section 265.20(a) peace officer exemption in New York

2025The peace officer exemption of Penal Law § 265.20(a)(1)(c) is a proviso, which need not be pleaded in the indictment but may be raised by the accused as a bar to prosecution or a defense at trial ( see People v David , 41 NY3d 90 , 96; People v Santana , 7 NY3d 234, 236 ; People v Kohut , 30 NY2d 183, 187 ; People v Rodriguez , 235 AD3d 541 , 542).

2019Because the exemptions in Penal Law section 265.20 are found outside the particular Penal Law provisions to which they apply, interpreting them to require an initial showing by a defendant is consistent with the interpretive principles traditionally used to differentiate between exceptions and provisos ( see Kohut , 30 NY2d at 187 ; Santana , 7 NY3d at 237 ).

2025The peace officer exemption of Penal Law § 265.20(a)(1)(c) is a proviso, which need not be pleaded in the indictment but may be raised by the accused as a bar to prosecution or a defense at trial ( see People v David , 41 NY3d 90 , 96; People v Santana , 7 NY3d 234, 236 ; People v Kohut , 30 NY2d 183, 187 ; People v Rodriguez , 235 AD3d 541 , 542).

2019Because the exemptions in Penal Law section 265.20 are found outside the particular Penal Law provisions to which they apply, interpreting them to require an initial showing by a defendant is consistent with the interpretive principles traditionally used to differentiate between exceptions and provisos ( see Kohut , 30 NY2d at 187 ; Santana , 7 NY3d at 237 ).

1987First, in citing Salata (supra) and its progeny, the court in Di Dominick (supra) overlooked the critical distinction, discussed above, that the cases were civil in nature.

1978(Matter of Salata v Tolman, 38 AD2d 991 ; Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth.

2025Further, by entering a plea of guilty, the defendant forfeited any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that did not directly involve the plea negotiation process ( see People v Petgen , 55 NY2d 529, 534-535 ; People v Ponce , 232 AD3d 741 , 742).

2025Further, by entering a plea of guilty, the defendant forfeited any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that did not directly involve the plea negotiation process ( see People v Petgen , 55 NY2d 529, 534-535 ; People v Ponce , 232 AD3d 741 , 742).

2025The peace officer exemption of Penal Law § 265.20(a)(1)(c) is a proviso, which need not be pleaded in the indictment but may be raised by the accused as a bar to prosecution or a defense at trial ( see People v David , 41 NY3d 90 , 96; People v Santana , 7 NY3d 234, 236 ; People v Kohut , 30 NY2d 183, 187 ; People v Rodriguez , 235 AD3d 541 , 542).

2018Since the defendant raised the exemption under Penal Law § 265.20(a)(1)(f) as his defense, the People were required to disprove the exemption beyond a reasonable doubt ( see generally People v Santana , 7 NY3d 234, 236-237 ; People v Kohut , 30 NY2d 183, 187 ; see also Matter of Nikim A ., 179 AD2d 638, 639 ; People v Roccaforte , 141 AD2d 775, 775 ; People v Montgomery , 106 AD2d 410, 411 ; William C.

2018Here, there is no evidence that defendant was ever issued a certificate of good conduct ( see People v Kemp , 273 AD2d 806 , 806 [4th Dept 2000], cert denied 532 US 977 [2001]).

2018Since the defendant raised the exemption under Penal Law § 265.20(a)(1)(f) as his defense, the People were required to disprove the exemption beyond a reasonable doubt ( see generally People v Santana , 7 NY3d 234, 236-237 ; People v Kohut , 30 NY2d 183, 187 ; see also Matter of Nikim A ., 179 AD2d 638, 639 ; People v Roccaforte , 141 AD2d 775, 775 ; People v Montgomery , 106 AD2d 410, 411 ; William C.

2018Here, there is no evidence that defendant was ever issued a certificate of good conduct ( see People v Kemp , 273 AD2d 806 , 806 [4th Dept 2000], cert denied 532 US 977 [2001]).

1994In Zodda (supra), the defendant sold a firearm to an undercover police officer.

1987First, in citing Salata (supra) and its progeny, the court in Di Dominick (supra) overlooked the critical distinction, discussed above, that the cases were civil in nature.

1980Indeed, Mr. Justice Silverman remarked, writing for the plurality (p 390), "it is hard to see why even possession of an unlimited license should exempt one from section 265.03 which penalizes possession of a loaded firearm 'with intent to use the same unlawfully against another.’ ” In contrast, in People v Serrano ( 71 AD2d 258, 260-261 , opp pending), where there was no unlawful intent, the exemption of section 265.20 (subd a, par 3) of the Penal Law continued to apply.

1980Indeed, Mr. Justice Silverman remarked, writing for the plurality (p 390), "it is hard to see why even possession of an unlimited license should exempt one from section 265.03 which penalizes possession of a loaded firearm 'with intent to use the same unlawfully against another.’ ” In contrast, in People v Serrano ( 71 AD2d 258, 260-261 , opp pending), where there was no unlawful intent, the exemption of section 265.20 (subd a, par 3) of the Penal Law continued to apply.

1978Here, defendant’s superiors had decided that he was not eligible to carry a firearm, and thus divested defendant of that immunity granted to peace officers under section 265.20 of the Penal Law (see People v Pianto, 220 App Div 333 ).

1978The rules and regulations of the department govern the conduct of the correction officer as a peace officer, and he must yield to the conditions of his employment.” (Anemone v Kross, 23 Misc 2d 186, 187 .) In Figaro v Ward ( 86 Misc 2d 530 , 532), the court held: "Where a person is seeking to take advantage of a statutory exemption granted to him because of the nature of his employment, i.e., in this case, peace officer, he cannot complain when the scope of exemption is limited by a regulation of his employer provided that the regulation is not arbitrary and capricious.” There is a further lin

1973In the case of Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter ( 45 Misc 2d 956, 961 , affd. 23 A D 2d 933, affd. 16 N Y 2d 47) the court stated: “ Nor will the courts sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of each enactment brought before it, or decide whether policy which it expresses offends the welfare of a particular group. ’ ’ Accordingly, it is clear that the relief sought by plaintiffs predicated on plaintiffs ’ status as peace officers pursuant to section 265.20 of the Penal Law must be denied.