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10 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garlick v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensinggreen1 sentence2024Garlick v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 176 A.3d 1030, 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Myers, D.green1 sentence2020Suppress Hr’g at 19; see also Myers, 164 A.3d at 1171 (stating the police must “notify the arrestee that there is no right to consult with an attorney before making a decision.”) Therefore, Officer - 17 - Barnett’s description of the consequences of refusal did not comply with his statutory obligations under Section 1547(b). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Riedel
green
2 sentences2017On the other hand, a driver who is not under arrest at the time the blood test is administered “cannot claim the explicit statutory protection of section 1547(b).” Id. at 184 , 651 A.2d at 142 . 2017However, the Riedel Court did not rely upon any distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, and held that the motorist in that case had no statutory right to refuse testing because he "was not under arrest at the time the blood test was administered and cannot claim the explicit statutory protection of section 1547(b).” Riedel, 651 A.2d at 142 . | 3 | 2016–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Myers
green
1 sentence2016The Court acknowledged that Mcileely had not addressed the issue of Pennsylvania's implied consent statute but stressed that because Myers was unconscious at the time of the blood test, he did not have the opportunity to refuse the testing and thereby "claim the statutory protection of Section 1547(b)(l).'' Id. at 1127-30 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Weaver v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
green
2 sentences2005Alexander argues that as a juvenile, these penalties did not apply to him and that he was not adequately informed in order to make a knowing and conscious choice. 4 However, in Weaver v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 873 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005), this Court rejected the argument that the DL-26 form does not meet the statutory notification requirements of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547 because it does not inform a licensee of the minimum enhanced penalties for second and third offenders. 2005Alexander argues that as a juvenile, these penalties did not apply to him and that he was not adequately informed in order to make a knowing and conscious choice. [4] However, in Weaver v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 873 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005), this Court rejected the argument that the DL-26 form does not meet the statutory notification requirements of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547 because it does not inform a licensee of the minimum enhanced penalties for second and third offenders. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Commonwealth v. Diulus
green
2 sentences1992In Commonwealth v. Diulus, 391 Pa.Super. 379 , 571 A.2d 418 (1990), this court recognized that the statutory language of § 1547 made compliance with the regulatory language of § 77.24(d) mandatory for admissibility as well. 1992In Commonwealth v. Diulus, 391 Pa.Super. 379 , 571 A.2d 418 (1990), this court recognized that the statutory language of § 1547 made compliance with the regulatory language of § 77.24(d) mandatory for admissibility as well. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Commonwealth v. Smith
green
1 sentence1989To the same effect is Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Smith, 114 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 420, 539 A.2d 22 (1988). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Commonwealth v. Wadzinski
neutral
2 sentences1982Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 239 Pa.Super. 76 , 361 A.2d 790 (1976). *440 Gotto asserts that the results of a blood-alcohol test were improperly admitted into evidence because the test was performed in violation of her statutory rights under Section 1547 of the Motor Vehicle Code. 6 Specifically, she argues that her consent to a blood test could not have been a knowing one because she had not been advised of her right to submit instead to a breath test. 1982Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 239 Pa.Super. 76 , 361 A.2d 790 (1976). *440 Gotto asserts that the results of a blood-alcohol test were improperly admitted into evidence because the test was performed in violation of her statutory rights under Section 1547 of the Motor Vehicle Code. 6 Specifically, she argues that her consent to a blood test could not have been a knowing one because she had not been advised of her right to submit instead to a breath test. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.