section 413 sentencing proceeding (Maryland) · Go Syfert
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section 413 sentencing proceeding in Maryland

10 Maryland opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2002 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Lockett v. Ohiogreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, “a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors”); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150 , 507 A.2d 1072, 1087 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 , 107 S.Ct. 292 , 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(explaining that “[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitu

2001See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, “a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors”); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150 , 507 A.2d 1072, 1087 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 , 107 S.Ct. 292 , 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(explaining that “[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitu

11
Franklin v. Lynaughgreen
scotus · 1988 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999Indeed, the “catchall” provision in the statutory sentencing scheme of § 413(g)(8) provides that the sentencing body shall consider “[a]ny other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case.” While the jury has great leeway in considering all relevant evidence and sentencing factors in rendering its verdict, it is appropriate to focus and direct the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence, particularly in capital sentencing cases “in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death p

1999Indeed, the “catchall” provision in the statutory sentencing scheme of § 413(g)(8) provides that the sentencing body shall consider “[a]ny other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case.” While the jury has great leeway in considering all relevant evidence and sentencing factors in rendering its verdict, it is appropriate to focus and direct the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence, particularly in capital sentencing cases “in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death p

11
Tichnell v. Stategreen
md · 1981 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 45 , 427 A.2d 991, 992 (1981). 9 .

1993Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 45 , 427 A.2d 991, 992 (1981). 9 .

11
Tichnell v. Stategreen
md · 1980 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986See Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 728 , 415 A.2d 830, 847 (1980) (Tichnell I).

1986See Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 728 , 415 A.2d 830, 847 (1980) (Tichnell I).

11
Johnson v. Stategreen
md · 1982 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
2 sentences

1983Therefore, evidence of a convicted person's confession to prior criminal conduct, voluntarily made, may be admitted at sentencing pursuant to section 413 (c) (1) (v) if the court deems it to be of probative value and relevant to sentence, `provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements' and challenge their voluntariness." Johnson, 292 Md. at 441-43 , 439 A.2d at 562-63 (emphasis added). *245 Thus, this Court indicated that under § 413 (c) (1) (v) under certain circumstances certain evidence of unrelated crimes of which the accused has not been convicted is admiss

1983Therefore, evidence of a convicted person's confession to prior criminal conduct, voluntarily made, may be admitted at sentencing pursuant to section 413 (c) (1) (v) if the court deems it to be of probative value and relevant to sentence, `provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements' and challenge their voluntariness." Johnson, 292 Md. at 441-43 , 439 A.2d at 562-63 (emphasis added). *245 Thus, this Court indicated that under § 413 (c) (1) (v) under certain circumstances certain evidence of unrelated crimes of which the accused has not been convicted is admiss

11
Hammett v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1979 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir.1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

11
People v. Morsegreen
cal · 1969 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

11
United States v. Dalhovergreen
ca7 · 1938 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir.1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

11
State v. MacKeyyellow
tenn · 1977 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir.1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

11
Commonwealth. v. Hossgreen
pa · 1971 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Apprendi v. New Jersey green
scotus · 2000
2 sentences

2002With regard to the sentence, the Court shall determine: (1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or court’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 413(d); and (3) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or court’s finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. (f) Decision of Court of Appeals. — In addition to its review pursuant to any direct appeal, with regard to the death sentence, the Court shall: (1) Affirm the se

2002With regard to the sentence, the Court shall determine: (1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or court’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 413(d); and (3) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or court’s finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. (f) Decision of Court of Appeals. — In addition to its review pursuant to any direct appeal, with regard to the death sentence, the Court shall: (1) Affirm the se

12002–2002
Borchardt v. State green
md · 2001
2 sentences

2002Following our decision in Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001), 15 which had not been filed at the time that Baker submitted his briefs or made his oral arguments before this Court, we hold that the questions submitted by Baker that rely on Apprendi are without merit.

2002Following our decision in Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001), 15 which had not been filed at the time that Baker submitted his briefs or made his oral arguments before this Court, we hold that the questions submitted by Baker that rely on Apprendi are without merit.

12002–2002
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California v. Ponce green
scotus · 1986
2 sentences

2001See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, "a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors"); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150 , 507 A.2d 1072, 1087 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 , 107 S.Ct. 292 , 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(explaining that "[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitu

2001See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, “a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors”); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150 , 507 A.2d 1072, 1087 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 , 107 S.Ct. 292 , 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(explaining that “[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitu

12001–2001
Bowers v. State green
md · 1986
2 sentences

2001See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, “a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors”); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150 , 507 A.2d 1072, 1087 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 , 107 S.Ct. 292 , 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(explaining that “[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitu

2001See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, “a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors”); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150 , 507 A.2d 1072, 1087 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 , 107 S.Ct. 292 , 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(explaining that “[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitu

12001–2001
Dufour v. Mississippi green
scotus · 1986
2 sentences

2001See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, "a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors"); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150 , 507 A.2d 1072, 1087 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 , 107 S.Ct. 292 , 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(explaining that "[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitu

2001See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 992 (1978)(holding in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, “a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors”); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 150 , 507 A.2d 1072, 1087 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 , 107 S.Ct. 292 , 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(explaining that “[t]he intention is, as we see it, simply that the jury may itself set forth any facts not listed on the submitted form which it believes constitu

12001–2001
Poole v. State green
md · 1981
2 sentences

1983Poole v. State, 290 Md. 114 , 428 A.2d 434 (1981) (Poole I). .

1983Poole v. State, 290 Md. 114 , 428 A.2d 434 (1981) (Poole I). .

11983–1983
Scott v. State green
md · 1983
2 sentences

1983This Court stated that the language of § 413 (c) (1) (i) through (iv) "collectively unambiguously restricts the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case to something less inclusive than what generally is admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case." Scott, 297 Md. at 246 , 465 A.2d at 1132 .

1983This Court stated that the language of § 413 (c) (1) (i) through (iv) "collectively unambiguously restricts the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case to something less inclusive than what generally is admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case." Scott, 297 Md. at 246 , 465 A.2d at 1132 .

11983–1983
Furman v. Georgia green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

1982See Tichnell v. State, supra; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S. Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Proffitt v. Florida, supra; Jurek v. Texas, supra. Accord ingly, because the death penalty was unlawfully imposed, we will vacate it and remand the case for a new sentencing proceeding under section 413. 21 c.

1982See Tichnell v. State, supra; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S. Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Proffitt v. Florida, supra; Jurek v. Texas, supra. Accord ingly, because the death penalty was unlawfully imposed, we will vacate it and remand the case for a new sentencing proceeding under section 413. 21 c.

11982–1982
Morse v. California green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir.1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

11982–1982
Dalhover v. United States green
scotus · 1938
2 sentences

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

1982E.g., United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir.1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711 , 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 411 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 342-45 (Tenn. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98 , 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 709 (Tex. Crim.

11982–1982
In Re WINSHIP green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1980Tichnell's position is supported by an amicus brief filed by the Public Defender. *730 Relying on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), it is suggested that due process requires the prosecution to assume the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any mitigating circumstances enumerated in § 413 (g) that are raised by the accused in the penalty phase of trial.

1980Tichnell's position is supported by an amicus brief filed by the Public Defender. *730 Relying on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), it is suggested that due process requires the prosecution to assume the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any mitigating circumstances enumerated in § 413 (g) that are raised by the accused in the penalty phase of trial.

11980–1980
Dobbert v. Florida green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

1980The Supreme Court in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), considered a death penalty statute that had been amended between the time of the offense and the time of the trial, and decided that the change did not constitute an ex post facto violation.

1980The Supreme Court in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), considered a death penalty statute that had been amended between the time of the offense and the time of the trial, and decided that the change did not constitute an ex post facto violation.

11980–1980
Mullaney v. Wilbur green
scotus · 1975
2 sentences

1980Tichnell's position is supported by an amicus brief filed by the Public Defender. *730 Relying on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), it is suggested that due process requires the prosecution to assume the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any mitigating circumstances enumerated in § 413 (g) that are raised by the accused in the penalty phase of trial.

1980Tichnell's position is supported by an amicus brief filed by the Public Defender. *730 Relying on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), it is suggested that due process requires the prosecution to assume the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any mitigating circumstances enumerated in § 413 (g) that are raised by the accused in the penalty phase of trial.

11980–1980

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