section 51-3-1 held liable in Georgia

2014Accordingly, we must address the merits of Ratliff’s claims because those issues were raised on the Deputies’ behalf in the motion for summary judgment and addressed by the trial court in its summary judgment order. (a) Ratliff asserts that the Deputies are liable under OCGA § 51-3-1 for negligence “in their unofficial role of keeping and maintaining the grounds of the [ADC].” However, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Ratliff failed to present evidence in support of each of the elements of her premises liability claim, entitling the Deputies to summary judgment. “[A] property ow

2014Accordingly, we must address the merits of Ratliff’s claims because those issues were raised on the Deputies’ behalf in the motion for summary judgment and addressed by the trial court in its summary judgment order. (a) Ratliff asserts that the Deputies are liable under OCGA § 51-3-1 for negligence “in their unofficial role of keeping and maintaining the grounds of the [ADC].” However, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Ratliff failed to present evidence in support of each of the elements of her premises liability claim, entitling the Deputies to summary judgment. “[A] property ow

2025This charge unmistakably invited the jury to find the landlord liable under OCGA § 51-3-1, a statutory ground which, for the reasons stated above in Division 2 (a), was inapplicable by the facts in this case.9 See MARTA v. Tyler, 360 Ga. App. 710 , 714 (1) ( 860 SE2d 224 ) (2021) (“A charge unauthorized by the evidence, which injects into the case issues not made by the pleadings or evidence, is presumed to be harmful to the losing party, and such a charge is grounds for new trial unless it is apparent that the jury could not have been misled by it.”) (citation omitted).

2025The effect, in turn, was 9 Indeed, although the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the landlord liable for “damages to the invitee for injuries caused by the owner’s failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe[,]” “Georgia law has long excepted landlords from general landowner liability with respect to premises possessed by tenants.” Cham, 311 at Ga. 175 (2) (a). 18 to supplant the landlord’s limited duty to keep the premises in repair with “a harsher rule of responsibility than that to which [it] w[as] already subject.” (Citation omitted.) Bir

2025The effect, in turn, was 9 Indeed, although the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the landlord liable for “damages to the invitee for injuries caused by the owner’s failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe[,]” “Georgia law has long excepted landlords from general landowner liability with respect to premises possessed by tenants.” Cham, 311 at Ga. 175 (2) (a). 18 to supplant the landlord’s limited duty to keep the premises in repair with “a harsher rule of responsibility than that to which [it] w[as] already subject.” (Citation omitted.) Bir

2021See also Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484, 486 n.6 (436 SE2d 196) (1993) (it is a “well- established principle that where control over premises has been relinquished to another, the owner . . . of those premises cannot be held liable under OCGA § 51-3-1”); Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 718 (83 SE 670) (1914) (because the defendant landlord was not in possession of the premises where plaintiff’s decedent was injured, it was not necessary to decide whether the decedent was a licensee on the premises; the only question was whether landlord was liable for 7 In other words, a landowner

2021See also Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484 , 486 n.6 ( 436 SE2d 196 ) (1993) (it is a “well- established principle that where control over premises has been relinquished to another, the owner . . . of those premises cannot be held liable under OCGA § 51-3-1”); Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 718 ( 83 SE 670 ) (1914) (because the defendant landlord was not in possession of the premises where plaintiff’s decedent was injured, it was not necessary to decide whether the decedent was a licensee on the premises; the only question was whether landlord was liable for 7 In other words, a land

2021See also Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484 , 486 n.6 ( 436 SE2d 196 ) (1993) (it is a “well- established principle that where control over premises has been relinquished to another, the owner . . . of those premises cannot be held liable under OCGA § 51-3-1”); Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 718 ( 83 SE 670 ) (1914) (because the defendant landlord was not in possession of the premises where plaintiff’s decedent was injured, it was not necessary to decide whether the decedent was a licensee on the premises; the only question was whether landlord was liable for 7 In other words, a land

2021See also Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484 , 486 n.6 ( 436 SE2d 196 ) (1993) (it is a “well- established principle that where control over premises has been relinquished to another, the owner . . . of those premises cannot be held liable under OCGA § 51-3-1”); Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 718 ( 83 SE 670 ) (1914) (because the defendant landlord was not in possession of the premises where plaintiff’s decedent was injured, it was not necessary to decide whether the decedent was a licensee on the premises; the only question was whether landlord was liable for 7 In other words, a land

2021See also Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484 , 486 n.6 ( 436 SE2d 196 ) (1993) (it is a “well- established principle that where control over premises has been relinquished to another, the owner . . . of those premises cannot be held liable under OCGA § 51-3-1”); Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 718 ( 83 SE 670 ) (1914) (because the defendant landlord was not in possession of the premises where plaintiff’s decedent was injured, it was not necessary to decide whether the decedent was a licensee on the premises; the only question was whether landlord was liable for 7 In other words, a land

2021See also Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484 , 486 n.6 ( 436 SE2d 196 ) (1993) (it is a “well- established principle that where control over premises has been relinquished to another, the owner . . . of those premises cannot be held liable under OCGA § 51-3-1”); Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 718 ( 83 SE 670 ) (1914) (because the defendant landlord was not in possession of the premises where plaintiff’s decedent was injured, it was not necessary to decide whether the decedent was a licensee on the premises; the only question was whether landlord was liable for 7 In other words, a land

2010Grey v. Milliken & Co., 245 Ga. App. 804 ( 539 SE2d 186 ) (2000); Englehart v. OKI America, 209 Ga. App. 151 ( 433 SE2d 331 ) (1993), disapproved in part on other grounds, Baker v. Harcon, 303 Ga. App. 749, 755 ( 694 SE2d 673 ) (2010).

2010Grey v. Milliken & Co., 245 Ga. App. 804 ( 539 SE2d 186 ) (2000); Englehart v. OKI America, 209 Ga. App. 151 ( 433 SE2d 331 ) (1993), disapproved in part on other grounds, Baker v. Harcon, 303 Ga. App. 749, 755 ( 694 SE2d 673 ) (2010).

1995Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga.App. 207 (4a) ( 124 SE2d 441 ) (1962)." Lidster v. Jones, 176 Ga.App. 392, 393 , 336 S.E.2d 287 (1985), cert. vacated Pine Terrace Assoc. v. Lidster, 255 Ga. 405, 406 , 341 S.E.2d 8 (1986).

1995Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga.App. 207 (4a) ( 124 SE2d 441 ) (1962)." Lidster v. Jones, 176 Ga.App. 392, 393 , 336 S.E.2d 287 (1985), cert. vacated Pine Terrace Assoc. v. Lidster, 255 Ga. 405, 406 , 341 S.E.2d 8 (1986).

1995Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga.App. 207 (4a) ( 124 SE2d 441 ) (1962)." Lidster v. Jones, 176 Ga.App. 392, 393 , 336 S.E.2d 287 (1985), cert. vacated Pine Terrace Assoc. v. Lidster, 255 Ga. 405, 406 , 341 S.E.2d 8 (1986).

1995Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga.App. 207 (4a) ( 124 SE2d 441 ) (1962)." Lidster v. Jones, 176 Ga.App. 392, 393 , 336 S.E.2d 287 (1985), cert. vacated Pine Terrace Assoc. v. Lidster, 255 Ga. 405, 406 , 341 S.E.2d 8 (1986).