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10 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Adkinsgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla.2012). 2012See State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412 (Fla.2012). | 3 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mackle Vincent Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2012The trial court dismissed the charges at issue based on its finding that section 893.18 was unconstitutional pursuant to Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir.2012). 2012The trial court dismissed the charges at issue based on its finding that section 893.13 was unconstitutional pursuant to Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir.2012). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2012The trial court dismissed the charges at issue based on its finding that section 893.18 was unconstitutional pursuant to Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir.2012). 2012The trial court dismissed the charges at issue based on its finding that section 893.13 was unconstitutional pursuant to Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir.2012). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Scott v. State
yellow
1 sentence2005Section 893.101 clarifies the elements of an offense of possession of a controlled substance, expressly stating that "knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter," and the supreme court cases holding otherwise are "contrary to legislative intent." See Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002) (holding in part that guilty knowledge is an element of possession of a controlled substance under section 893.13(6)); Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996) (same). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Chicone v. State
yellow
1 sentence2005Section 893.101 clarifies the elements of an offense of possession of a controlled substance, expressly stating that "knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter," and the supreme court cases holding otherwise are "contrary to legislative intent." See Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002) (holding in part that guilty knowledge is an element of possession of a controlled substance under section 893.13(6)); Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996) (same). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Camp v. State
green
1 sentence1996Case law interpreting the meaning of actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance under section 893.13(1)(f) is equally applicable to section 893.147. [3] Numerous subsequent district court opinions, including Camp v. State, 293 So.2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 302 So.2d 413 (Fla.1974), and Doby v. State, 352 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), have held that knowledge of the presence of narcotic drugs is an essential element of possession charges. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Doby v. State
green
1 sentence1996Case law interpreting the meaning of actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance under section 893.13(1)(f) is equally applicable to section 893.147. [3] Numerous subsequent district court opinions, including Camp v. State, 293 So.2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 302 So.2d 413 (Fla.1974), and Doby v. State, 352 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), have held that knowledge of the presence of narcotic drugs is an essential element of possession charges. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Camp
green
1 sentence1996Case law interpreting the meaning of actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance under section 893.13(1)(f) is equally applicable to section 893.147. [3] Numerous subsequent district court opinions, including Camp v. State, 293 So.2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 302 So.2d 413 (Fla.1974), and Doby v. State, 352 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), have held that knowledge of the presence of narcotic drugs is an essential element of possession charges. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Perez v. State
green
1 sentence1995Upon the state’s confession of error, with which we agree, we reverse the order under review denying the defendant Larry Carlton’s motion to vacate judgment and sentence under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 and remand the cause to the trial court with directions: (1) to grant the defendant’s motion to vacate solely as to the habitual felony offender sentence of five years imprisonment imposed on the conviction for unlawful possession of cocaine, as Section 775.084(l)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1993), does not permit a defendant to be sentenced as a habitual felony offender on a conviction for unlawful poss | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1989Relying on Smith v. State, 430 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1983), which was not mentioned in Gordon, this court rejected Gordon's rationale and held that possession is not a necessarily lesser included offense of sale of a controlled substance, because each statutory offense requires proof of an element which the other does not. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Medlin
green
1 sentence1982If this were a case of simple delivery or possession of a controlled substance under § 893.13, State v. Medlin, 273 So.2d 394 (Fla. 1973) would apply and the State would not be required to prove intent or knowledge although absence of either would appear to be a defense for the jury to consider. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.