defendant asserts claim in Illinois

2006People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 125 , 636 N.E.2d 485, 497 (1994).

2006People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 125 , 636 N.E.2d 485, 497 (1994).

2017The defendant asserts that defense counsel’s errors during his opening statements, and during his questioning of the defendant, unfairly prejudiced the defense because the jury was needlessly given some details of a prior conviction, which included violence, and was permitted to speculate as to the extent of the injury caused when the clerk was struck with the Coke can. ¶ 35 Our courts have voiced concerns that providing proof of an accused’s “penchant for criminal behavior would control the decision-making process, resulting in convictions based upon past guilt instead of current evidence.” P

2017The defendant asserts that defense counsel’s errors during his opening statements, and during his questioning of the defendant, unfairly prejudiced the defense because the jury was needlessly given some details of a prior conviction, which included violence, and was permitted to speculate as to the extent of the injury caused when the clerk was struck with the Coke can. ¶ 35 Our courts have voiced concerns that providing proof of an accused’s “penchant for criminal behavior would control the decision-making process, resulting in convictions based upon past guilt instead of current evidence.” P

2001When a defendant asserts a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the statute “ ‘operates to prevent the constitutional claim from arising except in cases involving prolonged delay or novel issues.’ ” People v. Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d 437, 441 (1973), quoting People v. Stuckey, 34 Ill. 2d 521, 523 (1966).

2001When a defendant asserts a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the statute “ ‘operates to prevent the constitutional claim from arising except in cases involving prolonged delay or novel issues.’ ” People v. Anderson , 53 Ill. 2d 437, 441 (1973), quoting People v. Stuckey , 34 Ill. 2d 521, 523 (1966).

2001When a defendant asserts a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the statute “ ‘operates to prevent the constitutional claim from arising except in cases involving prolonged delay or novel issues.’ ” People v. Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d 437, 441 (1973), quoting People v. Stuckey, 34 Ill. 2d 521, 523 (1966).

2001When a defendant asserts a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the statute “ ‘operates to prevent the constitutional claim from arising except in cases involving prolonged delay or novel issues.’ ” People v. Anderson , 53 Ill. 2d 437, 441 (1973), quoting People v. Stuckey , 34 Ill. 2d 521, 523 (1966).

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding (People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” ( People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding ( People v. Burgess , 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris , 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page , 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell , 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding (People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” ( People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding ( People v. Burgess , 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris , 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page , 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell , 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding (People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” ( People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding ( People v. Burgess , 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris , 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page , 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell , 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding (People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” ( People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding ( People v. Burgess , 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris , 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page , 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell , 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding (People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” ( People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding ( People v. Burgess , 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris , 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page , 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell , 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding (People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

1998Our court has repeatedly rejected this contention, however, concluding that the argument “rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language” ( People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 539 (1992)), and we continue to adhere to that holding ( People v. Burgess , 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322 (1997); People v. Harris , 164 Ill. 2d 322, 350 (1994); People v. Page , 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283 (1993); People v. Mitchell , 152 Ill. 2d 274, 345-46 (1992); People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992)). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

2011People v. Smith, 191 Ill.2d 408, 411 , 247 Ill.Dec. 458 , 732 N.E.2d 513 (2000).

2011People v. Smith, 191 Ill.2d 408, 411 , 247 Ill.Dec. 458 , 732 N.E.2d 513 (2000).

2025“To show an actual conflict of interest, a defendant must point to ‘ “some specific defect in his counsel’s strategy, tactics, or decision making attributable to [a] conflict.” ’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Morales, 209 Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2004) quoting People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d, 1, 18 (1988)). ¶ 16 In People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (3d) 140921 , defendant was convicted of domestic battery and filed a pro se posttrial letter in which he claimed, among other things, that one of his witnesses had not been called to testify.

2025“To show an actual conflict of interest, a defendant must point to ‘ “some specific defect in his counsel’s strategy, tactics, or decision making attributable to [a] conflict.” ’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Morales, 209 Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2004) quoting People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d, 1, 18 (1988)). ¶ 16 In People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (3d) 140921 , defendant was convicted of domestic battery and filed a pro se posttrial letter in which he claimed, among other things, that one of his witnesses had not been called to testify.

2025Here, the defendant asserts that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest at the second amended motion hearing. ¶ 15 A defendant may establish a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel “by showing an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his counsel’s performance.” People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d 134, 144 (2008).

2025“To show an actual conflict of interest, a defendant must point to ‘ “some specific defect in his counsel’s strategy, tactics, or decision making attributable to [a] conflict.” ’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Morales, 209 Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2004) quoting People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d, 1, 18 (1988)). ¶ 16 In People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (3d) 140921 , defendant was convicted of domestic battery and filed a pro se posttrial letter in which he claimed, among other things, that one of his witnesses had not been called to testify.

2023Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459 (cause and prejudice test is an exception to section 122-3). ¶ 77 Except when a defendant asserts a claim of actual innocence, the Postconviction Act allows circuit courts to grant leave to file a successive postconviction petition “only” if a defendant can satisfy both prongs of this cause and prejudice test. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018); Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14 ; People v. Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 27 .

2021Where, as here, a defendant asserts a claim of ineffective assistance during the guilty-plea process, defendant must establish that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and also that “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 26 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ).