matter of law bar in California

2021(Golden Eagle Land Investment, L.P. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 399, 422 [deciding prong two issue despite trial court’s failure to reach it].) As we further explain, we conclude that, under the applicable standard for anti-SLAPP motions, Appellants met their burden of establishing the requisite probability of prevailing on their malicious prosecution claim against Respondents, and Respondents did not establish as a matter of law a defense to Appellants’ claim.

2021(Golden Eagle Land Investment, L.P. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 399, 422 [deciding prong two issue despite trial court’s failure to reach it].) As we further explain, we conclude that, under the applicable standard for anti-SLAPP motions, Appellants met their burden of establishing the requisite probability of prevailing on their malicious prosecution claim against Respondents, and Respondents did not establish as a matter of law a defense to Appellants’ claim.

2016The law is clear that “[wjhether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 103 ; accord People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 214 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 125 , 186 P.3d 496 ].) The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 335 are in accordance with this statement of the law and, in no uncertain terms, advise that a trial court should: “Give this instruction only if the court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties agree abou

2016The law is clear that “[wjhether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 103 ; accord People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 214 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 125 , 186 P.3d 496 ].) The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 335 are in accordance with this statement of the law and, in no uncertain terms, advise that a trial court should: “Give this instruction only if the court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties agree abou

2016(People v. Hill, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 555 .) By choosing not to instruct the jury that the codefendants were accomplices as a matter of law, the trial court “avoid[ed] imputations of the guilt of [the codefendants] which might have flowed from the court’s direction that the confessing [codefendant] was their accomplice as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 556.) While neither of the defendants in the present case confessed, both were charged as aiders and abettors of crimes perpetrated by other individuals.

2014(People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 162-163 (rejecting challenge that accomplice as a matter of law instruction directed jury to find the defendant acted with witness); accord, People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 210-211 , disapproved of on another ground in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1 .) People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536 (Hill), cited by appellant, does not alter our analysis.

2001In the alternative, appellant maintains *753 that even if he made a full credit bid, the full credit bid rule as construed by the California Supreme Court in Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226 , 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 , 900 P.2d 601 does not as a matter of law bar his causes of action for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, as the trial court found.

2001In the alternative, appellant maintains *753 that even if he made a full credit bid, the full credit bid rule as construed by the California Supreme Court in Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226 , 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 , 900 P.2d 601 does not as a matter of law bar his causes of action for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, as the trial court found.

2016Turning now to defendants’ claim that the court erred in giving the accomplice as a matter of law instruction, our task is to determine “ ‘whether *1269 there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the law in light of the instructions given, the entire record of trial, and the arguments of counsel.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Fiu (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 360, 370 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 ].) As we will explain, we conclude the trial court did err in giving this instruction, although we also conclude that this error was not prejudicial.

2016Turning now to defendants’ claim that the court erred in giving the accomplice as a matter of law instruction, our task is to determine “ ‘whether *1269 there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the law in light of the instructions given, the entire record of trial, and the arguments of counsel.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Fiu (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 360, 370 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 ].) As we will explain, we conclude the trial court did err in giving this instruction, although we also conclude that this error was not prejudicial.

2014(People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 162-163 (rejecting challenge that accomplice as a matter of law instruction directed jury to find the defendant acted with witness); accord, People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 210-211 , disapproved of on another ground in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1 .) People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536 (Hill), cited by appellant, does not alter our analysis.

2014(People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 162-163 (rejecting challenge that accomplice as a matter of law instruction directed jury to find the defendant acted with witness); accord, People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 210-211 , disapproved of on another ground in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1 .) People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536 (Hill), cited by appellant, does not alter our analysis.

2014(People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 162-163 (rejecting challenge that accomplice as a matter of law instruction directed jury to find the defendant acted with witness); accord, People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 210-211 , disapproved of on another ground in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1 .) People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536 (Hill), cited by appellant, does not alter our analysis.

2014Most recently, in Sander v. State Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th 300, 326 [ 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 250 , 314 P.3d 488 ], our Supreme Court declined to hold “as a matter of law that bar applicants’ constitutional rights of privacy preclude disclosure” of information included in the State Bar admissions database (such as the applicant’s race, ethnicity, law school, bar exam results, and grade point averages) “even in a deidentified form.” The court did not reach the factual dispute whether it is possible to successfully deidentify information obtained from government databases.

2014Most recently, in Sander v. State Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th 300, 326 [ 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 250 , 314 P.3d 488 ], our Supreme Court declined to hold “as a matter of law that bar applicants’ constitutional rights of privacy preclude disclosure” of information included in the State Bar admissions database (such as the applicant’s race, ethnicity, law school, bar exam results, and grade point averages) “even in a deidentified form.” The court did not reach the factual dispute whether it is possible to successfully deidentify information obtained from government databases.

2013Grace & Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1318 , 1327- 1330 [finding a public school district could not state a cause of action in negligence or strict liability based on the presence of asbestos products in its buildings when the products had not contaminated the buildings by releasing friable asbestos]; Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v. Grumman Flexible (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 289, 293-298 [holding a transportation district could not recover in negligence or strict liability for the cost of repairing defective bus parts that had not caused further damage]. 10 II.

2013Accordingly, neither the Right to Repair Act nor the economic loss rule applies as a matter of law to bar Irena from its award of ―carrying costs.‖ 4 See for example: Zamora v. Shell Oil Co. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 204, 208-211 [barring recovery for homeowners in negligence or strict liability for the cost of replacing water pipes known to be defective, but which had not yet leaked]; Fieldstone v. Briggs Plumbing Products, Inc. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 357, 363-367 [rejecting an award of damage based on strict liability for a general contractor who replaced defective sinks that rusted and chipped p

2013Accordingly, neither the Right to Repair Act nor the economic loss rule applies as a matter of law to bar Irena from its award of ―carrying costs.‖ 4 See for example: Zamora v. Shell Oil Co. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 204, 208-211 [barring recovery for homeowners in negligence or strict liability for the cost of replacing water pipes known to be defective, but which had not yet leaked]; Fieldstone v. Briggs Plumbing Products, Inc. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 357, 363-367 [rejecting an award of damage based on strict liability for a general contractor who replaced defective sinks that rusted and chipped p

2013(See Nelson, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 81 ; Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072 [applying Nelson and concluding Department was immune as a matter of law from claim that nurse summoned to provide medical treatment failed to provide adequate treatment].) Any evidence that Nurse Ramirez failed to properly provide adequate treatment to Christopher cannot support a claim for fail to summon medical care pursuant to section 845.6. ( Castaneda, supra, at p. 1074 ["Once summoned, the quality of medical care is a matter of medical policy and practice, imposing on medical practitioners a duty

2013(See Nelson, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 81 ; Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072 [applying Nelson and concluding Department was immune as a matter of law from claim that nurse summoned to provide medical treatment failed to provide adequate treatment].) Any evidence that Nurse Ramirez failed to properly provide adequate treatment to Christopher cannot support a claim for fail to summon medical care pursuant to section 845.6. ( Castaneda, supra, at p. 1074 ["Once summoned, the quality of medical care is a matter of medical policy and practice, imposing on medical practitioners a duty

2010(Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 564 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 268 ].) Accordingly, the trial court may sustain a demurrer on the ground of judicial estoppel where the facts pleaded and judicially noticed indicate as a matter of law the doctrine should be applied, i.e., that a court has adopted or accepted as true the inconsistent position. 4 As we will show, the only such fact that is a candidate for judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position is the fact that a minor’s compromise may have been granted by the trial court incident to the settlement agreement in the rescission acti

2010(Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 564 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 268 ].) Accordingly, the trial court may sustain a demurrer on the ground of judicial estoppel where the facts pleaded and judicially noticed indicate as a matter of law the doctrine should be applied, i.e., that a court has adopted or accepted as true the inconsistent position. 4 As we will show, the only such fact that is a candidate for judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position is the fact that a minor’s compromise may have been granted by the trial court incident to the settlement agreement in the rescission acti

2002“Primary assumption of risk arises where a plaintiff voluntarily participates in an activity or sport involving certain inherent risks; primary assumption of risk . . . bar[s] recovery because no duty of care is owed as to such risks.” (Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 8, 11 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 ].) Whether, in a given case, the doctrine will be applied is a legal question which turns on the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity and to each other.

2002“Primary assumption of risk arises where a plaintiff voluntarily participates in an activity or sport involving certain inherent risks; primary assumption of risk . . . bar[s] recovery because no duty of care is owed as to such risks.” (Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 8, 11 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 ].) Whether, in a given case, the doctrine will be applied is a legal question which turns on the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity and to each other.

2000(See § 1387; People v. Superior Court (Martinez ) (1993) 19 *88 Cal.App.4th 738, 744, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 [section 1387 "is sometimes loosely described as establishing a two-dismissal rule"].) It does not preclude a single section 1385 dismissal from barring retrial.

2000(See Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 482 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 637 P.2d 1029 ; see also Agresti, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 606, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 ["a dismissal may sometimes have the same effect as an acquittal to dispose of criminal charges"]; cf. People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038-1039 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 884 P.2d 1015, fn. 6 ( Lagunas ) [implying that the court's grant of a new trial motion after a guilty verdict because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law may bar retrial]; People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 698-699 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 704 P.2d 719 ( Trevi

2000(See Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 482 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 637 P.2d 1029 ; see also Agresti, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 606, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 ["a dismissal may sometimes have the same effect as an acquittal to dispose of criminal charges"]; cf. People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038-1039 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 884 P.2d 1015, fn. 6 ( Lagunas ) [implying that the court's grant of a new trial motion after a guilty verdict because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law may bar retrial]; People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 698-699 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 704 P.2d 719 ( Trevi

2000(See Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 482 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 637 P.2d 1029 ; see also Agresti, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 606, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 ["a dismissal may sometimes have the same effect as an acquittal to dispose of criminal charges"]; cf. People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038-1039 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 884 P.2d 1015, fn. 6 ( Lagunas ) [implying that the court's grant of a new trial motion after a guilty verdict because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law may bar retrial]; People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 698-699 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 704 P.2d 719 ( Trevi