Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Josephgreen2 sentences2000See State v. Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 456 , 653 N.E.2d 285, 291-292 . 2000See State v. Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 456 , 653 N.E.2d 285, 291-292 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Filiaggigreen2 sentences2016Compare R.C. 2941.145. {¶ 70} “We have consistently required strict compliance with Ohio statutes when reviewing the procedures in capital cases.” Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d at 240 , 714 N.E.2d 867 . 2016Compare R.C. 2941.145. {¶ 70} “We have consistently required strict compliance with Ohio statutes when reviewing the procedures in capital cases.” Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d at 240 , 714 N.E.2d 867 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Davis, 139 Ohio St.3d 122 , 2014-Ohio-1615 , 9 N.E.3d 1031, ¶ 27 (“The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that the ‘ “decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels” ’ ”), quoting Hubbard ex rel. 2015See State v. Davis, 139 Ohio St.3d 122 , 2014-Ohio-1615 , 9 N.E.3d 1031, ¶ 27 (“The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that the ‘ “decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels” ’ ”), quoting Hubbard ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Penix
green
2 sentences1993R.C. 2929.04(A) provides in relevant part: “Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the following is specified, in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (( * * * “(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commissi 1993R.C. 2929.04(A) provides in relevant part: “Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the following is specified, in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (( * * * “(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commissi | 2 | 1993–1995 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 117-118 . {¶ 146} R.C. 2929.04 describes the death penalty specifications to be included in an indictment and provides: (A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated b 2015Id. at 117-118 . {¶ 146} R.C. 2929.04 describes the death penalty specifications to be included in an indictment and provides: (A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated b | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Jenks
yellow
1 sentence2008Thus, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 11} In the present case, the specification at issue is contained in R.C. 2929.04 (A) and provides as follows: Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the R | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Crane v. Commissioner
green
1 sentence1999Crane v. Commr. of Internal Revenue (1947), 331 U.S. 1 , 6 ; Lake Cty. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Long
green
2 sentences1995Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 , 7 O.O.3d 178 , 372 N.E.2d 804 ; State v. Broom (1989), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 281 , 533 N.E.2d 682, 689 . 1995Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 , 7 O.O.3d 178 , 372 N.E.2d 804 ; State v. Broom (1989), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 281 , 533 N.E.2d 682, 689 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Wiles
green
2 sentences1995Our established precedent is clear that the "principal offender" requirement of the felony-murder specification set forth in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) equates to a finding of "actual killer." State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 369 , 513 N.E.2d 744 ; State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 92 , 571 N.E.2d 97, 122 ; State v. Taylor (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 308 , 612 N.E.2d 316, 325 . 1995Our established precedent is clear that the "principal offender" requirement of the felony-murder specification set forth in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) equates to a finding of "actual killer." State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 369 , 513 N.E.2d 744 ; State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 92 , 571 N.E.2d 97, 122 ; State v. Taylor (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 308 , 612 N.E.2d 316, 325 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Broom
green
2 sentences1995Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 , 7 O.O.3d 178 , 372 N.E.2d 804 ; State v. Broom (1989), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 281 , 533 N.E.2d 682, 689 . 1995Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 , 7 O.O.3d 178 , 372 N.E.2d 804 ; State v. Broom (1989), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 281 , 533 N.E.2d 682, 689 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1995Our established precedent is clear that the "principal offender" requirement of the felony-murder specification set forth in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) equates to a finding of "actual killer." State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 369 , 513 N.E.2d 744 ; State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 92 , 571 N.E.2d 97, 122 ; State v. Taylor (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 308 , 612 N.E.2d 316, 325 . 1995Our established precedent is clear that the "principal offender" requirement of the felony-murder specification set forth in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) equates to a finding of "actual killer." State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 369 , 513 N.E.2d 744 ; State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 92 , 571 N.E.2d 97, 122 ; State v. Taylor (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 308 , 612 N.E.2d 316, 325 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Johnson
red
2 sentences1988For purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if he has been nominated for election according to law, or if he has filed a petition or petitions according to law to have his name placed on the ballot in a primary or general election, or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary or general election. “(2) The offense was committed for hire. ■ “(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial or punishment for another offense committed by the offender. “(4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a detention facili 1988For purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if he has been nominated for election according to law, or if he has filed a petition or petitions according to law to have his name placed on the ballot in a primary or general election, or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary or general election. “(2) The offense was committed for hire. ■ “(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial or punishment for another offense committed by the offender. “(4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a detention facili | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bell v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1980C. 2929.04 (but, see, Lockett v. Ohio [1978], 438 U. S. 586 , and Bell v. Ohio [1978], 438 U. S. 637 ), which provides in pertinent part: “(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond a reasonable doubt: “(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robber | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Lockett v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1980C. 2929.04 (but, see, Lockett v. Ohio [1978], 438 U. S. 586 , and Bell v. Ohio [1978], 438 U. S. 637 ), which provides in pertinent part: “(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond a reasonable doubt: “(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robber | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.