section 36-11-1 statutory presentment requirement in Georgia

2019See Burton v. DeKalb County, 202 Ga. App. 676, 677 ( 415 SE2d 647 ) (1992) (“[I]f a complaint is filed and properly served within the 12-month time limit, the requirements of [OCGA § 36-11-1] are met.”).

2016See Burton, supra, 202 Ga. App. at 678 , 3 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Leonard, as this Court must, I would find that Smalley had apparent authority to act as the County’s agent for the purpose of accepting Leonard’s ante litem notice and, therefore, I would find that Leonard complied with the presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1.

2024See Mendez, 310 Ga. at 122 (2) (b). (b) Turning to the second question before us, we also answer this question in the affirmative — a claimant’s duty under OCGA § 36-11-1 is satisfied by presenting notice to the appropriate county governing authority of her official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.

2024See Mendez, 310 Ga. at 122 (2) (b). 20 (b) Turning to the second question before us, we also answer this question in the affirmative—a claimant’s duty under OCGA § 36-11-1 is satisfied by presenting notice to the appropriate county governing authority of her official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.

2024OCGA § 36-11-1 provides: “All claims against counties must be presented within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or the same are barred, provided that minors or other persons laboring under disabilities shall be allowed 12 months after the removal of the disability to present their claims.” In Collington, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that “official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for a deputy’s allegedly negligent use of a county-owned vehicle are claims against the county itself, and thus, the presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to such claims[.]”3 Howe

2024In Collington, after embarking on a detailed analysis of the historical context of OCGA § 36-11-1, the Supreme Court of Georgia clearly and unequivocally held that “official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for a deputy’s allegedly negligent use of a county-owned vehicle are claims against the county itself, and thus, the 4 presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to such claims, including [Morney’s] official-capacity claims against the Sheriff in this case.” 318 Ga. at 34-37 (2) (a).

2024We thus reverse the trial court’s dismissal of 5 See, e.g., Moats, 349 Ga. App. at 818 (2), Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2). 6 The Supreme Court clarified in Collington that it was not deciding “whether presenting a claim to the Sheriff would also satisfy the presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1.” 318 Ga. at 38 (2) (b) n. 11. 6 Morney’s claims against the sheriff in his official capacity and remand the case to the trial court to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

2023See Moats I, 349 Ga. App. at 815 (2) (“[T]his Court has explicitly held . . . that OCGA § 36-11-1 applies both to the counties and to the sheriffs, when sued in their official capacities.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2); Columbia County v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 151-152 ( 695 SE2d 674 ) (2010) (overruled in part on other grounds by Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 402 (3) ( 788 SE2d 872 ) (2016)).

2024First enacted in 1860, “[t]he statutory presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1 has been part of our law for more 12 than 150 years.” Croy v. Whitfield County, 301 Ga. 380, 381 (2) ( 801 SE2d 892 ) (2017).

2024First enacted in 1860, “[t]he statutory presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1 has been part of our law for more 12 than 150 years.” Croy v. Whitfield County, 301 Ga. 380, 381 (2) ( 801 SE2d 892 ) (2017).

2024We thus reverse the trial court’s dismissal of 5 See, e.g., Moats, 349 Ga. App. at 818 (2), Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2). 6 The Supreme Court clarified in Collington that it was not deciding “whether presenting a claim to the Sheriff would also satisfy the presentment requirement of OCGA § 36-11-1.” 318 Ga. at 38 (2) (b) n. 11. 6 Morney’s claims against the sheriff in his official capacity and remand the case to the trial court to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

2023See Moats I, 349 Ga. App. at 815 (2) (“[T]his Court has explicitly held . . . that OCGA § 36-11-1 applies both to the counties and to the sheriffs, when sued in their official capacities.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2); Columbia County v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 151-152 ( 695 SE2d 674 ) (2010) (overruled in part on other grounds by Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 402 (3) ( 788 SE2d 872 ) (2016)).

2023See Moats I, 349 Ga. App. at 815 (2) (“[T]his Court has explicitly held . . . that OCGA § 36-11-1 applies both to the counties and to the sheriffs, when sued in their official capacities.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2); Columbia County v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 151-152 ( 695 SE2d 674 ) (2010) (overruled in part on other grounds by Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 402 (3) ( 788 SE2d 872 ) (2016)).

2023See Moats I, 349 Ga. App. at 815 (2) (“[T]his Court has explicitly held . . . that OCGA § 36-11-1 applies both to the counties and to the sheriffs, when sued in their official capacities.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2); Columbia County v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 151-152 ( 695 SE2d 674 ) (2010) (overruled in part on other grounds by Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 402 (3) ( 788 SE2d 872 ) (2016)).

2023See Moats I, 349 Ga. App. at 815 (2) (“[T]his Court has explicitly held . . . that OCGA § 36-11-1 applies both to the counties and to the sheriffs, when sued in their official capacities.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2); Columbia County v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 151-152 ( 695 SE2d 674 ) (2010) (overruled in part on other grounds by Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 402 (3) ( 788 SE2d 872 ) (2016)).

2023See Moats I, 349 Ga. App. at 815 (2) (“[T]his Court has explicitly held . . . that OCGA § 36-11-1 applies both to the counties and to the sheriffs, when sued in their official capacities.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Davis, 344 Ga. App. at 532 (2); Columbia County v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 151-152 ( 695 SE2d 674 ) (2010) (overruled in part on other grounds by Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 402 (3) ( 788 SE2d 872 ) (2016)).

2019Thus, we 5 Both the county statute and the city statute require only substantial compliance, Barngrover, supra, 250 Ga. App. at 596 (4), and neither statute affirmatively requires prospective plaintiffs to identify themselves, see OCGA §§ 36- 11-1; 36-33-5, and so the material requirements of the statutes for the purposes of this appeal are identical. 10 conclude that the March 27, 2015 notice failed to satisfy the statutory presentment requirement.6 Nevertheless, although the notice was deficient, we agree with the plaintiffs that their complaint was sufficient to meet the statutory presentme

2019Thus, we 5 Both the county statute and the city statute require only substantial compliance, Barngrover, supra, 250 Ga. App. at 596 (4), and neither statute affirmatively requires prospective plaintiffs to identify themselves, see OCGA §§ 36- 11-1; 36-33-5, and so the material requirements of the statutes for the purposes of this appeal are identical. 10 conclude that the March 27, 2015 notice failed to satisfy the statutory presentment requirement.6 Nevertheless, although the notice was deficient, we agree with the plaintiffs that their complaint was sufficient to meet the statutory presentme