section 1983 malicious prosecution claim in New York

2016Further, a governmental entity “cannot be liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution under 42 USC § 1983 unless an official government policy, custom or widespread practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights” (Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d at 762 ; see Combs v City of New York, 130 AD3d 862, 865 [2015]; Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 847 [2011]).

2012Under 42 USC § 1983 , a party may pursue a civil claim for damages and injunctive relief against any person who acts under color of state law to deprive that party of a constitutional right (see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 846 [2011]). "[T]o sustain a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, there must be a seizure or other perversion of proper legal procedures implicating the claimant’s personal liberty and privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment” (Washington v County of Rock-land, 373 F3d 310 , 316 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Albright v Oliver, 510 US 266

2020However, "the government itself cannot be liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution under 42 USC § 1983 unless an official government policy, custom or widespread practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights" ( id. ; see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs. , 436 US 658 ).

2016However, as will be discussed in detail hereinafter, the government itself cannot be liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution under 42 USC § 1983 unless an official government policy, custom or widespread practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights (Monell, 436 US at 694, 701 ; Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 385 [1989]).

2012Here, the Village defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 42 USC § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action by demonstrating that the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff was commenced with a prearraignment, nonfelony summons which subsequently required the plaintiff to appear in court on five occasions without imposing any additional restrictions on her liberty or travel (see Parkash v Town of Southeast, 2011 WL 5142669 , *5-6, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 128545 , *14-16 [SD NY], affd 468 Fed Appx 80 [2d Cir]; Burg v Gosselin, 591 F3d 9

2012Here, the Village defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 42 USC § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action by demonstrating that the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff was commenced with a prearraignment, nonfelony summons which subsequently required the plaintiff to appear in court on five occasions without imposing any additional restrictions on her liberty or travel (see Parkash v Town of Southeast, 2011 WL 5142669 , *5-6, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 128545 , *14-16 [SD NY], affd 468 Fed Appx 80 [2d Cir]; Burg v Gosselin, 591 F3d 9

2012Under 42 USC § 1983 , a party may pursue a civil claim for damages and injunctive relief against any person who acts under color of state law to deprive that party of a constitutional right (see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 846 [2011]). "[T]o sustain a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, there must be a seizure or other perversion of proper legal procedures implicating the claimant’s personal liberty and privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment” (Washington v County of Rock-land, 373 F3d 310 , 316 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Albright v Oliver, 510 US 266

2012Under 42 USC § 1983 , a party may pursue a civil claim for damages and injunctive relief against any person who acts under color of state law to deprive that party of a constitutional right (see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 846 [2011]). "[T]o sustain a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, there must be a seizure or other perversion of proper legal procedures implicating the claimant’s personal liberty and privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment” (Washington v County of Rock-land, 373 F3d 310 , 316 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Albright v Oliver, 510 US 266

2012Here, the Village defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 42 USC § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action by demonstrating that the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff was commenced with a prearraignment, nonfelony summons which subsequently required the plaintiff to appear in court on five occasions without imposing any additional restrictions on her liberty or travel (see Parkash v Town of Southeast, 2011 WL 5142669 , *5-6, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 128545 , *14-16 [SD NY], affd 468 Fed Appx 80 [2d Cir]; Burg v Gosselin, 591 F3d 9

2012Here, the Village defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 42 USC § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action by demonstrating that the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff was commenced with a prearraignment, nonfelony summons which subsequently required the plaintiff to appear in court on five occasions without imposing any additional restrictions on her liberty or travel (see Parkash v Town of Southeast, 2011 WL 5142669 , *5-6, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 128545 , *14-16 [SD NY], affd 468 Fed Appx 80 [2d Cir]; Burg v Gosselin, 591 F3d 9

2020Here, in opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged unconstitutional actions resulted from an official policy, regulation, or custom ( see Combs v City of New York , 130 AD3d 862, 865 ).

2016Further, a governmental entity “cannot be liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution under 42 USC § 1983 unless an official government policy, custom or widespread practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights” (Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d at 762 ; see Combs v City of New York, 130 AD3d 862, 865 [2015]; Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 847 [2011]).

2016However, as will be discussed in detail hereinafter, the government itself cannot be liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution under 42 USC § 1983 unless an official government policy, custom or widespread practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights (Monell, 436 US at 694, 701 ; Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 385 [1989]).

2016Here, the law firm established, prima facie, that even if it had timely asserted a cause of action to recover damages for malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 in the federal action, the plaintiff would not have been successful on the merits, since the plaintiffs conviction and a judicial determination of probable cause in the underlying criminal proceeding created a presumption of the existence of probable cause for that criminal proceeding (see Knox v County of Putnam, 2012 WL 4462011 , *4, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 139586 , *16 [SD NY, Sept. 27, 2012, No. 10-Civ-1671 (ER)]; Passucci v Ho

2016Here, the law firm established, prima facie, that even if it had timely asserted a cause of action to recover damages for malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 in the federal action, the plaintiff would not have been successful on the merits, since the plaintiffs conviction and a judicial determination of probable cause in the underlying criminal proceeding created a presumption of the existence of probable cause for that criminal proceeding (see Knox v County of Putnam, 2012 WL 4462011 , *4, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 139586 , *16 [SD NY, Sept. 27, 2012, No. 10-Civ-1671 (ER)]; Passucci v Ho

2016Here, the law firm established, prima facie, that even if it had timely asserted a cause of action to recover damages for malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 in the federal action, the plaintiff would not have been successful on the merits, since the plaintiffs conviction and a judicial determination of probable cause in the underlying criminal proceeding created a presumption of the existence of probable cause for that criminal proceeding (see Knox v County of Putnam, 2012 WL 4462011 , *4, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 139586 , *16 [SD NY, Sept. 27, 2012, No. 10-Civ-1671 (ER)]; Passucci v Ho

2016Here, the law firm established, prima facie, that even if it had timely asserted a cause of action to recover damages for malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 in the federal action, the plaintiff would not have been successful on the merits, since the plaintiffs conviction and a judicial determination of probable cause in the underlying criminal proceeding created a presumption of the existence of probable cause for that criminal proceeding (see Knox v County of Putnam, 2012 WL 4462011 , *4, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 139586 , *16 [SD NY, Sept. 27, 2012, No. 10-Civ-1671 (ER)]; Passucci v Ho

2016The City demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution by establishing that the undisputed essential facts underlying the arrest gave rise to probable cause to believe that the plaintiff intentionally aided in the commission of a gunpoint robbery and knowingly possessed stolen property (see Penal Law §§ 20.00, 160.15 [2]; 165.45 [2]; People v Haynes, 16 AD3d 434, 435 [2005]; People v Sanchez, 216 AD2d 207, 208 [1995]; People v Gleeson, 161 AD2d 902 [1990]; People v Byrd, 156

2016In Lee v Edwards ( 101 F3d 805, 812-813 [2d Cir 1996]), the plaintiff’s $200,000 punitive damage award, solely for his section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, was found to be excessive and reduced to $75,000.

2016Considering the aforementioned law in the context of a summary judgment motion, the defendant moving for summary judgment must establish a defense to the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and false arrest claims as a matter of law by submitting sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues *763 of fact (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 49 [2015]; Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps.

2016The City demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution by establishing that the undisputed essential facts underlying the arrest gave rise to probable cause to believe that the plaintiff intentionally aided in the commission of a gunpoint robbery and knowingly possessed stolen property (see Penal Law §§ 20.00, 160.15 [2]; 165.45 [2]; People v Haynes, 16 AD3d 434, 435 [2005]; People v Sanchez, 216 AD2d 207, 208 [1995]; People v Gleeson, 161 AD2d 902 [1990]; People v Byrd, 156

2016The City demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution by establishing that the undisputed essential facts underlying the arrest gave rise to probable cause to believe that the plaintiff intentionally aided in the commission of a gunpoint robbery and knowingly possessed stolen property (see Penal Law §§ 20.00, 160.15 [2]; 165.45 [2]; People v Haynes, 16 AD3d 434, 435 [2005]; People v Sanchez, 216 AD2d 207, 208 [1995]; People v Gleeson, 161 AD2d 902 [1990]; People v Byrd, 156

2016The City demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution by establishing that the undisputed essential facts underlying the arrest gave rise to probable cause to believe that the plaintiff intentionally aided in the commission of a gunpoint robbery and knowingly possessed stolen property (see Penal Law §§ 20.00, 160.15 [2]; 165.45 [2]; People v Haynes, 16 AD3d 434, 435 [2005]; People v Sanchez, 216 AD2d 207, 208 [1995]; People v Gleeson, 161 AD2d 902 [1990]; People v Byrd, 156

2014(See Beck v City of New York, 2014 WL 80544 , *4, 2014 US Dist LEXIS 1136 , *11-12 [SD NY, Jan. 3, 2014, No. 12-Civ-9231 (RA)] [driving without a license is not a criminal offense for purposes of a federal 42 USC § 1983 malicious prosecution claim; “ ‘the traffic court proceeding is civil in nature,’ and was thus ‘a regulatory rather than a “criminal proceeding’ ” (citation omitted)]; People v McCray, Sup Ct, Bronx County 2009, Dawson, J., index No. 909/ 2007, slip op at 1, 3-4 [resolution of traffic ticket charging violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 (1) in DMV Administrative Adjudicat

2014Prosecution does not debar discipline; nor does discipline debar prosecution”]; People v United Bus Corp., 102 Misc 2d 1097, 1098 [Suffolk Dist Ct 1980] [“The Administrative Adjudications Bureau (where corporate defendant pleaded guilty to Vehicle and Traffic Law violation for excessive exhaust) is not a court.