material witness rule in Illinois

2005Such a requirement would not only serve to resurrect the now-defunct "material witness" rule, which mandated that all individuals involved in procuring an allegedly involuntary confession testify during a motion to suppress that confession (see People v. R.D., 155 Ill.2d 122, 143-44 , 184 Ill.Dec. 389 , 613 N.E.2d 706 (1993) (repudiating the material witness rule in its entirety)), but also extend that discarded rule into areas where our supreme court has explicitly refused to go (see People v. Stokes, 46 Ill.2d 325, 327-28 , 263 N.E.2d 21 (1970) (refusing to extend the material witness rule t

2005Such a requirement would not only serve to resurrect the now-defunct "material witness" rule, which mandated that all individuals involved in procuring an allegedly involuntary confession testify during a motion to suppress that confession (see People v. R.D., 155 Ill.2d 122, 143-44 , 184 Ill.Dec. 389 , 613 N.E.2d 706 (1993) (repudiating the material witness rule in its entirety)), but also extend that discarded rule into areas where our supreme court has explicitly refused to go (see People v. Stokes, 46 Ill.2d 325, 327-28 , 263 N.E.2d 21 (1970) (refusing to extend the material witness rule t

2004People v. Feagans, 134 Ill.

2004People v. Feagans , 134 Ill.

1997Though he acknowledges the demise of the material witness rule,” a rule which was born out of dicta in the case of People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578 , 136 N.E. 470 (1922) (see People v. R.D., 155 Ill. 2d 122 , 613 N.E.2d 706 (1993)), he claims that People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414 , 610 N.E.2d 16 (1992), requires a trial court to make a specific finding that the testimony of the absent material witness is not necessary to the question of voluntariness.

1997Though he acknowledges the demise of the material witness rule,” a rule which was born out of dicta in the case of People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578 , 136 N.E. 470 (1922) (see People v. R.D., 155 Ill. 2d 122 , 613 N.E.2d 706 (1993)), he claims that People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414 , 610 N.E.2d 16 (1992), requires a trial court to make a specific finding that the testimony of the absent material witness is not necessary to the question of voluntariness.

1993JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court: The State, in these consolidated appeals, asks this court to redefine and to limit the scope of the material witness rule (People v. Armstrong (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 471, 475-76 ; People v. Rogers (1922), 303 Ill. 578 ; Ill. Rev.

1989The State responds that the defendant has waived this issue by failing to object to the State's failure to call the witnesses in the trial court and by failing to raise the issue in his motion for a new trial. *202 The material-witness rule calls upon the State to produce or explain the absence of all material witnesses connected with the taking of a confession whenever the voluntary nature of a confession is brought into question by a motion to suppress. ( People v. Armstrong (1972), 51 Ill.2d 471, 475-76 ; People v. Rogers (1922), 303 Ill. 578 .) Section 114-11 of the Code of Criminal Proced

1993See Sims, 21 Ill. 2d at 434 (House, J., specially concurring, joined by Bristow and Klingbiel, JJ.); cf. Brooks, 115 Ill. 2d 510 .” (Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 450 .) The Patterson court determined that the material witness rule should no longer be applied mechanically to reverse a defendant’s conviction or the trial court’s ruling upon a motion to suppress simply because all material witnesses were not called.

1992(People v. Sims (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 425, 429 ; see People v. Brooks (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 510, 518 .) In the final analysis, whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary is a matter of competency of the evidence which should be left to the discretion of the trial court.

1992(Cf. In re Lamb (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 383 .) The purpose of the material witness rule is to safeguard against improperly induced confessions and not to require an empty exercise.

1976(In re Lamb, 61 Ill. 2d 383 , 336 N.E.2d 753 ; People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398 , 207 N.E.2d 68 ; People v. Joe, 31 Ill. 2d 220 , 201 N.E.2d 416 ; People v. Freeman, 25 Ill. 2d 88 , 182 N.E.2d 677 ; People v. Sims, 21 Ill. 2d 425 , 173 N.E.2d 494 .) Similarly, an appellate court has held that the material witness rule did not apply to the giving of the Miranda warnings where there was no contention of coercion.

1997Though he acknowledges the demise of the material witness rule,” a rule which was born out of dicta in the case of People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578 , 136 N.E. 470 (1922) (see People v. R.D., 155 Ill. 2d 122 , 613 N.E.2d 706 (1993)), he claims that People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414 , 610 N.E.2d 16 (1992), requires a trial court to make a specific finding that the testimony of the absent material witness is not necessary to the question of voluntariness.

1997Though he acknowledges the demise of the material witness rule,” a rule which was born out of dicta in the case of People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578 , 136 N.E. 470 (1922) (see People v. R.D., 155 Ill. 2d 122 , 613 N.E.2d 706 (1993)), he claims that People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414 , 610 N.E.2d 16 (1992), requires a trial court to make a specific finding that the testimony of the absent material witness is not necessary to the question of voluntariness.

1988(People v. McClure (1976), 43 Ill.

1980People v. McClure (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 1059 , 358 N.E.2d 23 .

1984App. 3d 621, 624 , 410 N.E.2d 121, 123 .

1984The material witness rule requires that the “State must produce all material witnesses, that is, all witnesses whose testimony is material to the issue of the voluntariness of the challenged statement. [Citations.] This rule is a safeguard against the use of improperly induced or coerced confessions by the State. [Citation.] Alternatively, the State could explain the failure of such a witness to testify.” People v. Robinson (1980), 87 Ill.

1983App. 3d 859 , 316 N.E.2d 37 .) Consequently, the trial judge was correct in his decision that the State had not violated the material witness rule and defendant’s confession should not be suppressed on that ground.

1976People v. Richardson, 21 Ill.

1994App. 3d 252 (where appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial because of the State’s failure to present a material witness at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to authorities, circuit court could on remand hold new evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress the statements; doctrine of law of the case did not prevent trial court from holding a de novo evidentiary hearing); People v. Sampson (1980), 86 Ill.

1993(See, e.g., Remeta v. State (1989), 300 Ark. 92 , 777 S.W.2d 833 ; Commonwealth v. Howard (1976), 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476 , 350 N.E.2d 721 ; Commonwealth v. Moore (1971), 443 Pa. 364 , 279 A.2d 179 .) The State urges this court to join the overwhelming majority of States which do not place such a burden on the prosecution.

1993(See, e.g., Remeta v. State (1989), 300 Ark. 92 , 777 S.W.2d 833 ; Commonwealth v. Howard (1976), 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476 , 350 N.E.2d 721 ; Commonwealth v. Moore (1971), 443 Pa. 364 , 279 A.2d 179 .) The State urges this court to join the overwhelming majority of States which do not place such a burden on the prosecution.

1993(See, e.g., Remeta v. State (1989), 300 Ark. 92 , 777 S.W.2d 833 ; Commonwealth v. Howard (1976), 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476 , 350 N.E.2d 721 ; Commonwealth v. Moore (1971), 443 Pa. 364 , 279 A.2d 179 .) The State urges this court to join the overwhelming majority of States which do not place such a burden on the prosecution.

1993(See, e.g., Remeta v. State (1989), 300 Ark. 92 , 777 S.W.2d 833 ; Commonwealth v. Howard (1976), 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476 , 350 N.E.2d 721 ; Commonwealth v. Moore (1971), 443 Pa. 364 , 279 A.2d 179 .) The State urges this court to join the overwhelming majority of States which do not place such a burden on the prosecution.

1993The court refused to apply the material witness rule in such circumstances, stating: “We feel that the circumstances which gave rise to the rule in the earlier confession cases do not exist in the present identification cases, particularly with the advent of United, States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 , 87 S. Ct. 1951 ; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 , 87 S. Ct. 1967 .

1993The court refused to apply the material witness rule in such circumstances, stating: “We feel that the circumstances which gave rise to the rule in the earlier confession cases do not exist in the present identification cases, particularly with the advent of United, States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 , 87 S. Ct. 1951 ; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 , 87 S. Ct. 1967 .

1993The court refused to apply the material witness rule in such circumstances, stating: “We feel that the circumstances which gave rise to the rule in the earlier confession cases do not exist in the present identification cases, particularly with the advent of United, States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 , 87 S. Ct. 1951 ; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 , 87 S. Ct. 1967 .

1993The court refused to apply the material witness rule in such circumstances, stating: “We feel that the circumstances which gave rise to the rule in the earlier confession cases do not exist in the present identification cases, particularly with the advent of United, States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 , 87 S. Ct. 1951 ; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 , 87 S. Ct. 1967 .

1993The court refused to apply the material witness rule in such circumstances, stating: “We feel that the circumstances which gave rise to the rule in the earlier confession cases do not exist in the present identification cases, particularly with the advent of United, States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 , 87 S. Ct. 1951 ; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 , 87 S. Ct. 1967 .

1993The court refused to apply the material witness rule in such circumstances, stating: “We feel that the circumstances which gave rise to the rule in the earlier confession cases do not exist in the present identification cases, particularly with the advent of United, States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 , 87 S. Ct. 1951 ; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 , 87 S. Ct. 1967 .

1993(See, e.g., Remeta v. State (1989), 300 Ark. 92 , 777 S.W.2d 833 ; Commonwealth v. Howard (1976), 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476 , 350 N.E.2d 721 ; Commonwealth v. Moore (1971), 443 Pa. 364 , 279 A.2d 179 .) The State urges this court to join the overwhelming majority of States which do not place such a burden on the prosecution.

1993(See, e.g., Remeta v. State (1989), 300 Ark. 92 , 777 S.W.2d 833 ; Commonwealth v. Howard (1976), 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476 , 350 N.E.2d 721 ; Commonwealth v. Moore (1971), 443 Pa. 364 , 279 A.2d 179 .) The State urges this court to join the overwhelming majority of States which do not place such a burden on the prosecution.

1992People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178, 202 , 547 N.E.2d 145 ; People v. Ralon (1991), 211 Ill.

1992People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178, 202 , 547 N.E.2d 145 ; People v. Ralon (1991), 211 Ill.

1992(People v. Bell (1971), 50 Ill.

1992People v. Smith (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 328, 333 .

1992(Ralon, 211 Ill.

1992People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178, 202 , 547 N.E.2d 145 ; People v. Ralon (1991), 211 Ill.

1991Defendant relies on People v. Peck (1974), 18 Ill.

1987(People v. Jennings (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 610, 618 .) Thus, we fail to see how the evidence mentioned above, without more, would establish Edwards as a material witness, and therefore the State was not required to present his testimony at the suppression hearing.

1985(People v. Terrell (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 60 ; People v. French (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 146 .) In the instant case, the defendant argues that he did object when Officer Hannan attempted to testify- as to what the defendant told him and that, while the ground for this objection was not clearly stated, this court should infer that the ground was voluntariness because that was the only possible ground to suppress the statement.

1985(People v. Terrell (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 60 ; People v. French (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 146 .) In the instant case, the defendant argues that he did object when Officer Hannan attempted to testify- as to what the defendant told him and that, while the ground for this objection was not clearly stated, this court should infer that the ground was voluntariness because that was the only possible ground to suppress the statement.

1984App. 3d 807, 814 , 420 N.E.2d 544 , we discussed the application of the material witness rule: “We have noted that the rule at issue is a practical one, intended to aid the trial court in its determination of voluntariness.

1984In People v. Monroe (1981), 95 Ill.

1984(In re J.C.) When, as here, a defendant “does not receive a full evidentiary hearing in the trial court on the voluntariness of his confession, including the rights afforded him by Miranda,” it is proper to remand the case for a “new full and complete hearing on the admissibility of the defendant’s confession.” People v. White (1973), 10 Ill.