section 643 mandatory life sentence in Maryland

2016We held that federal double jeopardy principles protected the defendant from being "subjected to two hearings to determine an[] enhanced mandatory sentence under § 643B(c)[.]” Id. at 324, 416 A.2d 773 .

1988As a matter of fact, it may well *406 be more devastating to him if a second hearing on sentencing is allowed, as is obviously the case here.” Butler, 46 Md.App. at 324 , 416 A.2d 773 .

2008Specifically, according to the State, “§ 643B(c) does not mandate ‘separate terms of confinement[;]’ [rather,] the two convictions [must] be obtained on ‘separate occasions,’ and that the offender [must] have served ‘at least one term of confinement.’ ” The State then points to Garrett v. State, 59 Md.App. 97 , 474 A.2d 931 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 483 , 479 A.2d 372 (1984) and Simpkins v. State, 79 Md.App. 687 , 558 A.2d 816 (1989), and contends that “the predicate offenses used for the purposes of sentence enhancement under § 643B(c) do not have to be separated by a term of confinement.” Thir

2008Specifically, according to the State, “§ 643B(c) does not mandate ‘separate terms of confinement[;]’ [rather,] the two convictions [must] be obtained on ‘separate occasions,’ and that the offender [must] have served ‘at least one term of confinement.’ ” The State then points to Garrett v. State, 59 Md.App. 97 , 474 A.2d 931 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 483 , 479 A.2d 372 (1984) and Simpkins v. State, 79 Md.App. 687 , 558 A.2d 816 (1989), and contends that “the predicate offenses used for the purposes of sentence enhancement under § 643B(c) do not have to be separated by a term of confinement.” Thir

2008Specifically, according to the State, “§ 643B(c) does not mandate ‘separate terms of confinement[;]’ [rather,] the two convictions [must] be obtained on ‘separate occasions,’ and that the offender [must] have served ‘at least one term of confinement.’ ” The State then points to Garrett v. State, 59 Md.App. 97 , 474 A.2d 931 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 483 , 479 A.2d 372 (1984) and Simpkins v. State, 79 Md.App. 687 , 558 A.2d 816 (1989), and contends that “the predicate offenses used for the purposes of sentence enhancement under § 643B(c) do not have to be separated by a term of confinement.” Thir

2008Specifically, according to the State, “§ 643B(c) does not mandate ‘separate terms of confinement[;]’ [rather,] the two convictions [must] be obtained on ‘separate occasions,’ and that the offender [must] have served ‘at least one term of confinement.’ ” The State then points to Garrett v. State, 59 Md.App. 97 , 474 A.2d 931 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 483 , 479 A.2d 372 (1984) and Simpkins v. State, 79 Md.App. 687 , 558 A.2d 816 (1989), and contends that “the predicate offenses used for the purposes of sentence enhancement under § 643B(c) do not have to be separated by a term of confinement.” Thir

2001Moore v. State, 72 Md.App. 524, 526 , 531 A.2d 1026 (1987).

2001Moore v. State, 72 Md.App. 524, 526 , 531 A.2d 1026 (1987).

1990Moreover, Bowman v. State, 314 Md. 725, 739-40 , 552 A.2d 1303 (1989), which appellant cites, simply said that the State is precluded from proving an enhanced sentence under § 643B, following an appellate reversal of such a sentence based on insufficiency of the evidence.

1990Moreover, Bowman v. State, 314 Md. 725, 739-40 , 552 A.2d 1303 (1989), which appellant cites, simply said that the State is precluded from proving an enhanced sentence under § 643B, following an appellate reversal of such a sentence based on insufficiency of the evidence.

1990Bowman explicitly relies on Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988).

1990Bowman explicitly relies on Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988).

1983We have required prosecutors to comply with the terms of plea agreements and have reversed convictions where there were violations of the agreement by the State. 2 Thus, we have adhered to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), that "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” 3 *236 In the instant case, Loveday maintains that the prosecutor was duty bound t

1983We have required prosecutors to comply with the terms of plea agreements and have reversed convictions where there were violations of the agreement by the State. 2 Thus, we have adhered to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), that "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” 3 *236 In the instant case, Loveday maintains that the prosecutor was duty bound t

1982Pointing to the fact that his twenty-five year mandatory sentence in the present case is partially based upon two robbery convictions obtained pursuant to this statutory scheme in Baltimore City when he was seventeen, appellant argues that the court improperly imposed a mandatory sentence pursuant to § 643B (c) because his prior robbery convictions "cannot be considered as proper predicates for the imposition of a mandatory sentence under § 643B (c).” In making this argument, appellant recognizes that Long does not have retroactive effect in Maryland (see Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689 (1975)),

1982Pointing to the fact that his twenty-five year mandatory sentence in the present case is partially based upon two robbery convictions obtained pursuant to this statutory scheme in Baltimore City when he was seventeen, appellant argues that the court improperly imposed a mandatory sentence pursuant to § 643B (c) because his prior robbery convictions "cannot be considered as proper predicates for the imposition of a mandatory sentence under § 643B (c).” In making this argument, appellant recognizes that Long does not have retroactive effect in Maryland (see Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689 (1975)),

1982Pointing to the fact that his twenty-five year mandatory sentence in the present case is partially based upon two robbery convictions obtained pursuant to this statutory scheme in Baltimore City when he was seventeen, appellant argues that the court improperly imposed a mandatory sentence pursuant to § 643B (c) because his prior robbery convictions "cannot be considered as proper predicates for the imposition of a mandatory sentence under § 643B (c).” In making this argument, appellant recognizes that Long does not have retroactive effect in Maryland (see Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689 (1975)),

1980We believe the better reasoned rule is as set out in Reed and Crawley, supra. It. seems to us that it is equally as important to an accused not to be subjected to two hearings to determine and enhanced mandatory sentence under § 643B (c) as it is not to be subjected to two trials to determine his guilt in the first place.