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9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yost v. Torokyellow2 sentences2020The Court then explained that the recent enactment of OCGA § 9-15-14 provided for some internal sanctions – namely, attorney fees and litigation expenses — but did not resolve the problems “relative to other elements of recovery, specifically: special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences[;] . . . or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4.” Yost, 256 Ga. at 95 (emphasis in original).12 At this point in the opinion, to conclude 12 OCGA § 9-15-14 says, in per 2018We need not determine for purposes of this appeal whether the statutorily defined "malice" required to establish an abusive litigation claim is identical to the "malice" required to establish mental distress damages. 15 As we have explained: Under Yost , a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: "special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness; or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4." (Citat | 3 | 3 |
Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2018We need not determine for purposes of this appeal whether the statutorily defined "malice" required to establish an abusive litigation claim is identical to the "malice" required to establish mental distress damages. 15 As we have explained: Under Yost , a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: "special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness; or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4." (Citat 2018We need not determine for purposes of this appeal whether the statutorily defined "malice" required to establish an abusive litigation claim is identical to the "malice" required to establish mental distress damages. 15 As we have explained: Under Yost , a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: "special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness; or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4." (Citat | 2 | 2 |
Dierkes v. Crawford Orthodontic Care, P.C.green2 sentences2024See 7 Of note, since it was last amended in 1987, OCGA § 51-12-6 has also provided that “punitive damages under Code Section . . . 51-12-5.1 shall not be awarded.” See Ga. L. 1987, p. 915, § 6. 9 Dierkes, 284 Ga. App. at 101 (4). 2024Auth. of Houston County, 239 Ga. App. 203, 204 (1) ( 521 SE2d 199 ) (1999); see also Dierkes, 284 Ga. App. at 101 (4).7 As it relates to Nayani’s claim of invasion of privacy, in which she effectively admits that she has not demonstrated general damages, Georgia law allows for the remedy of either nominal damages under OCGA § 51-12-4 or damages for injury to “peace, happiness, and feelings” pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-6 — but not both. | 1 | 1 |
Sletto v. Hospital Authority of Houston Countygreen2 sentences2024Auth. of Houston County, 239 Ga. App. 203, 204 (1) ( 521 SE2d 199 ) (1999); see also Dierkes, 284 Ga. App. at 101 (4).7 As it relates to Nayani’s claim of invasion of privacy, in which she effectively admits that she has not demonstrated general damages, Georgia law allows for the remedy of either nominal damages under OCGA § 51-12-4 or damages for injury to “peace, happiness, and feelings” pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-6 — but not both. 2024Auth. of Houston County, 239 Ga. App. 203, 204 (1) ( 521 SE2d 199 ) (1999); see also Dierkes, 284 Ga. App. at 101 (4).7 As it relates to Nayani’s claim of invasion of privacy, in which she effectively admits that she has not demonstrated general damages, Georgia law allows for the remedy of either nominal damages under OCGA § 51-12-4 or damages for injury to “peace, happiness, and feelings” pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-6 — but not both. | 1 | 1 |
Condon v. Vickerygreen2 sentences2018As noted by the trial court and the defendants, in Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 326-327 (3) (a) ( 606 SE2d 336 ) (2004), this Court stated that “the lawsuit contemplated by OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq. is appropriate in only two circumstances: when the allegedly abusive civil litigation occurs in a court other than one of record, or when the allegedly abused litigant can prove special damages in addition to the costs and expenses of litigation and attorney fees.” Notably, however, Condon addressed the application of OCGA § 9-15-14 and whether a motion under that statute could be renewed unde 2018As noted by the trial court and the defendants, in Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 326-327 (3) (a) ( 606 SE2d 336 ) (2004), this Court stated that “the lawsuit contemplated by OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq. is appropriate in only two circumstances: when the allegedly abusive civil litigation occurs in a court other than one of record, or when the allegedly abused litigant can prove special damages in addition to the costs and expenses of litigation and attorney fees.” Notably, however, Condon addressed the application of OCGA § 9-15-14 and whether a motion under that statute could be renewed unde | 1 | 1 |
Vogtle v. Colemangreen1 sentence2018See Vogtle, 259 Ga. at 116 (1); Yost, 256 Ga. at 95 (10); Woodall v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 Ga. App. 624, 626 ( 402 SE2d 359 ) (1991); Cassidy v. Wilson, 196 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 395 SE2d 291 ) (1990); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Phillips, 193 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 387 SE2d 34 ) (1989).15 Hence, even when construed strictly, OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) permits a party to forego 15 As we have explained: Under Yost, a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: “special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wil | 1 | 1 |
Woodall v. Hayt, Hayt & Landaugreen2 sentences2018See Vogtle, 259 Ga. at 116 (1); Yost, 256 Ga. at 95 (10); Woodall v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 Ga. App. 624, 626 ( 402 SE2d 359 ) (1991); Cassidy v. Wilson, 196 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 395 SE2d 291 ) (1990); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Phillips, 193 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 387 SE2d 34 ) (1989).15 Hence, even when construed strictly, OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) permits a party to forego 15 As we have explained: Under Yost, a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: “special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wil 2018See Vogtle, 259 Ga. at 116 (1); Yost, 256 Ga. at 95 (10); Woodall v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 Ga. App. 624, 626 ( 402 SE2d 359 ) (1991); Cassidy v. Wilson, 196 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 395 SE2d 291 ) (1990); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Phillips, 193 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 387 SE2d 34 ) (1989).15 Hence, even when construed strictly, OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) permits a party to forego 15 As we have explained: Under Yost, a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: “special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wil | 1 | 1 |
Cassidy v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2018See Vogtle, 259 Ga. at 116 (1); Yost, 256 Ga. at 95 (10); Woodall v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 Ga. App. 624, 626 ( 402 SE2d 359 ) (1991); Cassidy v. Wilson, 196 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 395 SE2d 291 ) (1990); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Phillips, 193 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 387 SE2d 34 ) (1989).15 Hence, even when construed strictly, OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) permits a party to forego 15 As we have explained: Under Yost, a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: “special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wil 2018See Vogtle, 259 Ga. at 116 (1); Yost, 256 Ga. at 95 (10); Woodall v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 Ga. App. 624, 626 ( 402 SE2d 359 ) (1991); Cassidy v. Wilson, 196 Ga. App. 6, 8 ( 395 SE2d 291 ) (1990); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Phillips, 193 Ga. App. 79, 80 (1) ( 387 SE2d 34 ) (1989).15 Hence, even when construed strictly, OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) permits a party to forego 15 As we have explained: Under Yost, a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: “special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wil | 1 | 1 |
Whitehead v. Cuffiegreen1 sentence1997Pursuant to that Code section, “[i]f an injury is small or the mitigating circumstances are strong, nominal damages only are given.” However, as stated above, no evidence of any injury has been shown. “[W]here there is no evidence of injury accompanying the tort, an essential element of the tort is lacking, thereby entitling the defendant to judgment in his favor.” Whitehead, supra at 353 (2). | 1 | 1 |
Zepp v. Toporekgreen2 sentences1993The mere fact that his former marital status may be restored by setting the divorce aside does not change this result. “[I]t is not the law in this state that clients seeking to sue their attorneys for malpractice or misconduct which resulted in an adverse or unacceptable judgment must first set aside that judgment before proceeding against their attorneys.” Zepp v. Toporek, 211 Ga. App. 169, 172 ( 438 SE2d 636 ) (1993). 1993The mere fact that his former marital status may be restored by setting the divorce aside does not change this result. “[I]t is not the law in this state that clients seeking to sue their attorneys for malpractice or misconduct which resulted in an adverse or unacceptable judgment must first set aside that judgment before proceeding against their attorneys.” Zepp v. Toporek, 211 Ga. App. 169, 172 ( 438 SE2d 636 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy
green
2 sentences1991Yost v. Torok, supra at 95 , however, specifically authorizes the award of "special damages, other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness (see Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 252 Ga. 149 ( 311 SE2d 818 ) (1984)); or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4." Therefore, the issue here is whether Fabe's actions in filing a lawsuit which was completely without a justiciable issue were wilful or the equivalent of wilfulness. 1991Yost v. Torok, supra at 95 , however, specifically authorizes the award of "special damages, other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness (see Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 252 Ga. 149 ( 311 SE2d 818 ) (1984)); or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4." Therefore, the issue here is whether Fabe's actions in filing a lawsuit which was completely without a justiciable issue were wilful or the equivalent of wilfulness. | 3 | 1986–1991 |
Central Virginia Community College v. Katz
green
2 sentences2018We need not determine for purposes of this appeal whether the statutorily defined "malice" required to establish an abusive litigation claim is identical to the "malice" required to establish mental distress damages. 15 As we have explained: Under Yost , a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: "special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness; or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4." (Citat 2018We need not determine for purposes of this appeal whether the statutorily defined "malice" required to establish an abusive litigation claim is identical to the "malice" required to establish mental distress damages. 15 As we have explained: Under Yost , a plaintiff who has been subjected to abusive litigation can recover: "special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; damages for mental distress, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness; or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4." (Citat | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lott v. Hatcher
green
2 sentences2018But "an admission in judicio applies only to the admission of fact and does not apply where the admission is merely the opinion or conclusion of the pleader as to law or fact." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lott v. Hatcher , 275 Ga. App. 424 , 425, 620 S.E.2d 651 (2005). 2018But "an admission in judicio applies only to the admission of fact and does not apply where the admission is merely the opinion or conclusion of the pleader as to law or fact." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lott v. Hatcher , 275 Ga. App. 424 , 425, 620 S.E.2d 651 (2005). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Stepperson, Inc. v. Long
green
2 sentences1989There we said: we have outlined . . . other elements of recovery, specifically: special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; DAMAGES FOR MENTAL DISTRESS, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness (see Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 252 Ga. 149 ( 311 SE2d 818 ) (1984)); or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4. [Emphasis in original, capitalization added.] In a footnote, it was pointed out that “[p]unitive damages [under OCGA § 51-12-5], however, are excluded, as the tort 1989There we said: we have outlined . . . other elements of recovery, specifically: special damages other than attorney fees and expenses of litigation; DAMAGES FOR MENTAL DISTRESS, where there is either wilfulness, or wanton and reckless disregard of consequences which is the equivalent of wilfulness (see Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 252 Ga. 149 ( 311 SE2d 818 ) (1984)); or nominal damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-4. [Emphasis in original, capitalization added.] In a footnote, it was pointed out that “[p]unitive damages [under OCGA § 51-12-5], however, are excluded, as the tort | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.