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12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nagel v. Stategreen2 sentences2012J., and Doyle, P. J., concur. 1 Notably, “[t]he trial court, rather than mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release under OCGA § 17-7-131.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nagel, supra, 262 Ga. at 889 (1). 2012J., and Doyle, P. J., concur. 1 Notably, “[t]he trial court, rather than mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release under OCGA § 17-7-131.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nagel, supra, 262 Ga. at 889 (1). | 3 | 4 |
Loftin v. Stategreen2 sentences1993Loftin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 613, 615 ( 349 SE2d 777 ) (1986). 1993Loftin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 613, 615 ( 349 SE2d 777 ) (1986). | 3 | 3 |
NELOR v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Nelor, supra, 309 Ga. App. at 166 . | 1 | 1 |
Nagel v. Stategreen2 sentences2009OCGA § 37-3-1 (9.1) provides that a mentally ill person continues to require inpatient involuntary treatment if the person presents a substantial risk of imminent harm to themselves or others, or is so unable to care for their own physical health and safety as to create an imminently life-endangering crisis, and is in need of involuntary inpatient treatment. 2 See Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892-893 (2) (b) ( 427 SE2d 490 ) (1993) (“Nagel I”). 3 Id. at 892 (2) (b). 4 Id. 5 Nagel v. State, 264 Ga. 150, 152 (2) ( 442 SE2d 446 ) (1994) (the trial court, not mental health professionals, has the r 2009OCGA § 37-3-1 (9.1) provides that a mentally ill person continues to require inpatient involuntary treatment if the person presents a substantial risk of imminent harm to themselves or others, or is so unable to care for their own physical health and safety as to create an imminently life-endangering crisis, and is in need of involuntary inpatient treatment. 2 See Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892-893 (2) (b) ( 427 SE2d 490 ) (1993) (“Nagel I”). 3 Id. at 892 (2) (b). 4 Id. 5 Nagel v. State, 264 Ga. 150, 152 (2) ( 442 SE2d 446 ) (1994) (the trial court, not mental health professionals, has the r | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See OCGA § 9-11-52 (c); Waters v. Ellzey, 290 Ga. App. 693 ( 660 SE2d 392 ) (2008); Ruff v. Central State Hosp., 192 Ga. App. 631, 632 (1) ( 385 SE2d 734 ) (1989). 3 “[T]he presumption of continued insanity applies to initial commitment hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (e) as well as to subsequent release hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f).” Williams, 185 Ga. App. at 560 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Ruff v. Central State Hospitalgreen2 sentences2009See OCGA § 9-11-52 (c); Waters v. Ellzey, 290 Ga. App. 693 ( 660 SE2d 392 ) (2008); Ruff v. Central State Hosp., 192 Ga. App. 631, 632 (1) ( 385 SE2d 734 ) (1989). 3 “[T]he presumption of continued insanity applies to initial commitment hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (e) as well as to subsequent release hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f).” Williams, 185 Ga. App. at 560 (1). 2009See OCGA § 9-11-52 (c); Waters v. Ellzey, 290 Ga. App. 693 ( 660 SE2d 392 ) (2008); Ruff v. Central State Hosp., 192 Ga. App. 631, 632 (1) ( 385 SE2d 734 ) (1989). 3 “[T]he presumption of continued insanity applies to initial commitment hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (e) as well as to subsequent release hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f).” Williams, 185 Ga. App. at 560 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Our Supreme Court has specifically held that “[t]he superior court, and not mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release under OCGA § 17-7-131. [Cit.]” Butler v. State, 258 Ga. 344, 345 (1) ( 369 SE2d 252 ) (1988). 1989Our Supreme Court has specifically held that “[t]he superior court, and not mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release under OCGA § 17-7-131. [Cit.]” Butler v. State, 258 Ga. 344, 345 (1) ( 369 SE2d 252 ) (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1988Further, we are satisfied that such a presumption is sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment to a mental institution without violating appellant’s due process rights; see Jones v. United States, 463 U. S. 354 (103 SC 3043, 77 LE2d 694). | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. Stategreen2 sentences1988See Arnold v. State, 173 Ga. App. 839 ( 328 SE2d 572 ). 1988See Arnold v. State, 173 Ga. App. 839 ( 328 SE2d 572 ). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Stategreen2 sentences1984This contention is controlled adversely to appellant by Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 643-46 ( 266 SE2d 466 ) (1980), in which the Supreme Court held that in release proceedings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (former Code Ann. § 27-1503) an insanity acquittee, such as appellant in the case at bar, is not denied due process and equal protection of the law by being required to bear the burden of proving his fitness for release while other persons who are civilly committed are not. 1984This contention is controlled adversely to appellant by Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 643-46 ( 266 SE2d 466 ) (1980), in which the Supreme Court held that in release proceedings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (former Code Ann. § 27-1503) an insanity acquittee, such as appellant in the case at bar, is not denied due process and equal protection of the law by being required to bear the burden of proving his fitness for release while other persons who are civilly committed are not. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sikes v. State
green
1 sentence2023In Sikes, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the options available to a trial court following a defendant’s conditional release under OCGA § 17-7-131 (e) (5). 268 Ga. 19 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Waters v. Ellzey
green
2 sentences2009See OCGA § 9-11-52 (c); Waters v. Ellzey, 290 Ga. App. 693 ( 660 SE2d 392 ) (2008); Ruff v. Central State Hosp., 192 Ga. App. 631, 632 (1) ( 385 SE2d 734 ) (1989). 3 “[T]he presumption of continued insanity applies to initial commitment hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (e) as well as to subsequent release hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f).” Williams, 185 Ga. App. at 560 (1). 2009See OCGA § 9-11-52 (c); Waters v. Ellzey, 290 Ga. App. 693 ( 660 SE2d 392 ) (2008); Ruff v. Central State Hosp., 192 Ga. App. 631, 632 (1) ( 385 SE2d 734 ) (1989). 3 “[T]he presumption of continued insanity applies to initial commitment hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (e) as well as to subsequent release hearings under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f).” Williams, 185 Ga. App. at 560 (1). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hogan v. Nagel
green
1 sentence2003Hogan v. Nagel, supra, 273 Ga. at 578-579 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.