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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mirna Serrano v. Cintas Corporationgreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F3d 884, 901-902 (II) (C) (3) (6th Cir. 2012) (holding instead that to justify a protective order under Federal Rule 26 (c), one of the enumerated harms “must be illustrated with a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements” (citation and punctuation omitted)); BlueMountain Credit Alt. 2022See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F3d 884, 901-902 (II) (C) (3) (6th Cir. 2012) (holding instead that to justify a protective order under Federal Rule 26 (c), one of the enumerated harms “must be illustrated with a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements” (citation and punctuation omitted)); BlueMountain Credit Alt. | 1 | 1 |
General Motors LLC v. Robert Randall Buchanangreen2 sentences2022See Buchanan, 359 Ga. App. at 415 (1) (noting that “the court may consider a myriad of factors to determine whether GM showed good cause to protect Barra from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” but that it was not required to). 2022See Buchanan, 359 Ga. App. at 415 (1) (noting that “the court may consider a myriad of factors to determine whether GM showed good cause to protect Barra from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” but that it was not required to). | 1 | 1 |
Flower v. T.R.A. Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2022Rather, as required by the text of the rule, a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) is warranted only where the movant demonstrates to the trial court that the sitting for a deposition would result in “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” 31 Inc., 111 P3d 1192, 1206 (Wisc. | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, Inc.green2 sentences2021“What constitutes ‘good cause’ must be left largely to the trial judge who has a latitude of discretion in determining whether the showing has been made.” Harris v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, 322 Ga. App. 894, 901 (3) ( 746 SE2d 618 ) (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2021“What constitutes ‘good cause’ must be left largely to the trial judge who has a latitude of discretion in determining whether the showing has been made.” Harris v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, 322 Ga. App. 894, 901 (3) ( 746 SE2d 618 ) (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Christopher v. Stategreen2 sentences2017“OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) does establish a general statutory basis for the entry of protective orders limiting or curtailing discovery under appropriate circumstances, provided such limitations do not have the effect of frustrating and preventing legitimate discovery.” Christopher v. State of Ga., 185 Ga. App. 532, 533 ( 364 SE2d 905 ) (1988) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2017“OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) does establish a general statutory basis for the entry of protective orders limiting or curtailing discovery under appropriate circumstances, provided such limitations do not have the effect of frustrating and preventing legitimate discovery.” Christopher v. State of Ga., 185 Ga. App. 532, 533 ( 364 SE2d 905 ) (1988) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Kight v. McG Health, Inc.green1 sentence2015See Kight II, 296 Ga. at 690 . 7 In some situations, the production in discovery of one type of relevant information may make it possible to demonstrate that producing another very similar, or another less relevant, type of information would be unduly burdensome or expensive, justifying a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). | 1 | 1 |
Sherrill v. Martingreen2 sentences1999In Sherrill v. Martin, 161 Ga.App. 558, 559-560 (2), 288 S.E.2d 648 (1982), one party's expert witness, a questioned document examiner, was called as a witness for deposition and the other side moved for protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26(b)(4)(B) to prevent the testimony, because the condition for discovery had not been met. 1999In Sherrill v. Martin, 161 Ga.App. 558, 559-560 (2), 288 S.E.2d 648 (1982), one party's expert witness, a questioned document examiner, was called as a witness for deposition and the other side moved for protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26(b)(4)(B) to prevent the testimony, because the condition for discovery had not been met. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC v. WORKMAN Et Al.
green
2 sentences2018Following the Court of Appeals' decision in RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC v. Workman , 341 Ga. App. 127 , 798 S.E.2d 677 (2017), we granted certiorari to consider two questions: whether attorney fees and costs are available under OCGA § 9-15-14 for conduct that occurs during the course of post-judgment discovery, and whether an entity is barred from seeking sanctions under OCGA § 9-11-37 by failing to request sanctions at the time it sought and obtained a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26. 2018Following the Court of Appeals' decision in RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC v. Workman , 341 Ga. App. 127 , 798 S.E.2d 677 (2017), we granted certiorari to consider two questions: whether attorney fees and costs are available under OCGA § 9-15-14 for conduct that occurs during the course of post-judgment discovery, and whether an entity is barred from seeking sanctions under OCGA § 9-11-37 by failing to request sanctions at the time it sought and obtained a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
GENERAL MOTORS, LLC v. BUCHANAN
green
2 sentences2026General Motors v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811 ( 874 SE2d 52 ) (2022). 2026General Motors v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811 ( 874 SE2d 52 ) (2022). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Blanton v. Blanton
green
2 sentences1992Based on this court’s decision in Blanton v. Blanton, 259 Ga. 622 ( 385 SE2d 672 ) (1989), the Court of Appeals reluctantly affirmed the decision of the trial court. 1992Based on this court’s decision in Blanton v. Blanton, 259 Ga. 622 ( 385 SE2d 672 ) (1989), the Court of Appeals reluctantly affirmed the decision of the trial court. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Bergen v. Cardiopul Medical, Inc.
green
2 sentences1988The confusion which the discovering party created in Bergen v. Cardiopul Med., 175 Ga. App. 700 ( 334 SE2d 28 ) (1985), the sole case cited by appellant, is not present here. 1988The confusion which the discovering party created in Bergen v. Cardiopul Med., 175 Ga. App. 700 ( 334 SE2d 28 ) (1985), the sole case cited by appellant, is not present here. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.