section 29-1207(4) good cause in Nebraska

2018Referencing § 29-1207(4)(f), the court found that judicial delay, absent a showing of good cause, does not *665 suspend a defendant's right to a speedy trial. "[A] court cannot table a motion and thereby suspend the defendant's right where judicial delay [without a showing of good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f) ] *862 would otherwise warrant discharge." State v. Wilcox, 224 Neb. at 143 , 395 N.W.2d at 775 .

2018Referencing § 29-1207(4)(f), the court found that judicial delay, absent a showing of good cause, does not *665 suspend a defendant's right to a speedy trial. "[A] court cannot table a motion and thereby suspend the defendant's right where judicial delay [without a showing of good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f) ] *862 would otherwise warrant discharge." State v. Wilcox, 224 Neb. at 143 , 395 N.W.2d at 775 .

1997In addressing the time period after the substituted judge had been assigned to the case, we stated that a court cannot table a motion and thereby suspend the defendant’s rights where judicial delay without a showing of good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f) would otherwise warrant discharge. *629 In State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362 , 405 N.W.2d 576 (1987), we clarified Wilcox by pointing out that where the excludable period properly falls under § 29-1207(4)(a) rather than the catchall provision of § 29-1207(4)(f), no showing of reasonableness or good cause is necessary to exclude the delay.

1997In addressing the time period after the substituted judge had been assigned to the case, we stated that a court cannot table a motion and thereby suspend the defendant’s rights where judicial delay without a showing of good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f) would otherwise warrant discharge. *629 In State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362 , 405 N.W.2d 576 (1987), we clarified Wilcox by pointing out that where the excludable period properly falls under § 29-1207(4)(a) rather than the catchall provision of § 29-1207(4)(f), no showing of reasonableness or good cause is necessary to exclude the delay.

2025See, also, State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 , 202 N.W.2d 604 (1972) (requiring specific findings of existence of good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f)). 24 State v. McKenna, 228 Neb. 29 , 421 N.W.2d 19 (1988). - 575 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 319 Nebraska Reports STATE V.

2025See, also, State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 , 202 N.W.2d 604 (1972) (requiring specific findings of existence of good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f)). 24 State v. McKenna, 228 Neb. 29 , 421 N.W.2d 19 (1988). - 575 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 319 Nebraska Reports STATE V.

2021Stat. § 29-3805 (Reissue 2016). 31 State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 237 , 888 N.W.2d 153, 157 (2016). 32 Id. 33 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). 34 See State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245 , 609 N.W.2d 349 (2000). 35 State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386 , 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980). 36 See id. - 766 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports STATE v. COOMES will give deference to such factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 37 With these principles in mind, we consider the district court’s factual findings of good cause.

2021Stat. § 29-3805 (Reissue 2016). 31 State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 237 , 888 N.W.2d 153, 157 (2016). 32 Id. 33 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). 34 See State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245 , 609 N.W.2d 349 (2000). 35 State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386 , 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980). 36 See id. - 766 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports STATE v. COOMES will give deference to such factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 37 With these principles in mind, we consider the district court’s factual findings of good cause.

2021Immediately after appointing replacement defense counsel on February 11, 2020, the court advised Coomes it would 41 Feldhacker, supra note 37 , 267 Neb. at 155, 672 N.W.2d at 635 (explaining that “[t]he phrase ‘period of delay’ in § 29-1207(4)(f ) refers to a specified period of time in which trial did not commence”). 42 State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 850 , 932 N.W.2d 64, 69 (2019). 43 See, e.g., State v. Craig, 15 Neb. App. 836 , 739 N.W.2d 206 (2007) (finding “good cause” under § 29-1207(4)(f ) to exclude time between appointment of public defender and counsel’s first appearance when defend

2021Immediately after appointing replacement defense counsel on February 11, 2020, the court advised Coomes it would 41 Feldhacker, supra note 37 , 267 Neb. at 155, 672 N.W.2d at 635 (explaining that “[t]he phrase ‘period of delay’ in § 29-1207(4)(f ) refers to a specified period of time in which trial did not commence”). 42 State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 850 , 932 N.W.2d 64, 69 (2019). 43 See, e.g., State v. Craig, 15 Neb. App. 836 , 739 N.W.2d 206 (2007) (finding “good cause” under § 29-1207(4)(f ) to exclude time between appointment of public defender and counsel’s first appearance when defend

2021Stat. § 29-3805 (Reissue 2016). 31 State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 237 , 888 N.W.2d 153, 157 (2016). 32 Id. 33 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). 34 See State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245 , 609 N.W.2d 349 (2000). 35 State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386 , 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980). 36 See id. - 766 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports STATE v. COOMES will give deference to such factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 37 With these principles in mind, we consider the district court’s factual findings of good cause.

2021Stat. § 29-3805 (Reissue 2016). 31 State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 237 , 888 N.W.2d 153, 157 (2016). 32 Id. 33 State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 , 895 N.W.2d 710 (2017). 34 See State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245 , 609 N.W.2d 349 (2000). 35 State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386 , 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980). 36 See id. - 766 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports STATE v. COOMES will give deference to such factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 37 With these principles in mind, we consider the district court’s factual findings of good cause.

2015See, State v. Covey, 267 Neb. 210 , 673 N.W.2d 208 (2004); State v. Turner, supra; State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362 , 405 N.W.2d 576 (1987), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433 , 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990).

2015See, State v. Covey, 267 Neb. 210 , 673 N.W.2d 208 (2004); State v. Turner, supra; State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362 , 405 N.W.2d 576 (1987), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433 , 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990).

2004Thus, in State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 872 , 652 N.W.2d 612, 617 (2002), we pointed out that “§ 29-1207(4)(f) provides that other periods of delay may be excluded if the court finds they are for good cause.” See, also, State v. Recek, 263 Neb. 644 , 641 N.W.2d 391 (2002) (noting that under § 29-1207(4)(f), State did not sustain its burden to show good cause for delay).

2004Thus, in State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 872 , 652 N.W.2d 612, 617 (2002), we pointed out that “§ 29-1207(4)(f) provides that other periods of delay may be excluded if the court finds they are for good cause.” See, also, State v. Recek, 263 Neb. 644 , 641 N.W.2d 391 (2002) (noting that under § 29-1207(4)(f), State did not sustain its burden to show good cause for delay).

2002App. 758 , 532 N.W.2d 338 (1995).

2002The *843 court also excluded the extra 20 days for good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f) because Hayes’ trial “could not have started before June 21,1999 (unless the Court were to call a special jury term).” The defendant must accept delay as a consequence of making pretrial motions for purposes of the speedy trial statute, where the delay is not inordinate or unreasonable. § 29-1207(4)(a); State v. Borland, 3 Neb.

1998See, also, State v. Sumstine, 239 Neb. 707 , 478 N.W.2d 240 (1991); State v. Craig, 219 Neb. 70 , 361 N.W.2d 206 (1985) (indicating that time consumed in obtaining depositions at request of defendant, in absence of impermissible conduct by state delaying depositions, should be excluded).

1998See, also, State v. Sumstine, 239 Neb. 707 , 478 N.W.2d 240 (1991); State v. Craig, 219 Neb. 70 , 361 N.W.2d 206 (1985) (indicating that time consumed in obtaining depositions at request of defendant, in absence of impermissible conduct by state delaying depositions, should be excluded).

1998This court agreed with the trial court that “[t]he delay regarding the depositions was not attributable to any negligence or misconduct on the part of the State,” id. at 778 , 336 N.W.2d at 102 , and held that “[a]ny delay in trial was attributable to the depositions, and such delay was for ‘good cause’ under § 29-1207(4)(f),” id. at 779, 336 N.W.2d at 103 .

1998This court agreed with the trial court that “[t]he delay regarding the depositions was not attributable to any negligence or misconduct on the part of the State,” id. at 778 , 336 N.W.2d at 102 , and held that “[a]ny delay in trial was attributable to the depositions, and such delay was for ‘good cause’ under § 29-1207(4)(f),” id. at 779, 336 N.W.2d at 103 .