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12 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gomezgreen2 sentences1983See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 , 102 S.Ct. 1439 , 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, supra; People v. Weisenberger, supra. In our opinion the defendant’s privacy expectation, when measured against this dual standard, qualifies for constitutional protection under Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. 1982See People v. Gomez, Colo., 632 P.2d 586 (1981); People v. Becker, 188 Colo. 160 , 533 P.2d 494 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1996People v. Johnson, 865 P.2d 836, 842 (Colo.1994). 1996Id. ; see generally 4 Wayne R. | 1 | 3 |
Outlaw v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2025Arrests and investigatory stops are “seizures implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article II, section 7.” Outlaw v. People, 17 P.3d 150, 154 (Colo. 2001). ¶ 18 An investigatory stop is less intrusive than an arrest and is “justified upon reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the detainee is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and is limited in scope to a brief detention to confirm or dispel that suspicion.” People v. Fields, 2018 CO 2 , ¶ 12. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences1997See Hill, 929 P.2d at 738-39 . 1997See Hill, 929 P.2d at 738-39 . | 1 | 1 |
Gomez v. Coloradogreen2 sentences1983See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 , 102 S.Ct. 1439 , 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, supra; People v. Weisenberger, supra. In our opinion the defendant’s privacy expectation, when measured against this dual standard, qualifies for constitutional protection under Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. 1983See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 , 102 S.Ct. 1439 , 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, supra; People v. Weisenberger, supra. In our opinion the defendant’s privacy expectation, when measured against this dual standard, qualifies for constitutional protection under Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Chavez-Barragan
green
1 sentence2025When assessing the reasonableness of an investigatory stop, courts consider “(1) the length of the detention; (2) whether the officer diligently pursued the basis for the initial stop; (3) whether the suspect was required to move from one location to another; and (4) whether there were alternative, less intrusive means available.” People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 66, ¶ 22 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Fields
green
1 sentence2025Arrests and investigatory stops are “seizures implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article II, section 7.” Outlaw v. People, 17 P.3d 150, 154 (Colo. 2001). ¶ 18 An investigatory stop is less intrusive than an arrest and is “justified upon reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the detainee is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and is limited in scope to a brief detention to confirm or dispel that suspicion.” People v. Fields, 2018 CO 2 , ¶ 12. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Jackson
red
1 sentence2002Jackson, 39 P.3d at 1179 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co.
green
2 sentences2001Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 200 , 90 S.Ct. 872 , 25 L.Ed.2d 218 (1970); San Diego Bldg. 2001Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 200 , 90 S.Ct. 872 , 25 L.Ed.2d 218 (1970); San Diego Bldg. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Trujillo
green
1 sentence1994In Trujillo , we defined the “consensual interview” as “ ‘that in which no restraint of the liberty of the citizen is implicated, but the voluntary cooperation of the citizen is elicited through non-coercive questioning.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Miller
red
2 sentences1984In Charnes this court held that a bank customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy under Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution in the bank records of his financial transactions. [16] But cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 , 96 S.Ct. 1619 , 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (no such expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 1984In Charnes this court held that a bank customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy under Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution in the bank records of his financial transactions. [16] But cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 , 96 S.Ct. 1619 , 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (no such expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Smith v. Maryland
red
2 sentences1983A. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979), the United States Supreme Court considered “whether the installation and use of a pen register constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 736 , 99 S.Ct. at 2578 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 224 . 1983A. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979), the United States Supreme Court considered “whether the installation and use of a pen register constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 736 , 99 S.Ct. at 2578 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 224 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Becker
green
2 sentences1982See People v. Gomez, Colo., 632 P.2d 586 (1981); People v. Becker, 188 Colo. 160 , 533 P.2d 494 (1975). 1982See People v. Gomez, Colo., 632 P.2d 586 (1981); People v. Becker, 188 Colo. 160 , 533 P.2d 494 (1975). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Denver, South Park & Pacific Railroad v. Roberts
neutral
2 sentences1942Denver Co. *Page 292 v. Roberts, supra. The bringing of an action in the improper precinct is not a fatal jurisdictional defect where the justice of peace court, as in the case at bar, has general jurisdiction of the subject matter under section 7, chapter 96, '35 C.S.A., which confers countrywide jurisdiction in various kinds of proceedings, including actions on contract where the amount involved does not exceed $300.00, and section 14 fixing the venue in the precinct of the debtor's residence confers a mere personal privilege which may be waived by his failure to claim it in the justice of p 1942Denver Co. v. Roberts, supra. The bringing of an action in the improper precinct is not a fatal jurisdictional defect where the justice of peace court, as in the case at bar, has general jurisdiction of the subject matter under section 7,’ chapter 96, ’35 C.S.A., which confers countrywide jurisdiction in various kinds of proceedings, including actions on contract where the amount involved does not exceed $300.00, and section 14 fixing the venue in the precinct of the debtor’s residence confers a mere personal privilege which may be. waived by his failure to claim it in the justice of peace cou | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.