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10 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Wadegreen2 sentences2013Harris v. Snelgrove, 290 Ga. 181, 182-183 (2) ( 718 SE2d 300 ) (2011); Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 599 (V) ( 544 SE2d 99 ) (2001). 2013Harris v. Snelgrove, 290 Ga. 181, 182-183 (2) ( 718 SE2d 300 ) (2011); Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 599 (V) ( 544 SE2d 99 ) (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. Snelgrovegreen2 sentences2013Harris v. Snelgrove, 290 Ga. 181, 182-183 (2) ( 718 SE2d 300 ) (2011); Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 599 (V) ( 544 SE2d 99 ) (2001). 2013Harris v. Snelgrove, 290 Ga. 181, 182-183 (2) ( 718 SE2d 300 ) (2011); Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 599 (V) ( 544 SE2d 99 ) (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurancegreen2 sentences2023Co., 280 Ga. 545, 546 ( 629 SE2d 260 ) (2006). 13 (Emphasis supplied.) 7 By contrast, the present case addresses the Wilkinsons’ claim under the Equitable Caregiver Statute, which provides that “an individual seeking to be adjudicated an equitable caregiver of a child may establish standing to maintain the action,” in part by filing a pleading containing an affidavit demonstrating prima facie compliance with certain requirements.14 The superior court can adjudicate an individual to be an equitable caregiver if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has: (1) Fully and com 2023Co., 280 Ga. 545, 546 ( 629 SE2d 260 ) (2006). 13 (Emphasis supplied.) 7 By contrast, the present case addresses the Wilkinsons’ claim under the Equitable Caregiver Statute, which provides that “an individual seeking to be adjudicated an equitable caregiver of a child may establish standing to maintain the action,” in part by filing a pleading containing an affidavit demonstrating prima facie compliance with certain requirements.14 The superior court can adjudicate an individual to be an equitable caregiver if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has: (1) Fully and com | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of C. L.green1 sentence2021L., 284 Ga. App. 674, 675 (1) ( 644 SE2d 530 ) (2007) (once the biological father legitimated the child, mother’s husband to whom she was married when she gave birth to the child was no longer considered the legal father of the child and thus he “was not one of the limited number of related third parties who may seek custody from a legal parent”). | 1 | 1 |
Baskin v. Halegreen2 sentences2021See Walls v. Walls, 278 Ga. 206, 207, n.3 ( 599 SE2d 173 ) (2004) (under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), third parties to whom a court may grant custody of a minor child “are limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent”); Baskin v. Hale, 337 Ga. App. 420, 423 (1) ( 787 SE2d 785 ) (2016) (although former boyfriend had shared parenting duties with mother, lived in the home and helped raise the minor child, he had no basis for obtaining custody under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1) when he was neither an adoptive parent nor one of the relatives listed in 2021See Walls v. Walls, 278 Ga. 206, 207, n.3 ( 599 SE2d 173 ) (2004) (under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), third parties to whom a court may grant custody of a minor child “are limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent”); Baskin v. Hale, 337 Ga. App. 420, 423 (1) ( 787 SE2d 785 ) (2016) (although former boyfriend had shared parenting duties with mother, lived in the home and helped raise the minor child, he had no basis for obtaining custody under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1) when he was neither an adoptive parent nor one of the relatives listed in | 1 | 1 |
Walls v. Wallsgreen2 sentences2021See Walls v. Walls, 278 Ga. 206, 207, n.3 ( 599 SE2d 173 ) (2004) (under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), third parties to whom a court may grant custody of a minor child “are limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent”); Baskin v. Hale, 337 Ga. App. 420, 423 (1) ( 787 SE2d 785 ) (2016) (although former boyfriend had shared parenting duties with mother, lived in the home and helped raise the minor child, he had no basis for obtaining custody under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1) when he was neither an adoptive parent nor one of the relatives listed in 2021See Walls v. Walls, 278 Ga. 206, 207, n.3 ( 599 SE2d 173 ) (2004) (under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), third parties to whom a court may grant custody of a minor child “are limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent”); Baskin v. Hale, 337 Ga. App. 420, 423 (1) ( 787 SE2d 785 ) (2016) (although former boyfriend had shared parenting duties with mother, lived in the home and helped raise the minor child, he had no basis for obtaining custody under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1) when he was neither an adoptive parent nor one of the relatives listed in | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Stricklandgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 633-634 (1). 2016In reviewing a trial court’s findings in a custody dispute under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), we are mindful that “[i]n the appellate review of a bench trial, a trial court’s factual findings must not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” Strickland, 298 Ga. at 633 (1). “[D]ue deference must be given to the trial court, acknowledging that it has the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses,” and the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blackburn v. Blackburn
green
2 sentences1994Where a third party seeks to obtain custody of a child, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is presently unfit, Blackburn v. Blackburn, 249 Ga. 689 ( 292 SE2d 821 ) (1982), or otherwise not entitled to custody under OCGA §§ 19-7-1 and 19-7-4. 1994Where a third party seeks to obtain custody of a child, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is presently unfit, Blackburn v. Blackburn, 249 Ga. 689 ( 292 SE2d 821 ) (1982), or otherwise not entitled to custody under OCGA §§ 19-7-1 and 19-7-4. | 2 | 1987–1994 |
Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God, Inc. v. Brinson
green
1 sentence2023As noted in the above factual recitation, Richello I addressed the Wilkinsons’ claim for grandparent custody under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), which provides in part that “[t]he sole issue for determination in any such case shall be what is in the best interest of the child or children.”13 Thus, the analysis in Richello I was limited to a fairly straightforward review of the best interest of the child, and it explicitly adjudicated a partial loss of parental power by the parent. 12 (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Brinson, 287 Ga. at 486 , quoting Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re CL
green
1 sentence2021L., 284 Ga. App. 674, 675 (1) ( 644 SE2d 530 ) (2007) (once the biological father legitimated the child, mother’s husband to whom she was married when she gave birth to the child was no longer considered the legal father of the child and thus he “was not one of the limited number of related third parties who may seek custody from a legal parent”). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Reeves v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2019In Reeves, we held that although the child’s father had not legitimated the child, and there was no possibility he could do so because he was deceased, “no authority limit[s] a grandparent’s standing to challenge custody to circumstances [in which] the father has legitimated the child[.]”6 We further noted that OCGA § 9-7-3 (a) (2) defines “grandparent” as “the parent of a parent of a minor child, the parent of a minor child’s parent who has died, and the parent of a minor child’s parent whose 5 266 Ga. App. 297 ( 596 SE2d 668 ) (2004). 6 Id. at 297 . 5 parental rights have been terminated.” T 2019In Reeves, we held that although the child’s father had not legitimated the child, and there was no possibility he could do so because he was deceased, “no authority limit[s] a grandparent’s standing to challenge custody to circumstances [in which] the father has legitimated the child[.]”6 We further noted that OCGA § 9-7-3 (a) (2) defines “grandparent” as “the parent of a parent of a minor child, the parent of a minor child’s parent who has died, and the parent of a minor child’s parent whose 5 266 Ga. App. 297 ( 596 SE2d 668 ) (2004). 6 Id. at 297 . 5 parental rights have been terminated.” T | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Holdaway v. Holdaway
green
2 sentences2016Cf. Holdaway v. Holdaway, 338 Ga. App. 477 ( 789 SE2d 817 ) (2016) (affirming grant of primary physical and legal custody to grandmother under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.l)). 2016Cf. Holdaway v. Holdaway, 338 Ga. App. 477 ( 789 SE2d 817 ) (2016) (affirming grant of primary physical and legal custody to grandmother under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.l)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Durden v. Barron
green
2 sentences1983Durden v. Barron, 249 Ga. 686 ( 290 SE2d 923 ) (1982); Blackburn v. Blackburn, supra. The appellant contends that the appellee is in the position of a third party rather than a natural parent, because he by voluntary contract released his parental power to his mother when she petitioned for custody of Nicholas. 1983Durden v. Barron, 249 Ga. 686 ( 290 SE2d 923 ) (1982); Blackburn v. Blackburn, supra. The appellant contends that the appellee is in the position of a third party rather than a natural parent, because he by voluntary contract released his parental power to his mother when she petitioned for custody of Nicholas. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.