section 5-5-3.2(a) factor in Illinois

2019People v. Alexander , 239 Ill. 2d 205 , 212, 346 Ill.Dec. 458 , 940 N.E.2d 1062 (2010). ¶ 108 We address first defendant's complaint that the trial court unduly emphasized one of the aggravating factors in section 5-5-3.2(a) of the Code ( 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a) (West 2016) ), namely, whether "the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm." Defendant claims that this "was the only factor present in aggravation, out of 30 factors." Defendant misconceives the relevance of section 5-5-3.2(a) here.

2019People v. Alexander , 239 Ill. 2d 205 , 212, 346 Ill.Dec. 458 , 940 N.E.2d 1062 (2010). ¶ 108 We address first defendant's complaint that the trial court unduly emphasized one of the aggravating factors in section 5-5-3.2(a) of the Code ( 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a) (West 2016) ), namely, whether "the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm." Defendant claims that this "was the only factor present in aggravation, out of 30 factors." Defendant misconceives the relevance of section 5-5-3.2(a) here.

2025See Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 347-48 . ¶ 170 Even if the violation of Apprendi or section 111-3(c-5) were regarded as a - 47 - sentencing issue instead of (as in Crespo) a trial issue, defense counsel’s contemporaneous objection contained no mention of Apprendi or section 111-3(c-5) with reference to count I when, at the beginning of the reconvened sentencing hearing, the prosecutor invoked the aggravating factor in section 5-5-3.2(a)(2).

2025In People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347-48 (2001), the supreme court held that if the “defendant did not object at the time of trial,” “the proper inquiry” was “whether the Apprendi violation constituted ‘plain error,’ ”—more precisely, plain error that “was prejudicial.” The implication of that holding in Crespo is that, because of the lack of an Apprendi objection at trial, there was a procedural forfeiture that the defendant would have to undo through the plain-error doctrine. ¶ 169 The question might be raised, though, when the State called Moore to testify to how fast the crash data ret

2024People v. Williams, 303 Ill.

2023See People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d 870, 881 (1994). ¶ 17 Our supreme court disagreed with the defendant, holding that consideration of a defendant’s criminal history as an aggravating factor under section 5-5-3.2(a)(3) “does not constitute an enhancement.” Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 225, 229 .

2023Id. at 224 .

2023See People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d 870, 881 (1994). ¶ 17 Our supreme court disagreed with the defendant, holding that consideration of a defendant’s criminal history as an aggravating factor under section 5-5-3.2(a)(3) “does not constitute an enhancement.” Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 225, 229 .

2016We disagree. ¶ 17 In People v. Moore, 266 Ill.

2011See People v. Peterson, 227 Ill.App.3d 20, 24 , 169 Ill.Dec. 16 , 590 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1992) (where section 5-5-3.2(a)(2) applied because the defendant received between $60 and $80 before the drug transaction took place). ¶ 15 While the proceeds of the crime are not an aggravating factor under section 5-5-3.2(a)(2), they can be proper considerations at sentencing when the proceeds relate to such things as the extent and nature of a defendant's involvement in a particular criminal enterprise, a defendant's underlying motivation for committing the offense, the likelihood of the defendant's commi

2011See People v. Peterson, 227 Ill.App.3d 20, 24 , 169 Ill.Dec. 16 , 590 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1992) (where section 5-5-3.2(a)(2) applied because the defendant received between $60 and $80 before the drug transaction took place). ¶ 15 While the proceeds of the crime are not an aggravating factor under section 5-5-3.2(a)(2), they can be proper considerations at sentencing when the proceeds relate to such things as the extent and nature of a defendant's involvement in a particular criminal enterprise, a defendant's underlying motivation for committing the offense, the likelihood of the defendant's commi

1997App. 3d 708, 714 , 672 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (1996)), we find no justi­fi­ca­tion for conclud­ing that the sentenc­ing court may consider the aggra­vating factors in section 5-5-3.2(b) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b) (West 1994)) only when the court imposes an extended-term sen­tence and may not consider these factors at all when imposing a nonextended-term sentence.