section 9.41 custody of police in New York

2016Specifically, plaintiff testified that a paramedic suggested to the police that they afford decedent some time in which to recover from the effects of the seizure, and the neighbor testified that, after the police lifted decedent from the chair, decedent said, “[O]k, I’ll go, I’ll go.” Decedent testified that he said that he would go to the hospital but that he needed “some time to really just get [his] bearings and just figure out what’s going on.” We therefore conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendants’ motion with respect to the “wrongful arrest/false imprisonment” caus

2016Specifically, plaintiff testified that a paramedic suggested to the police that they afford decedent some time in which to recover from the effects of the seizure, and the neighbor testified that, after the police lifted decedent from the chair, decedent said, “[O]k, I’ll go, I’ll go.” Decedent testified that he said that he would go to the hospital but that he needed “some time to really just get [his] bearings and just figure out what’s going on.” We therefore conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendants’ motion with respect to the “wrongful arrest/false imprisonment” caus

2013While the interplay of those provisions might circumscribe the applicability of the standard Yukl analysis that defendant urges us to undertake (see People v Ripic, 182 AD2d 226, 233 [1992], appeal dismissed 81 NY2d 776 [1993]), we ultimately need not consider the issue further because, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that any error in admitting the KMH statements is harmless under these circumstances.

2001(See Matter of Von Holden v Chapman, 87 AD2d 66 ; also see People v Ripic, 182 AD2d 226, 232 , appeal dismissed 81 NY2d 776 .) It is noted that custody under Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 does not require proof that the person presents an immediate danger to others.

2016Defendants contend with respect to the cause of action for “wrongful arrest/false imprisonment” that the confinement of decedent was privileged because they were authorized to take decedent into custody pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 (see generally Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85 [2001]), and that they are therefore protected from liability based on qualified immunity (see Kravitz v Police Dept. of City of Hudson, 285 AD2d 716, 717-718 [2001]).

2016Defendants contend with respect to the cause of action for “wrongful arrest/false imprisonment” that the confinement of decedent was privileged because they were authorized to take decedent into custody pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 (see generally Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85 [2001]), and that they are therefore protected from liability based on qualified immunity (see Kravitz v Police Dept. of City of Hudson, 285 AD2d 716, 717-718 [2001]).

2016Specifically, plaintiff testified that a paramedic suggested to the police that they afford decedent some time in which to recover from the effects of the seizure, and the neighbor testified that, after the police lifted decedent from the chair, decedent said, “[O]k, I’ll go, I’ll go.” Decedent testified that he said that he would go to the hospital but that he needed “some time to really just get [his] bearings and just figure out what’s going on.” We therefore conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendants’ motion with respect to the “wrongful arrest/false imprisonment” caus

2016We further conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendants’ motion with respect to the battery cause of action because defendants failed to eliminate issues of fact whether the police officers in question used excessive force when taking decedent into custody (see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 846 [2011]). “ ‘Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness’ . . . ‘Because of its intensely factual nature, the question of whether the use of for

2016Specifically, plaintiff testified that a paramedic suggested to the police that they afford decedent some time in which to recover from the effects of the seizure, and the neighbor testified that, after the police lifted decedent from the chair, decedent said, “[O]k, I’ll go, I’ll go.” Decedent testified that he said that he would go to the hospital but that he needed “some time to really just get [his] bearings and just figure out what’s going on.” We therefore conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendants’ motion with respect to the “wrongful arrest/false imprisonment” caus

2016We further conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendants’ motion with respect to the battery cause of action because defendants failed to eliminate issues of fact whether the police officers in question used excessive force when taking decedent into custody (see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 846 [2011]). “ ‘Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness’ . . . ‘Because of its intensely factual nature, the question of whether the use of for

2016Defendants contend with respect to the cause of action for “wrongful arrest/false imprisonment” that the confinement of decedent was privileged because they were authorized to take decedent into custody pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 (see generally Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85 [2001]), and that they are therefore protected from liability based on qualified immunity (see Kravitz v Police Dept. of City of Hudson, 285 AD2d 716, 717-718 [2001]).

2016Defendants contend with respect to the cause of action for “wrongful arrest/false imprisonment” that the confinement of decedent was privileged because they were authorized to take decedent into custody pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 (see generally Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85 [2001]), and that they are therefore protected from liability based on qualified immunity (see Kravitz v Police Dept. of City of Hudson, 285 AD2d 716, 717-718 [2001]).

2016Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny . . . police officer . . . may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.” “ To be entitled to qualified immunity, it must be established that it was objectively reasonable for the police officer [s] involved to believe that [their] conduct was appropriate under the circumstances, or that officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether [their] conduct was proper’ ” (Rew v County of Nia

2016Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny . . . police officer . . . may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.” “ To be entitled to qualified immunity, it must be established that it was objectively reasonable for the police officer [s] involved to believe that [their] conduct was appropriate under the circumstances, or that officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether [their] conduct was proper’ ” (Rew v County of Nia

2013Although defendant argues that he was in custody at KMH and was thus entitled to Miranda warnings before being interrogated there (see generally People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]), the record does not disclose whether, at the time he made the statements at issue, he was in the custody of KMH mental health authorities pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) or whether, conversely, he was in the custody of police pursuant to section 9.41 (see Gonzalez v State of New York, 121 Misc 2d 210, 214-215 [1983], revd on other grounds 110 AD2d 810 [1985], appeal

2013Although defendant argues that he was in custody at KMH and was thus entitled to Miranda warnings before being interrogated there (see generally People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]), the record does not disclose whether, at the time he made the statements at issue, he was in the custody of KMH mental health authorities pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) or whether, conversely, he was in the custody of police pursuant to section 9.41 (see Gonzalez v State of New York, 121 Misc 2d 210, 214-215 [1983], revd on other grounds 110 AD2d 810 [1985], appeal

2013Although defendant argues that he was in custody at KMH and was thus entitled to Miranda warnings before being interrogated there (see generally People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]), the record does not disclose whether, at the time he made the statements at issue, he was in the custody of KMH mental health authorities pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) or whether, conversely, he was in the custody of police pursuant to section 9.41 (see Gonzalez v State of New York, 121 Misc 2d 210, 214-215 [1983], revd on other grounds 110 AD2d 810 [1985], appeal

2013Although defendant argues that he was in custody at KMH and was thus entitled to Miranda warnings before being interrogated there (see generally People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]), the record does not disclose whether, at the time he made the statements at issue, he was in the custody of KMH mental health authorities pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39 (a) (1) or whether, conversely, he was in the custody of police pursuant to section 9.41 (see Gonzalez v State of New York, 121 Misc 2d 210, 214-215 [1983], revd on other grounds 110 AD2d 810 [1985], appeal

2012Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Summer D., 67 AD3d 1008 [2009]; Matter of Davonte B., 44 AD3d 763 [2007]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (see Penal Law § 195.05; see generally People v Romeo, 9 AD3d 744 [2004]; Matter of Joshua C., 289 AD2d 1095 [2001]), and attempted assault in t

2012Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Summer D., 67 AD3d 1008 [2009]; Matter of Davonte B., 44 AD3d 763 [2007]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (see Penal Law § 195.05; see generally People v Romeo, 9 AD3d 744 [2004]; Matter of Joshua C., 289 AD2d 1095 [2001]), and attempted assault in t

2012Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Summer D., 67 AD3d 1008 [2009]; Matter of Davonte B., 44 AD3d 763 [2007]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (see Penal Law § 195.05; see generally People v Romeo, 9 AD3d 744 [2004]; Matter of Joshua C., 289 AD2d 1095 [2001]), and attempted assault in t

2012Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Summer D., 67 AD3d 1008 [2009]; Matter of Davonte B., 44 AD3d 763 [2007]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (see Penal Law § 195.05; see generally People v Romeo, 9 AD3d 744 [2004]; Matter of Joshua C., 289 AD2d 1095 [2001]), and attempted assault in t

2011The officers had reasonable cause to believe that defendant had committed a crime, thus permitting them to arrest him (see CPL 140.10 [1]; People v Parker, 84 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2011]).