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36 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences2013OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2); see Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) ( 655 SE2d 328 ) (2007) (a defendant’s refusal to submit to a state-administered chemical test of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance is admissible as evidence of the defendant’s intoxication). 2013OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2); see Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) ( 655 SE2d 328 ) (2007) (a defendant’s refusal to submit to a state-administered chemical test of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance is admissible as evidence of the defendant’s intoxication). | 3 | 3 |
Klink v. Statered2 sentences2017OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) provides: “In any criminal trial, the refusal of the defendant to permit a chemical analysis to be made of his blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of his arrest shall be admissible in evidence against him.” “The right to refuse to submit to state administered testing is not a constitutional right, but one created by the legislature.” (Citation omitted.) Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605, 606 (1) ( 533 SE2d 92 ) (2000). 2 Although Szopinski had a right to refuse a state-administered chemical test under Georgia law, the exercise of that right was not without 2017OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) provides: “In any criminal trial, the refusal of the defendant to permit a chemical analysis to be made of his blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of his arrest shall be admissible in evidence against him.” “The right to refuse to submit to state administered testing is not a constitutional right, but one created by the legislature.” (Citation omitted.) Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605, 606 (1) ( 533 SE2d 92 ) (2000). 2 Although Szopinski had a right to refuse a state-administered chemical test under Georgia law, the exercise of that right was not without | 2 | 2 |
State v. Frostgreen2 sentences2016Under Georgia law, evidence of a prior DUI charge “shall be admissible” in a DUI prosecution where the defendant refused to take the state-administered chemical test to show “knowledge, plan, or absence of mistake or accident.” 3 See OCGA § 24-4-417 (a) (1); see also State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 301 ( 773 SE2d 700 ) (2015). 2016Under Georgia law, evidence of a prior DUI charge “shall be admissible” in a DUI prosecution where the defendant refused to take the state-administered chemical test to show “knowledge, plan, or absence of mistake or accident.” 3 See OCGA § 24-4-417 (a) (1); see also State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 301 ( 773 SE2d 700 ) (2015). | 2 | 2 |
England v. Stategreen2 sentences2016England v. State, 302 Ga. App. 12, 14 (1) ( 689 SE2d 833 ) (2009). 2016England v. State, 302 Ga. App. 12, 14 (1) ( 689 SE2d 833 ) (2009). | 2 | 2 |
Thomas v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Thomas v. State, 294 Ga. App. 108, 111 (2) ( 668 SE2d 540 ) (2008). 2011Thomas v. State, 294 Ga. App. 108, 111 (2) ( 668 SE2d 540 ) (2008). | 2 | 2 |
Pendergrass v. Stategreen2 sentences2008In addition, a defendant’s admission tending to prove the crime charged is admissible as evidence against him (Pendergrass v. State, 245 Ga. 626,627 (1) (266 SE2d225) (1980)), as is a defendant’s refusal to submit to a State-administered chemical test of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances. 2006A defendant’s admission tending to prove the crime charged is admissible as evidence (Pendergrass v. State, 245 Ga. 626, 627 (1) ( 266 SE2d 225 ) (1980)) as is a defendant’s refusal to submit to a state-administered chemical test of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance. | 2 | 2 |
Epps v. Stategreen2 sentences2013The state bears the burden of showing that the implied consent requirements were met.11 We cannot say that the error was harmless, because Wallace submitted to the breath test immediately 9 See Epps v. State, 298 Ga. App. 607, 608 (1) ( 680 SE2d 636 ) (2009) (punctuation and footnote omitted); State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 ( 449 SE2d 639 ) (1994). 10 OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2); see Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) ( 655 SE2d 328 ) (2007) (a defendant’s refusal to submit to a state-administered chemical test of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance is admiss 2013The state bears the burden of showing that the implied consent requirements were met.11 We cannot say that the error was harmless, because Wallace submitted to the breath test immediately 9 See Epps v. State, 298 Ga. App. 607, 608 (1) ( 680 SE2d 636 ) (2009) (punctuation and footnote omitted); State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 ( 449 SE2d 639 ) (1994). 10 OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2); see Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) ( 655 SE2d 328 ) (2007) (a defendant’s refusal to submit to a state-administered chemical test of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance is admiss | 1 | 2 |
State v. Causeygreen2 sentences2013The state bears the burden of showing that the implied consent requirements were met.11 We cannot say that the error was harmless, because Wallace submitted to the breath test immediately 9 See Epps v. State, 298 Ga. App. 607, 608 (1) ( 680 SE2d 636 ) (2009) (punctuation and footnote omitted); State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 ( 449 SE2d 639 ) (1994). 10 OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2); see Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) ( 655 SE2d 328 ) (2007) (a defendant’s refusal to submit to a state-administered chemical test of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance is admiss 2013The state bears the burden of showing that the implied consent requirements were met.11 We cannot say that the error was harmless, because Wallace submitted to the breath test immediately 9 See Epps v. State, 298 Ga. App. 607, 608 (1) ( 680 SE2d 636 ) (2009) (punctuation and footnote omitted); State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 ( 449 SE2d 639 ) (1994). 10 OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2); see Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) ( 655 SE2d 328 ) (2007) (a defendant’s refusal to submit to a state-administered chemical test of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance is admiss | 1 | 2 |
Elliott v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Elliott, 305 Ga. at 179-180, 209 (IV), 8 223 (IV) (E). 2022See id. at 223 (IV) (E). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Olevik v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 243-244 (2) (c) (iii), 252 (3) (b). 2022See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 243-244 (2) (c) (iii), 252 (3) (b). | 1 | 1 |
Szopinski v. the Stategreen1 sentence2018See Szopinski v. State , 342 Ga. App. 647 , 650 (1), 804 S.E.2d 657 (2017) ; Brooks v. State , 187 Ga. App. 194 , 195 (1), 369 S.E.2d 801 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
ELLIOTT v. RESURGENS, P.C. Et Al.green1 sentence2018See Szopinski v. State , 342 Ga. App. 647 , 650 (1), 804 S.E.2d 657 (2017) ; Brooks v. State , 187 Ga. App. 194 , 195 (1), 369 S.E.2d 801 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Damatogreen2 sentences2018He cites to cases in which we have affirmed an order granting a motion to suppress where the evidence showed consumption of alcohol but did not show the effect of that consumption on the defendant, that is, that he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.7 7 State v. Encinas, 302 Ga. App. 334, 336-337 ( 691 SE2d 257 ) (2010) (An officer did not have probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI, even though the driver exuded the odor of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and refused to take a state-administered chemical test, where the driver showed 2018He cites to cases in which we have affirmed an order granting a motion to suppress where the evidence showed consumption of alcohol but did not show the effect of that consumption on the defendant, that is, that he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.7 7 State v. Encinas, 302 Ga. App. 334, 336-337 ( 691 SE2d 257 ) (2010) (An officer did not have probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI, even though the driver exuded the odor of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and refused to take a state-administered chemical test, where the driver showed | 1 | 1 |
State v. Graygreen2 sentences2018He cites to cases in which we have affirmed an order granting a motion to suppress where the evidence showed consumption of alcohol but did not show the effect of that consumption on the defendant, that is, that he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.7 7 State v. Encinas, 302 Ga. App. 334, 336-337 ( 691 SE2d 257 ) (2010) (An officer did not have probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI, even though the driver exuded the odor of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and refused to take a state-administered chemical test, where the driver showed 2018He cites to cases in which we have affirmed an order granting a motion to suppress where the evidence showed consumption of alcohol but did not show the effect of that consumption on the defendant, that is, that he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.7 7 State v. Encinas, 302 Ga. App. 334, 336-337 ( 691 SE2d 257 ) (2010) (An officer did not have probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI, even though the driver exuded the odor of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and refused to take a state-administered chemical test, where the driver showed | 1 | 1 |
State v. Encinasgreen2 sentences2018He cites to cases in which we have affirmed an order granting a motion to suppress where the evidence showed consumption of alcohol but did not show the effect of that consumption on the defendant, that is, that he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.7 7 State v. Encinas, 302 Ga. App. 334, 336-337 ( 691 SE2d 257 ) (2010) (An officer did not have probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI, even though the driver exuded the odor of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and refused to take a state-administered chemical test, where the driver showed 2018He cites to cases in which we have affirmed an order granting a motion to suppress where the evidence showed consumption of alcohol but did not show the effect of that consumption on the defendant, that is, that he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.7 7 State v. Encinas, 302 Ga. App. 334, 336-337 ( 691 SE2d 257 ) (2010) (An officer did not have probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI, even though the driver exuded the odor of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and refused to take a state-administered chemical test, where the driver showed | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Stategreen2 sentences2018He cites to cases in which we have affirmed an order granting a motion to suppress where the evidence showed consumption of alcohol but did not show the effect of that consumption on the defendant, that is, that he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.7 7 State v. Encinas, 302 Ga. App. 334, 336-337 ( 691 SE2d 257 ) (2010) (An officer did not have probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI, even though the driver exuded the odor of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and refused to take a state-administered chemical test, where the driver showed 2018He cites to cases in which we have affirmed an order granting a motion to suppress where the evidence showed consumption of alcohol but did not show the effect of that consumption on the defendant, that is, that he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.7 7 State v. Encinas, 302 Ga. App. 334, 336-337 ( 691 SE2d 257 ) (2010) (An officer did not have probable cause to arrest a driver for DUI, even though the driver exuded the odor of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and refused to take a state-administered chemical test, where the driver showed | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2017As we have explained, “[t]he implied consent statute grants drivers the right to refuse to take a state-administered test, with one of the consequences of exercising that right being that evidence of such refusal is admissible at trial.” Williams v. State, 297 Ga. App. 626, 628 ( 677 SE2d 773 ) (2009). 2017As we have explained, “[t]he implied consent statute grants drivers the right to refuse to take a state-administered test, with one of the consequences of exercising that right being that evidence of such refusal is admissible at trial.” Williams v. State, 297 Ga. App. 626, 628 ( 677 SE2d 773 ) (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Anderton v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Anderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s statement that “I will take a blood test” was a request that the officer designate a blood test, not a request for an independent test); England v. State, 302 Ga. App. 12, 15 (1) ( 689 SE2d 833 ) (2009) (defendant’s statement that he had *682 concerns about accuracy of breath test and would rather submit to a blood test was a request for a designated blood test, not a request for an independent test). 2016See Anderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s statement that “I will take a blood test” was a request that the officer designate a blood test, not a request for an independent test); England v. State, 302 Ga. App. 12, 15 (1) ( 689 SE2d 833 ) (2009) (defendant’s statement that he had *682 concerns about accuracy of breath test and would rather submit to a blood test was a request for a designated blood test, not a request for an independent test). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Peircegreen2 sentences2013Epps, supra. See State v. Peirce, 257 Ga. App. 623, 625 (1) ( 571 SE2d 826 ) (2002) (“Where the consent was based at least in part on deceptively misleading information concerning a penalty for refusal which the state was not authorized to implement, there was no informed choice and the test results are inadmissible.”) (footnote omitted). 2013Epps, supra. See State v. Peirce, 257 Ga. App. 623, 625 (1) ( 571 SE2d 826 ) (2002) (“Where the consent was based at least in part on deceptively misleading information concerning a penalty for refusal which the state was not authorized to implement, there was no informed choice and the test results are inadmissible.”) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009“OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (3) provides that a person who is accused of DUI and who undergoes a chemical test at the request of a law enforcement officer has the right to have a qualified person of his own choosing administer an additional test.” McGinn v. State, 268 Ga. App. 450, 451 ( 602 SE2d 209 ) (2004); Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 633, 636 (2) ( 583 SE2d 489 ) (2003). 2009“OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (3) provides that a person who is accused of DUI and who undergoes a chemical test at the request of a law enforcement officer has the right to have a qualified person of his own choosing administer an additional test.” McGinn v. State, 268 Ga. App. 450, 451 ( 602 SE2d 209 ) (2004); Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 633, 636 (2) ( 583 SE2d 489 ) (2003). | 1 | 1 |
McGinn v. Stategreen2 sentences2009“OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (3) provides that a person who is accused of DUI and who undergoes a chemical test at the request of a law enforcement officer has the right to have a qualified person of his own choosing administer an additional test.” McGinn v. State, 268 Ga. App. 450, 451 ( 602 SE2d 209 ) (2004); Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 633, 636 (2) ( 583 SE2d 489 ) (2003). 2009“OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (3) provides that a person who is accused of DUI and who undergoes a chemical test at the request of a law enforcement officer has the right to have a qualified person of his own choosing administer an additional test.” McGinn v. State, 268 Ga. App. 450, 451 ( 602 SE2d 209 ) (2004); Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 633, 636 (2) ( 583 SE2d 489 ) (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Brooks v. State; 9 Anderton v. State; 10 Gillaspy, supra, 270 Ga. App. at 114. | 1 | 1 |
| Florence v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hernandez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Croft v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edmond v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gordon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Dunbar v. Stategreen2 sentences2008(Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Dunbar v. State, 283 Ga. App. 872, 874 (2) ( 643 SE2d 292 ) (2007). 2008(Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Dunbar v. State, 283 Ga. App. 872, 874 (2) ( 643 SE2d 292 ) (2007). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lentschgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCafferty v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Public Safety v. Seaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lucas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joiner v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kelly v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Halsteadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leavitt v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hassettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richards v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Steed v. City of Atlantagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fielding
green
2 sentences1999See State v. Halstead, 230 Ga. App. 208 ( 496 SE2d 279 ) (1998); State v. Barfield, 230 Ga. App. 141 ( 495 SE2d 622 ) (1998); State v. Fielding, 229 Ga. App. 675 ( 494 SE2d 561 ) (1997). 1999See State v. Halstead, 230 Ga. App. 208 ( 496 SE2d 279 ) (1998); State v. Barfield, 230 Ga. App. 141 ( 495 SE2d 622 ) (1998); State v. Fielding, 229 Ga. App. 675 ( 494 SE2d 561 ) (1997). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
McMullen v. State
green
2 sentences2018Notably, in Williams , the Supreme Court cited to appellate opinions from other states that "seem to indicate ... that mere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant." Id. at 822 , 771 S.E.2d 373 . 20 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) (implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over). 21 OCGA § 40-6-392 delineates the procedural requirements for the admission at trial of the results of a state-administered chemical analys 2018Notably, in Williams , the Supreme Court cited to appellate opinions from other states that "seem to indicate ... that mere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant." Id. at 822 , 771 S.E.2d 373 . 20 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) (implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over). 21 OCGA § 40-6-392 delineates the procedural requirements for the admission at trial of the results of a state-administered chemical analys | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brooks v. State
green
2 sentences2018See Szopinski v. State , 342 Ga. App. 647 , 650 (1), 804 S.E.2d 657 (2017) ; Brooks v. State , 187 Ga. App. 194 , 195 (1), 369 S.E.2d 801 (1988). 2018See Szopinski v. State , 342 Ga. App. 647 , 650 (1), 804 S.E.2d 657 (2017) ; Brooks v. State , 187 Ga. App. 194 , 195 (1), 369 S.E.2d 801 (1988). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2018We note that the Appellant errs in relying on State v. Morgan , 289 Ga. App. 706 , 707, 658 S.E.2d 237 (2008), for his argument that "an officer must read a suspect his implied consent rights before the suspect may be subjected to a state-administered blood test, 'even though a suspect may otherwise consent to testing.' " (Emphasis in original.) This Court has specifically noted that Morgan was decided under the prior version of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 that did not include subsection (d.1), and it has implicitly ruled that Morgan no longer constitutes precedent on this issue. 2018We note that the Appellant errs in relying on State v. Morgan , 289 Ga. App. 706 , 707, 658 S.E.2d 237 (2008), for his argument that "an officer must read a suspect his implied consent rights before the suspect may be subjected to a state-administered blood test, 'even though a suspect may otherwise consent to testing.' " (Emphasis in original.) This Court has specifically noted that Morgan was decided under the prior version of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 that did not include subsection (d.1), and it has implicitly ruled that Morgan no longer constitutes precedent on this issue. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
McKIBBEN v. THE STATE
green
2 sentences2018Notably, in Williams , the Supreme Court cited to appellate opinions from other states that "seem to indicate ... that mere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant." Id. at 822 , 771 S.E.2d 373 . 20 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) (implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over). 21 OCGA § 40-6-392 delineates the procedural requirements for the admission at trial of the results of a state-administered chemical analys 2018Notably, in Williams , the Supreme Court cited to appellate opinions from other states that "seem to indicate ... that mere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant." Id. at 822 , 771 S.E.2d 373 . 20 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) (implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over). 21 OCGA § 40-6-392 delineates the procedural requirements for the admission at trial of the results of a state-administered chemical analys | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2018Notably, in Williams , the Supreme Court cited to appellate opinions from other states that "seem to indicate ... that mere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant." Id. at 822 , 771 S.E.2d 373 . 20 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) (implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over). 21 OCGA § 40-6-392 delineates the procedural requirements for the admission at trial of the results of a state-administered chemical analys 2018Notably, in Williams , the Supreme Court cited to appellate opinions from other states that "seem to indicate ... that mere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant." Id. at 822 , 771 S.E.2d 373 . 20 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) (implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over). 21 OCGA § 40-6-392 delineates the procedural requirements for the admission at trial of the results of a state-administered chemical analys | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Flading v. State
green
2 sentences2017See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (d), (f), (g) ; Flading v. State , 327 Ga. App. 346 , 347, n. 2, 759 S.E.2d 67 (2014). 2017See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (d), (f), (g) ; Flading v. State , 327 Ga. App. 346 , 347, n. 2, 759 S.E.2d 67 (2014). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Standish v. Department of Revenue green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Barfield green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Deckard v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Sprinkles v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Leviner green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Hughes green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Coleman green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.