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9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People in Interest of R.Sgreen1 sentence2020However, under limited circumstances, a court may intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings if an agency action (1) causes irreparable injury and (2) clearly exceeds statutory or constitutional jurisdiction or authority. § 24-4-106(8); Envirotest Sys., Corp. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 109 P.3d 142, 144 (Colo. 2005). ¶ 46 When a court rule and a statute conflict, we consider whether the affected matter is “procedural” or “substantive.” People v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 32 (citing Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375, 380-81 (Colo. 2004); People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wiedemergreen1 sentence2020However, under limited circumstances, a court may intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings if an agency action (1) causes irreparable injury and (2) clearly exceeds statutory or constitutional jurisdiction or authority. § 24-4-106(8); Envirotest Sys., Corp. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 109 P.3d 142, 144 (Colo. 2005). ¶ 46 When a court rule and a statute conflict, we consider whether the affected matter is “procedural” or “substantive.” People v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 32 (citing Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375, 380-81 (Colo. 2004); People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Borer v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2020However, under limited circumstances, a court may intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings if an agency action (1) causes irreparable injury and (2) clearly exceeds statutory or constitutional jurisdiction or authority. § 24-4-106(8); Envirotest Sys., Corp. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 109 P.3d 142, 144 (Colo. 2005). ¶ 46 When a court rule and a statute conflict, we consider whether the affected matter is “procedural” or “substantive.” People v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 32 (citing Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375, 380-81 (Colo. 2004); People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Envirotest Systems, Corp. v. Colorado Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2020However, under limited circumstances, a court may intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings if an agency action (1) causes irreparable injury and (2) clearly exceeds statutory or constitutional jurisdiction or authority. § 24-4-106(8); Envirotest Sys., Corp. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 109 P.3d 142, 144 (Colo. 2005). ¶ 46 When a court rule and a statute conflict, we consider whether the affected matter is “procedural” or “substantive.” People v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 32 (citing Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375, 380-81 (Colo. 2004); People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
McClellan v. Meyergreen1 sentence2013See also McClellan v. Meyer, 900 P.2d 24, 29 (Colo.1995); Comm. for Better Health Care for All Colorado Citizens by Schrier v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 888-89 (Colo.1992). . | 1 | 1 |
Committee for Better Health Care for All Colorado Citizens v. Meyergreen1 sentence2013See also McClellan v. Meyer, 900 P.2d 24, 29 (Colo.1995); Comm. for Better Health Care for All Colorado Citizens by Schrier v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 888-89 (Colo.1992). . | 1 | 1 |
Shea, Michael P. v. Office of Thrift Supervisiongreen1 sentence2012See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 , 103 S.Ct. 2187 , 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983) (although a statute facially permitted judicial review of actions of a board, the Supreme Court held that a final order was necessary, because "[the strong presumption is that judicial review will be available only when ageney action becomes final"); Shea v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 41, 43-45 (3d Cir.1991) (although a statute facially appeared to allow for judicial review of any order issued by an agency director, the court held that the term "order" in the statute at issue required "that an action | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2012See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 , 103 S.Ct. 2187 , 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983) (although a statute facially permitted judicial review of actions of a board, the Supreme Court held that a final order was necessary, because "[the strong presumption is that judicial review will be available only when ageney action becomes final"); Shea v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 41, 43-45 (3d Cir.1991) (although a statute facially appeared to allow for judicial review of any order issued by an agency director, the court held that the term "order" in the statute at issue required "that an action 2012See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 , 103 S.Ct. 2187 , 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983) (although a statute facially permitted judicial review of actions of a board, the Supreme Court held that a final order was necessary, because "[the strong presumption is that judicial review will be available only when ageney action becomes final"); Shea v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 41, 43-45 (3d Cir.1991) (although a statute facially appeared to allow for judicial review of any order issued by an agency director, the court held that the term "order" in the statute at issue required "that an action | 1 | 1 |
Dolan v. Rustgreen2 sentences1988Dolan v. Rust, 195 Colo. 173, 175-76 , 576 P.2d 560, 562 (1978); j3d. of County Comm’rs of Jefferson County v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347 , 350, 494 P.2d 85, 87 (1972). 1988Dolan v. Rust, 195 Colo. 173, 175-76 , 576 P.2d 560, 562 (1978); j3d. of County Comm’rs of Jefferson County v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347 , 350, 494 P.2d 85, 87 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Board of County Commissioners v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences1988Dolan v. Rust, 195 Colo. 173, 175-76 , 576 P.2d 560, 562 (1978); j3d. of County Comm’rs of Jefferson County v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347 , 350, 494 P.2d 85, 87 (1972). 1988Dolan v. Rust, 195 Colo. 173, 175-76 , 576 P.2d 560, 562 (1978); j3d. of County Comm’rs of Jefferson County v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347 , 350, 494 P.2d 85, 87 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Warren Village, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals
green
2 sentences1983Warren Village, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 619 P.2d 60 (Colo.1980). 1981Under Warren Village, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, Colo., 619 P.2d 60 (1980), judicial review of agency action pursuant to § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.1973 (1980 Cum.Supp.) is subject to time limits specified in the Colorado Appellate Rules. | 2 | 1981–1983 |
Taylor v. Tinsley
green
2 sentences1981The Commission next urges that Collopy's lawsuit should have been dismissed because he failed to "elect remedies." While its argument is not entirely clear, the Commission apparently contends that declaratory relief was not available because Collopy possessed other established common law and statutory remedies for the alleged taking— i.e., an inverse condemnation proceeding or an action for judicial review of agency action under section 24-4-106(4), see Taylor v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 182 , 330 P.2d 954 (1958). 1981The Commission next urges that Collopy's lawsuit should have been dismissed because he failed to "elect remedies." While its argument is not entirely clear, the Commission apparently contends that declaratory relief was not available because Collopy possessed other established common law and statutory remedies for the alleged taking— i.e., an inverse condemnation proceeding or an action for judicial review of agency action under section 24-4-106(4), see Taylor v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 182 , 330 P.2d 954 (1958). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
green
2 sentences1981Although it is true that an inverse condemnation proceeding is ordinarily the only remedy available to a litigant whose property has been taken for a public use without just compensation, Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company, 184 Colo. 360 , 520 P.2d 738 (1974), Collopy's action for declaratory, injunctive and damages relief falls within an exception to this general rule. 1981Although it is true that an inverse condemnation proceeding is ordinarily the only remedy available to a litigant whose property has been taken for a public use without just compensation, Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company, 184 Colo. 360 , 520 P.2d 738 (1974), Collopy's action for declaratory, injunctive and damages relief falls within an exception to this general rule. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Martin v. District Court
green
1 sentence1986On review, this court held that a county board of social services “is not an adversely affected or aggrieved ‘party’ empowered to bring an action for judicial re *469 view of an agency action within the meaning of section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973.” Martin , 191 Colo, at 109, 550 P.2d at 865 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.