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9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Porquez v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2003See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1) ( 492 SE2d 665 ) (1997) (“Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act so long as such a construction does not detract from the purpose of § 9-11-9.1, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.”). 2003See Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga.App. 461 -462, 588 S.E.2d 294 (2003). [10] 247 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001). [11] See id.; see also OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e) (addressing use of the renewal statute in professional negligence cases). [12] See id. [13] OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b); see also Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-333 (2), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999) (construing former version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b)). [14] See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997) ("Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed | 4 | 4 |
Gala v. Fishergreen2 sentences2020Moreover, “because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act, so long as such a construction does not detract from the [statute’s] purpose, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gala v. Fisher, 296 Ga. 870, 875 ( 770 SE2d 879 ) (2015). 2020Moreover, “because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act, so long as such a construction does not detract from the [statute’s] purpose, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gala v. Fisher, 296 Ga. 870, 875 ( 770 SE2d 879 ) (2015). | 3 | 3 |
Gadd v. WILSON & COMPANY, ENGINEERS & ARCHITECTSgreen2 sentences1998See also Gadd v. Wilson &c., 262 Ga. 234, 235 ( 416 SE2d 285 ) (1992). 1998See also Gadd v. Wilson &c., 262 Ga. 234, 235 ( 416 SE2d 285 ) (1992). | 2 | 3 |
Glisson v. HOSPITAL AUTH. OF VALDOSTAgreen2 sentences2025“This [C]ourt has repeatedly held that the spirit and intent of the Civil Practice Act require that pleadings are to be liberally construed in favor of the pleader[, and t]he language of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) shows a clear legislative intent to give a plaintiff extra time to secure an affidavit when the statute of limitation is about to expire.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Glisson, 224 Ga. App. at 654 (1). [B]ecause OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the li 2003See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1) ( 492 SE2d 665 ) (1997) (“Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act so long as such a construction does not detract from the purpose of § 9-11-9.1, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.”). | 2 | 2 |
Porquez v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2003See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1) ( 492 SE2d 665 ) (1997) (“Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act so long as such a construction does not detract from the purpose of § 9-11-9.1, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.”). 2003See Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga.App. 461 -462, 588 S.E.2d 294 (2003). [10] 247 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001). [11] See id.; see also OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e) (addressing use of the renewal statute in professional negligence cases). [12] See id. [13] OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b); see also Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-333 (2), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999) (construing former version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b)). [14] See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997) ("Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed | 1 | 2 |
Graham v. Reynoldsgreen1 sentence2020Accordingly, “[p]laintiffs are given a wide berth to conform to the statutory requirements, and in ruling on a motion to dismiss based on an allegedly defective affidavit, a court should construe the affidavit most favorably to the plaintiff and all doubts should be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, even if an unfavorable construction of the affidavit may be possible.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Graham, 343 Ga. App. at 280 (3). | 1 | 1 |
Grier-Baxter v. Sibleygreen2 sentences2003See Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga.App. 461 -462, 588 S.E.2d 294 (2003). [10] 247 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001). [11] See id.; see also OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e) (addressing use of the renewal statute in professional negligence cases). [12] See id. [13] OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b); see also Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-333 (2), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999) (construing former version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b)). [14] See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997) ("Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed 2003See Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga.App. 461 -462, 588 S.E.2d 294 (2003). [10] 247 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001). [11] See id.; see also OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e) (addressing use of the renewal statute in professional negligence cases). [12] See id. [13] OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b); see also Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-333 (2), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999) (construing former version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b)). [14] See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997) ("Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed | 1 | 1 |
Fales v. Jacobsgreen2 sentences2003See Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga.App. 461 -462, 588 S.E.2d 294 (2003). [10] 247 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001). [11] See id.; see also OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e) (addressing use of the renewal statute in professional negligence cases). [12] See id. [13] OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b); see also Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-333 (2), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999) (construing former version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b)). [14] See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997) ("Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed 2003See Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga.App. 461 -462, 588 S.E.2d 294 (2003). [10] 247 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001). [11] See id.; see also OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e) (addressing use of the renewal statute in professional negligence cases). [12] See id. [13] OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b); see also Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-333 (2), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999) (construing former version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b)). [14] See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997) ("Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed | 1 | 1 |
Tante v. Herringgreen2 sentences2003Co., 256 Ga.App. 266 , 568 S.E.2d 85 (2002), aff'd, 276 Ga. 697 , 583 S.E.2d 22 (2003). [16] Id. [17] Labovitz, supra at 334 (3), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999). [18] See id. at 337 , 519 S.E.2d 672 . [19] See id. [20] See id.; Tante v. Herring, 264 Ga. 694, 695 (2), 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994) (no expert affidavit needed where breach of fiduciary duty claim is not based on negligence involving attorney's performance of legal services); Boggs v. Bosley Med. 2003Co., 256 Ga.App. 266 , 568 S.E.2d 85 (2002), aff'd, 276 Ga. 697 , 583 S.E.2d 22 (2003). [16] Id. [17] Labovitz, supra at 334 (3), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999). [18] See id. at 337 , 519 S.E.2d 672 . [19] See id. [20] See id.; Tante v. Herring, 264 Ga. 694, 695 (2), 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994) (no expert affidavit needed where breach of fiduciary duty claim is not based on negligence involving attorney's performance of legal services); Boggs v. Bosley Med. | 1 | 1 |
Labovitz v. Hopkinsongreen2 sentences2003See Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga.App. 461 -462, 588 S.E.2d 294 (2003). [10] 247 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001). [11] See id.; see also OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e) (addressing use of the renewal statute in professional negligence cases). [12] See id. [13] OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b); see also Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-333 (2), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999) (construing former version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b)). [14] See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997) ("Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed 2003See Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga.App. 461 -462, 588 S.E.2d 294 (2003). [10] 247 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 545 S.E.2d 5 (2001). [11] See id.; see also OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e) (addressing use of the renewal statute in professional negligence cases). [12] See id. [13] OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b); see also Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-333 (2), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999) (construing former version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b)). [14] See Glisson, supra; see also Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (1), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997) ("Because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Printis v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Co., 256 Ga.App. 266 , 568 S.E.2d 85 (2002), aff'd, 276 Ga. 697 , 583 S.E.2d 22 (2003). [16] Id. [17] Labovitz, supra at 334 (3), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999). [18] See id. at 337 , 519 S.E.2d 672 . [19] See id. [20] See id.; Tante v. Herring, 264 Ga. 694, 695 (2), 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994) (no expert affidavit needed where breach of fiduciary duty claim is not based on negligence involving attorney's performance of legal services); Boggs v. Bosley Med. 2003Co., 256 Ga.App. 266 , 568 S.E.2d 85 (2002), aff'd, 276 Ga. 697 , 583 S.E.2d 22 (2003). [16] Id. [17] Labovitz, supra at 334 (3), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999). [18] See id. at 337 , 519 S.E.2d 672 . [19] See id. [20] See id.; Tante v. Herring, 264 Ga. 694, 695 (2), 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994) (no expert affidavit needed where breach of fiduciary duty claim is not based on negligence involving attorney's performance of legal services); Boggs v. Bosley Med. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Printis v. Bankers Life Insurance
neutral
2 sentences2003Co., 256 Ga.App. 266 , 568 S.E.2d 85 (2002), aff'd, 276 Ga. 697 , 583 S.E.2d 22 (2003). [16] Id. [17] Labovitz, supra at 334 (3), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999). [18] See id. at 337 , 519 S.E.2d 672 . [19] See id. [20] See id.; Tante v. Herring, 264 Ga. 694, 695 (2), 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994) (no expert affidavit needed where breach of fiduciary duty claim is not based on negligence involving attorney's performance of legal services); Boggs v. Bosley Med. 2003Co., 256 Ga.App. 266 , 568 S.E.2d 85 (2002), aff'd, 276 Ga. 697 , 583 S.E.2d 22 (2003). [16] Id. [17] Labovitz, supra at 334 (3), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999). [18] See id. at 337 , 519 S.E.2d 672 . [19] See id. [20] See id.; Tante v. Herring, 264 Ga. 694, 695 (2), 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994) (no expert affidavit needed where breach of fiduciary duty claim is not based on negligence involving attorney's performance of legal services); Boggs v. Bosley Med. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.