Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daniels v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2025Daniels, 270 Ga. at 290 (2). [T]he limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier. 2013See Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290-291 (2) ( 509 SE2d 41 ) (1998) (plaintiff satisfied exhaustion requirements required by OCGA § 33-24-41.1 by settling for the limits of underinsured’s liability coverage, even though “deemer” provided additional coverage); compare Holland v. Cotton States Mut. | 3 | 3 |
Carter v. Progressive Mountain Insurancegreen2 sentences2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, 2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, | 3 | 3 |
Tookes v. Murraygreen2 sentences2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, 2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, | 1 | 1 |
Katherine Griffin Barker v. Marlon Brack Muschettgreen2 sentences2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, 2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, | 1 | 1 |
Porex Corp. v. Haldopoulosgreen2 sentences2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, 2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, | 1 | 1 |
Ashline v. Marinas USA, L.P.green2 sentences2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, 2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, | 1 | 1 |
Jenna Newstrom v. Auto-Owners Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2025Co., 343 Ga. App. 576, 579 (3) ( 807 SE2d 501 ) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2025Co., 343 Ga. App. 576, 579 (3) ( 807 SE2d 501 ) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Damiyon Giddens v. Metropower, Inc.green2 sentences2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, 2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, | 1 | 1 |
Darby v. Mathisgreen2 sentences2024The statute authorizes the injured claimant to settle with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier by accepting payment of the carrier’s limits of liability coverage in return for the claimant’s execution of “a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants. …” The limited release provided for in the statute releases the settling insurance carrier from any liability to the claimant, and releases the tortfeasor from personal liability while preserving the claimant’s right to pursue claims to judgment against the tortfeasor for the purpose of co 2024The statute authorizes the injured claimant to settle with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier by accepting payment of the carrier’s limits of liability coverage in return for the claimant’s execution of “a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants. …” The limited release provided for in the statute releases the settling insurance carrier from any liability to the claimant, and releases the tortfeasor from personal liability while preserving the claimant’s right to pursue claims to judgment against the tortfeasor for the purpose of co | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Williamsongreen1 sentence2019See id. at 213 (2), 738 S.E.2d 712 (noting that "[t]he terms of this offer were simple: execution of a limited liability release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits"); Newton v. Ragland , 325 Ga. App. 371 , 375 (1), 750 S.E.2d 768 (2013) (terms of offer were simply that plaintiff "would execute a limited liability release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits by a certain deadline"); Smith v. Hall , 311 Ga. App. 99 , 99-101, 714 S.E.2d 742 (2011) (settlement offer did not specify how controversy would be terminated in return for the | 1 | 1 |
Superior Insurance v. Dawkinsgreen1 sentence2016While the release provided may have included additional terms not acceptable to the [plaintiffs], it is well settled that the mere inclusion of a release form unacceptable to the plaintiff does not alter the fact that a meeting of the minds had occurred with regard to the terms of the settlement.”) (citations and footnote omitted). 19 See Dawkins, supra at 46-47 (discussing the significance of a general release, as opposed to a limited release under OCGA § 33-24-41.1). 20 Albany, supra at 28 (1). | 1 | 1 |
City of Albany v. Freeneygreen1 sentence2016While the release provided may have included additional terms not acceptable to the [plaintiffs], it is well settled that the mere inclusion of a release form unacceptable to the plaintiff does not alter the fact that a meeting of the minds had occurred with regard to the terms of the settlement.”) (citations and footnote omitted). 19 See Dawkins, supra at 46-47 (discussing the significance of a general release, as opposed to a limited release under OCGA § 33-24-41.1). 20 Albany, supra at 28 (1). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carter v. Progressive Mountain Insurance
green
2 sentences2014This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271 ( 739 SE2d 750 ) (2013), to determine if that Court properly applied the motor vehicle insurance limited liability release provision of OCGA § 33-24-41.1. 1 Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, we reverse that Court’s judgment. *488 Velicia Carter (“Carter”) was injured in a February 22, 2010 automobile collision with Jeova Claudino Oliviera (“Oliviera”); it was alleged that Oliviera was under the influence of alcohol at the time. 2014This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271 ( 739 SE2d 750 ) (2013), to determine if that Court properly applied the motor vehicle insurance limited liability release provision of OCGA § 33-24-41.1. 1 Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, we reverse that Court’s judgment. *488 Velicia Carter (“Carter”) was injured in a February 22, 2010 automobile collision with Jeova Claudino Oliviera (“Oliviera”); it was alleged that Oliviera was under the influence of alcohol at the time. | 3 | 2014–2025 |
ERIC ANTHONY FERGUSON v. TIMOHTY SPRAGGINS, AS OF THE ESTATE OF SYLVIA SPRAGGINS
green
1 sentence2025A “release” is defined as “liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced.”10 And as our Supreme Court has explained, the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.11 9 Tookes v. Murray, | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Nelson v. State
neutral
2 sentences2025Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 295 Ga. 487, 489 ( 761 SE2d 261 ) (2014) (quoting Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271 ( 739 SE2d 754 ) (2013)). 2025Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 295 Ga. 487, 489 ( 761 SE2d 261 ) (2014) (quoting Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271 ( 739 SE2d 754 ) (2013)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Newton v. Ragland
green
2 sentences2019See id. at 213 (2), 738 S.E.2d 712 (noting that "[t]he terms of this offer were simple: execution of a limited liability release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits"); Newton v. Ragland , 325 Ga. App. 371 , 375 (1), 750 S.E.2d 768 (2013) (terms of offer were simply that plaintiff "would execute a limited liability release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits by a certain deadline"); Smith v. Hall , 311 Ga. App. 99 , 99-101, 714 S.E.2d 742 (2011) (settlement offer did not specify how controversy would be terminated in return for the 2019See id. at 213 (2), 738 S.E.2d 712 (noting that "[t]he terms of this offer were simple: execution of a limited liability release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits"); Newton v. Ragland , 325 Ga. App. 371 , 375 (1), 750 S.E.2d 768 (2013) (terms of offer were simply that plaintiff "would execute a limited liability release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits by a certain deadline"); Smith v. Hall , 311 Ga. App. 99 , 99-101, 714 S.E.2d 742 (2011) (settlement offer did not specify how controversy would be terminated in return for the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Smith v. Hall
green
2 sentences2019See id. at 213 (2), 738 S.E.2d 712 (noting that "[t]he terms of this offer were simple: execution of a limited liability release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits"); Newton v. Ragland , 325 Ga. App. 371 , 375 (1), 750 S.E.2d 768 (2013) (terms of offer were simply that plaintiff "would execute a limited liability release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits by a certain deadline"); Smith v. Hall , 311 Ga. App. 99 , 99-101, 714 S.E.2d 742 (2011) (settlement offer did not specify how controversy would be terminated in return for the 2019See id. at 213 (2), 738 S.E.2d 712 (noting that "[t]he terms of this offer were simple: execution of a limited liability release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits"); Newton v. Ragland , 325 Ga. App. 371 , 375 (1), 750 S.E.2d 768 (2013) (terms of offer were simply that plaintiff "would execute a limited liability release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits by a certain deadline"); Smith v. Hall , 311 Ga. App. 99 , 99-101, 714 S.E.2d 742 (2011) (settlement offer did not specify how controversy would be terminated in return for the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Herring v. Dunning
green
2 sentences2019See id. at 213 (2), 738 S.E.2d 712 (noting that "[t]he terms of this offer were simple: execution of a limited liability release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits"); Newton v. Ragland , 325 Ga. App. 371 , 375 (1), 750 S.E.2d 768 (2013) (terms of offer were simply that plaintiff "would execute a limited liability release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits by a certain deadline"); Smith v. Hall , 311 Ga. App. 99 , 99-101, 714 S.E.2d 742 (2011) (settlement offer did not specify how controversy would be terminated in return for the 2019See id. at 213 (2), 738 S.E.2d 712 (noting that "[t]he terms of this offer were simple: execution of a limited liability release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits"); Newton v. Ragland , 325 Ga. App. 371 , 375 (1), 750 S.E.2d 768 (2013) (terms of offer were simply that plaintiff "would execute a limited liability release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in exchange for the policy limits by a certain deadline"); Smith v. Hall , 311 Ga. App. 99 , 99-101, 714 S.E.2d 742 (2011) (settlement offer did not specify how controversy would be terminated in return for the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.