section 17 justify a conveyance in Illinois

1977App. 3d 532 , 347 N.E.2d 831 .) That principle was stated in Everett as follows: “It is * * 0 well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a conveyance under section 17 [citations], but it must be alleged and proved by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indirectly been used to acquire or enh

1977App. 3d 532 , 347 N.E.2d 831 .) That principle was stated in Everett as follows: “It is * * 0 well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a conveyance under section 17 [citations], but it must be alleged and proved by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indirectly been used to acquire or enh

1978(Gerhardt v. Gerhardt (1974), 18 Ill.

1976App. 3d 658, 661-662 , 310 N.E.2d 224 , the court stated: “There is no legal formula for determining whether the wife’s financial contribution, earnings, frugality, and good management will be deemed sufficient to warrant a conveyance under section 17 of the Divorce Act of all or part of the property held in the name of the husband, and each case must be adjudged on its particular facts.

1974Cross, supra. The record herein discloses clear and convincing evidence that the property involved, both real and personal, was accumulated through the joint efforts of the parties.

1962(Tuyls v. Tuyls 21 Ill.2d 192 ; Cross v. Cross, 5 Ill.2d 456 ; Nowogurski v. Nowogurski, 404 Ill. 276 .) Thus, the signing of the mortgage, plaintiff’s residence in the Northfield home and the birth of the children do not give her an equity in the property.

1963All that is required is that the recipient spouse be entitled to alimony and that the conveyance be equitable.” 409 Ill. 608, 611-612 .

1955(Persico v. Persico, 409 Ill. 608 .) The allegation of joint ownership of the property, coupled with the reference to the statute in the prayer for relief, were sufficient, in our opinion, to sustain the decree.

1962It is also well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a conveyance under section 17 (Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435 ; Bissett v. Bissett, 375 Ill. 551 ; Termaat v. Termaat, 357 Ill. 472 ,) but it must be alleged and proved by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indirectly been used to a

1955Stat. 1953, chap. 40, par. 19.) Since the enactment of this amendment, the allegations and proof of special equities or circumstances which were formerly necessary to sustain a conveyance under section 17 of the Divorce Act (see Ward v. Sampson, 395 Ill. 353 ; Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435 ) are no longer required.

1978App. 3d 1086 , 287 N.E.2d 47 .) There is, however, no legal formula for determining whether the wife’s contributions will be deemed sufficient to warrant an equitable conveyance under section 17 of the Divorce Act, and each case must be adjudged on its particular facts.

1977App. 3d 532 , 347 N.E.2d 831 .) That principle was stated in Everett as follows: “It is * * 0 well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a conveyance under section 17 [citations], but it must be alleged and proved by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indirectly been used to acquire or enh

1977App.3d 532 , 347 N.E.2d 831 .) That principle was stated in Everett as follows: "It is * * * well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a conveyance under section 17 [citations], but it must be alleged and proved by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indirectly been used to acquire or enha

1974In Everett v. Everett, 25 Ill.2d 342 , our Supreme Court said at 347-348: “It is also well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a conveyance under section 17 [Citations], but it must be alleged and proved by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indirectly been used to acquire or enhance the

1962(Miezio v. Miezio, 6 Ill.2d 469 .) In the case at bar the court could reasonably deem the conveyance an equitable one, as a settlement in lieu of alimony.

1962(Tuyls v. Tuyls 21 Ill.2d 192 ; Cross v. Cross, 5 Ill.2d 456 ; Nowogurski v. Nowogurski, 404 Ill. 276 .) Thus, the signing of the mortgage, plaintiff’s residence in the Northfield home and the birth of the children do not give her an equity in the property.

1962It is also well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a conveyance under section 17 (Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435 ; Bissett v. Bissett, 375 Ill. 551 ; Termaat v. Termaat, 357 Ill. 472 ,) but it must be alleged and proved by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indirectly been used to a

1962It is also well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a conveyance under section 17 (Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435 ; Bissett v. Bissett, 375 Ill. 551 ; Termaat v. Termaat, 357 Ill. 472 ,) but it must be alleged and proved by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indirectly been used to a

1962(Tuyls v. Tuyls 21 Ill.2d 192 ; Cross v. Cross, 5 Ill.2d 456 ; Nowogurski v. Nowogurski, 404 Ill. 276 .) Thus, the signing of the mortgage, plaintiff’s residence in the Northfield home and the birth of the children do not give her an equity in the property.

1955Stat. 1953, chap. 40, par. 19.) Since the enactment of this amendment, the allegations and proof of special equities or circumstances which were formerly necessary to sustain a conveyance under section 17 of the Divorce Act (see Ward v. Sampson, 395 Ill. 353 ; Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435 ) are no longer required.