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11 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harrell v. Harriet & Henderson Yarnsgreen2 sentences1999See Harrell v. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, 314 N.C. 566, 575 , 336 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1985). 1999See Harrell v. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, 314 N.C. 566, 575 , 336 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1985). | 2 | 2 |
Gupton v. Builders Transportgreen2 sentences2008See Gupton, 320 N.C. at 43 , 357 S.E.2d at 678 (“[B]ecause the prevention of double recovery, not exclusivity of remedy, is patently tire intent of the ‘in lieu of all other compensation’ clause in N.C.G.S. § 97-31, a plaintiff entitled to select a remedy under either N.C.G.S. § 97-31 or N.C.G.S. § 97-30 may receive benefits under the provisions offering the more generous benefits, less the amount he or she has already received.”). 2008See Gupton, 320 N.C. at 43 , 357 S.E.2d at 678 (“[B]ecause the prevention of double recovery, not exclusivity of remedy, is patently tire intent of the ‘in lieu of all other compensation’ clause in N.C.G.S. § 97-31, a plaintiff entitled to select a remedy under either N.C.G.S. § 97-31 or N.C.G.S. § 97-30 may receive benefits under the provisions offering the more generous benefits, less the amount he or she has already received.”). | 1 | 2 |
Knight v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green1 sentence2017App. at 11 , 562 S.E.2d at 442 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 "is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power," and terminates when a plaintiff has reached "maximum improvement." Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C.App. 228, 235 , 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998) (Timmons Goodson, J. dissenting) ("maximum medical improvement, by definition, means that the employee's healing period has ended"), reversed, 350 N.C. 63 , 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (per curiam adopting the dissent); see also Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 322, 328 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 288 ( 2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 "is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power," and terminates when a plaintiff has reached "maximum improvement." Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C.App. 228, 235 , 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998) (Timmons Goodson, J. dissenting) ("maximum medical improvement, by definition, means that the employee's healing period has ended"), reversed, 350 N.C. 63 , 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (per curiam adopting the dissent); see also Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 322, 328 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 288 ( | 1 | 1 |
Neal v. Carolina Managementgreen2 sentences2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 "is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power," and terminates when a plaintiff has reached "maximum improvement." Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C.App. 228, 235 , 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998) (Timmons Goodson, J. dissenting) ("maximum medical improvement, by definition, means that the employee's healing period has ended"), reversed, 350 N.C. 63 , 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (per curiam adopting the dissent); see also Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 322, 328 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 288 ( 2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 "is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power," and terminates when a plaintiff has reached "maximum improvement." Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C.App. 228, 235 , 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998) (Timmons Goodson, J. dissenting) ("maximum medical improvement, by definition, means that the employee's healing period has ended"), reversed, 350 N.C. 63 , 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (per curiam adopting the dissent); see also Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 322, 328 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 288 ( | 1 | 1 |
Neal v. Carolina Managementgreen2 sentences2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 "is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power," and terminates when a plaintiff has reached "maximum improvement." Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C.App. 228, 235 , 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998) (Timmons Goodson, J. dissenting) ("maximum medical improvement, by definition, means that the employee's healing period has ended"), reversed, 350 N.C. 63 , 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (per curiam adopting the dissent); see also Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 322, 328 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 288 ( 2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 "is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power," and terminates when a plaintiff has reached "maximum improvement." Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C.App. 228, 235 , 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998) (Timmons Goodson, J. dissenting) ("maximum medical improvement, by definition, means that the employee's healing period has ended"), reversed, 350 N.C. 63 , 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (per curiam adopting the dissent); see also Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 322, 328 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 288 ( | 1 | 1 |
Gupton v. Builders Transportgreen2 sentences1987App. 1, 4 , 348 S.E. 2d 601, 602 (1986). 1987One Commissioner dissented, opining that the majority had erred in awarding the plaintiff compensation under N.C.G.S. § 97-31; instead, it should have awarded compensation under N.C.G.S. § 97-30 “because the evidence clearly and indisputably proves his partial incapacity to earn wages as a result of his injury.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s award, declining to exclude from the definition of “loss of vision,” for which N.C.G.S. § 97-31(19) provides compensation, partial loss of “field of vision.” The opinion relied upon case law from that court in noting that “where all of the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Derebery v. Pitt County Fire Marshall
green
2 sentences1997The undersigned is of the opinion and concludes as a matter of law that in light of the Supreme Court decision in 318 N.C. 192 reversing the Court of Appeals and affirming the Industrial Commission's interpretation of Section 97-25 of the Act that accommodations are to be made accessible to the claimant, that plaintiff is entitled to have defendant pay for adding to plaintiff's new home those accessories necessary to accommodate plaintiff's disabilities. 1995The undersigned is of the opinion and concludes as a matter of law that in light of the Supreme Court decision in 318 N.C. 192 reversing the Court of Appeals and affirming the Industrial Commission's interpretation of Section 97-25 of the Act that accommodations are to be made accessible to the claimant, that plaintiff is entitled to have defendant pay for adding to plaintiff's new home those accessories necessary to accommodate plaintiff's disabilities. | 2 | 1995–1997 |
Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders
green
1 sentence2008Our Supreme Court stated that the Commission employee “apparently assumed, rather than determined, that [the] plaintiff was knowledgeable about workers’ compensation benefits, and, particularly, his right to claim permanent total disability compensation under section 97-29 rather than permanent partial disability compensation under section 97-31.” Id. at 434 , 444 S.E.2d at 195-96 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Crawley v. Southern Devices, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 "is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power," and terminates when a plaintiff has reached "maximum improvement." Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C.App. 228, 235 , 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998) (Timmons Goodson, J. dissenting) ("maximum medical improvement, by definition, means that the employee's healing period has ended"), reversed, 350 N.C. 63 , 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (per curiam adopting the dissent); see also Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 322, 328 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 288 ( 2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 “is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power,” and terminates when a plaintiff has reached “maximum improvement.” Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Crawley v. Southern Devices, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 "is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power," and terminates when a plaintiff has reached "maximum improvement." Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C.App. 228, 235 , 502 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1998) (Timmons Goodson, J. dissenting) ("maximum medical improvement, by definition, means that the employee's healing period has ended"), reversed, 350 N.C. 63 , 510 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (per curiam adopting the dissent); see also Royce v. Rushco Food Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 322, 328 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 288 ( 2001Crawley , however, holds compensation under section 97-31 “is made without regard to the loss of wage-earning power,” and terminates when a plaintiff has reached “maximum improvement.” Id. at 290 , 229 S.E.2d at 329 ; see Neal v. Carolina Mgmt., 130 N.C. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co.
green
1 sentence1996Whitley v. Columbia Lumber , 318 N.C. 89 (1986). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.