). 1994This enhanced responsibility arises because the relative culpability of nonparties must now be considered by the trier of the facts in apportioning liability under CPLR 1601, unless the plaintiff is able to prove that he or she was unable, despite the exercise of due diligence, to obtain personal jurisdiction over the nonparty (see, Zakshevsky v City of New York, 149 Misc 2d 52 ). | 2 | 1994–2011 |
Artibee v. Home Place Corporation
green
1 sentence2018While the law of apportionment of liability under CPLR 1601 has changed since the time of trial ( see Artibee v Home Place Corp. , 28 NY3d 739 [2017], modfg 132 AD3d 96 [3d Dept 2015]), any error in the court's charge allowing such apportionment was harmless, since the jury never reached the issue ( see John W. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Carol Artibee v. Home Place Corporation
green
1 sentence2018While the law of apportionment of liability under CPLR 1601 has changed since the time of trial ( see Artibee v Home Place Corp. , 28 NY3d 739 [2017], modfg 132 AD3d 96 [3d Dept 2015]), any error in the court's charge allowing such apportionment was harmless, since the jury never reached the issue ( see John W. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2012Under such circumstances, the joint and several liability of such a defendant shall not exceed its proportionate share of the total liability for the noneconomic loss (see CPLR 1601 [1]; Rangolan v County of Nassau, 96 NY2d at 46 ; Cole v Mandell Food Stores, 242 AD2d 552 , 554 [1997], affd 93 NY2d 34 [1999]). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Easley v. New York State Thruway Authority
green
1 sentence1997Since the instant situation does not fall within any of the exceptions to CPLR 1601 that are enumerated in CPLR 1602, it was improper for the court to determine that CPLR 1601 did not apply to the appellants on the ground that the policies underlying the enactment of General Obligations Law § 11-100 outweighed the policies underlying the subsequent enactment of CPLR article 16 (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 73, 74, 94; see also, Arbegast v Board of Educ., 65 NY2d 161 , 169; Easley v New York State Thruway Auth., 1 NY2d 374, 379 ; Schrader v Carney, 180 AD2d 200 ; Robinso | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Schrader v. Carney
green
1 sentence1997Since the instant situation does not fall within any of the exceptions to CPLR 1601 that are enumerated in CPLR 1602, it was improper for the court to determine that CPLR 1601 did not apply to the appellants on the ground that the policies underlying the enactment of General Obligations Law § 11-100 outweighed the policies underlying the subsequent enactment of CPLR article 16 (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 73, 74, 94; see also, Arbegast v Board of Educ., 65 NY2d 161 , 169; Easley v New York State Thruway Auth., 1 NY2d 374, 379 ; Schrader v Carney, 180 AD2d 200 ; Robinso | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Washington v. City of New York
green
1 sentence1997If equitable considerations were to play a part, the statute’s effect could unravel into uncertainty.” (Washington v City of New York, 160 Misc 2d, at 232-233 .) Plaintiffs also move to increase the award for future pain and suffering from $4,000 to at least $700,000, and to increase the jury verdict from $800,000 to $1,000,000. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Robinson v. June
green
1 sentence1997Since the instant situation does not fall within any of the exceptions to CPLR 1601 that are enumerated in CPLR 1602, it was improper for the court to determine that CPLR 1601 did not apply to the appellants on the ground that the policies underlying the enactment of General Obligations Law § 11-100 outweighed the policies underlying the subsequent enactment of CPLR article 16 (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 73, 74, 94; see also, Arbegast v Board of Educ., 65 NY2d 161 , 169; Easley v New York State Thruway Auth., 1 NY2d 374, 379 ; Schrader v Carney, 180 AD2d 200 ; Robinso | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Siler v. 146 Montague Associates
green
1 sentence1997CPLR 1601 limits the liability of a defendant found to be 50% or less at fault in causing the plaintiffs noneconomic losses to that defendant’s share of the fault (see, CPLR 1601; Siler v 146 Montague Assocs., 228 AD2d 33 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp.
green
1 sentence1996"Under CPLR article 16, a joint tortfeasor whose culpability is 50% or less is not jointly liable for all of plaintiff’s noneconomic damages, but severally liable for its proportionate share (CPLR 1601 [1])” (Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d 540, 554 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lake v. Watertown National Bank
neutral
1 sentence1989Bank, 31 Misc 2d 336 [1961].) It should be noted that even if the accident occurred after July 30, 1986, despite CPLR 1601 limiting liability for noneconomic losses of persons jointly liable, the City would still be severally and jointly liable for plaintiff’s personal injuries since the City was found to be more than 50% liable. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.