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9 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Abeyta v. Bumper to Bumper Auto Salvagegreen2 sentences2019See Abeyta, 14 2005-NMCA-087, ¶ 19 (“Once [the e]mployer rejected [the w]orker’s offer, [the 15 e]mployer became vulnerable to the fee[-]shifting provision of Section 52-1- 16 54(F)(4) if the final compensation order exceeded [the w]orker’s offer.”). 17 {21} Worker’s failure to show that his acceptance of the recommended resolution 18 was a valid offer of judgment under Section 52-1-54(F) and as required by Baker is 19 fatal to his argument. 2019See Abeyta, 2005-NMCA-087, ¶ 19 (“Once [the e]mployer rejected [the w]orker’s offer, [the e]mployer became vulnerable to the fee[-]shifting provision of Section 52-1-54(F)(4) if the final compensation order exceeded [the w]orker’s offer.”). {21} Worker’s failure to show that his acceptance of the recommended resolution was a valid offer of judgment under Section 52-1-54(F) and as required by Baker is fatal to his argument. | 2 | 2 |
Scott v. Transwestern Tankers, Inc.green2 sentences2025Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, Range 2 of Compensable Consequences §§ 10.01-.12 (current through Dec. 2024); id. § 10.01 3 (“The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original 4 injury or a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural result 5 of a compensable primary injury.”); id. § 10.02 (“If an injury is compensable, every 6 natural consequence of that injury is also compensable.”); see also Scott v. 7 Transwestern Tankers, Inc., 1963-NMSC-205 , ¶ 7, 73 N.M. 219 , 387 P.2d 327 8 (“Medical and surgical treatment 2025Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, Range 2 of Compensable Consequences §§ 10.01-.12 (current through Dec. 2024); id. § 10.01 3 (“The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original 4 injury or a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural result 5 of a compensable primary injury.”); id. § 10.02 (“If an injury is compensable, every 6 natural consequence of that injury is also compensable.”); see also Scott v. 7 Transwestern Tankers, Inc., 1963-NMSC-205 , ¶ 7, 73 N.M. 219 , 387 P.2d 327 8 (“Medical and surgical treatment | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Corn v. New Mexico Educators Federal Credit Unionyellow2 sentences2002In Corn v. New Mexico Educators Federal Credit Union, 119 N.M. 199, 207-08 , 889 P.2d 234, 242-43 (Ct.App.1994), overruled by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 32 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 , this Court held that the statutory cap on attorney fees violated equal protection in the absence of restrictions on employers’ legal fees. 2002In Corn v. New Mexico Educators Federal Credit Union, 119 N.M. 199, 207-08 , 889 P.2d 234, 242-43 (Ct.App.1994), overruled by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 32 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 , this Court held that the statutory cap on attorney fees violated equal protection in the absence of restrictions on employers’ legal fees. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baca v. Employment Services Division of the Human Services Department
green
2 sentences2025Dep’t, 1982-NMSC-096 , ¶ 4, 7 98 N.M. 617 , 651 P.2d 1261 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 8 {29} The parties agree that the slip-and-fall injury was a “single accidental injury” 9 for purposes of awarding attorney fees under Section 52-1-54(I) (2013). 2025Dep’t, 1982-NMSC-096 , ¶ 4, 7 98 N.M. 617 , 651 P.2d 1261 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 8 {29} The parties agree that the slip-and-fall injury was a “single accidental injury” 9 for purposes of awarding attorney fees under Section 52-1-54(I) (2013). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ullman v. Safeway Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2025Co., 2023-NMSC-030 , ¶ 44, 539 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks 10 and citation omitted). 11 {62} Regarding the first factor, because the attorney fee cap in Section 52-1-54(I) 12 has applied to workers’ compensation appeals in the courts from 1987 until now, 13 and no cases have presaged our decision, our holding “decid[es] an issue of first 14 impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.” Beavers, 1994-NMSC- 15 094, ¶ 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Martinez v. CITIES OF GOLD
green
2 sentences2011Martinez I, 2009-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 33-36 , 146 N.M. 735 , 215 P.3d 44 . {8} Our Supreme Court denied Worker’s petition for writ of certiorari, Martinez v. Cities of Gold, 2009-NMCERT-007 , 147 N.M. 361 , 223 P.3d 358 , and on August 18, 2009, this Court issued a mandate remanding the case to the WCJ for further proceedings consistent with the Martinez I opinion. {9} After the mandate issued, Worker filed a motion to compel payment records and to enforce the compensation order and Court of Appeals mandate. 2011Martinez I, 2009-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 33-36 , 146 N.M. 735 , 215 P.3d 44 . {8} Our Supreme Court denied Worker’s petition for writ of certiorari, Martinez v. Cities of Gold, 2009-NMCERT-007 , 147 N.M. 361 , 223 P.3d 358 , and on August 18, 2009, this Court issued a mandate remanding the case to the WCJ for further proceedings consistent with the Martinez I opinion. {9} After the mandate issued, Worker filed a motion to compel payment records and to enforce the compensation order and Court of Appeals mandate. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ezell v. Rocha
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1 sentence2011Martinez I, 2009-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 33-36 , 146 N.M. 735 , 215 P.3d 44 . {8} Our Supreme Court denied Worker’s petition for writ of certiorari, Martinez v. Cities of Gold, 2009-NMCERT-007 , 147 N.M. 361 , 223 P.3d 358 , and on August 18, 2009, this Court issued a mandate remanding the case to the WCJ for further proceedings consistent with the Martinez I opinion. {9} After the mandate issued, Worker filed a motion to compel payment records and to enforce the compensation order and Court of Appeals mandate. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Martinez v. CITIES OF GOLD CASINO
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2 sentences2011Martinez I, 2009-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 33-36 , 146 N.M. 735 , 215 P.3d 44 . {8} Our Supreme Court denied Worker’s petition for writ of certiorari, Martinez v. Cities of Gold, 2009-NMCERT-007 , 147 N.M. 361 , 223 P.3d 358 , and on August 18, 2009, this Court issued a mandate remanding the case to the WCJ for further proceedings consistent with the Martinez I opinion. {9} After the mandate issued, Worker filed a motion to compel payment records and to enforce the compensation order and Court of Appeals mandate. 2011Martinez I, 2009-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 33-36 , 146 N.M. 735 , 215 P.3d 44 . {8} Our Supreme Court denied Worker’s petition for writ of certiorari, Martinez v. Cities of Gold, 2009-NMCERT-007 , 147 N.M. 361 , 223 P.3d 358 , and on August 18, 2009, this Court issued a mandate remanding the case to the WCJ for further proceedings consistent with the Martinez I opinion. {9} After the mandate issued, Worker filed a motion to compel payment records and to enforce the compensation order and Court of Appeals mandate. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rumpf v. Rainbo Baking Co.
green
2 sentences2007While Rumpf indicates that a WCJ may reserve jurisdiction to consider awarding attorney fees, even where there is no compensation order, see Rumpf, 96 N.M. at 3 , 626 P.2d at 1305 , we do not believe that the case stands for the proposition that no compensation order is necessary to determine whether to shift fees under Section 52-1-54(F). 2007While Rumpf indicates that a WCJ may reserve jurisdiction to consider awarding attorney fees, even where there is no compensation order, see Rumpf, 96 N.M. at 3 , 626 P.2d at 1305 , we do not believe that the case stands for the proposition that no compensation order is necessary to determine whether to shift fees under Section 52-1-54(F). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque
green
2 sentences2002In Corn v. New Mexico Educators Federal Credit Union, 119 N.M. 199, 207-08 , 889 P.2d 234, 242-43 (Ct.App.1994), overruled by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 32 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 , this Court held that the statutory cap on attorney fees violated equal protection in the absence of restrictions on employers’ legal fees. 2002In Corn v. New Mexico Educators Federal Credit Union, 119 N.M. 199, 207-08 , 889 P.2d 234, 242-43 (Ct.App.1994), overruled by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 32 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 , this Court held that the statutory cap on attorney fees violated equal protection in the absence of restrictions on employers’ legal fees. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Mieras v. Dyncorp
green
2 sentences2002However, as this Court observed in Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095 , ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 401 , 925 P.2d 518 , the legislature remedied the constitutional infirmity addressed in Com by amending Section 52-1-54(1) to make the cap applicable to both claimants and employers. 2002However, as this Court observed in Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095 , ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 401 , 925 P.2d 518 , the legislature remedied the constitutional infirmity addressed in Com by amending Section 52-1-54(1) to make the cap applicable to both claimants and employers. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra
green
2 sentences1986In contrast, Section 52-1-54(D) permits fee awards when “the claimant shall thereafter collect compensation through court proceedings.” See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra, 92 N.M. 47 , 582 P.2d 819 (1978). 1986In contrast, Section 52-1-54(D) permits fee awards when “the claimant shall thereafter collect compensation through court proceedings.” See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra, 92 N.M. 47 , 582 P.2d 819 (1978). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Keyser v. Research Cottrell Company
green
2 sentences1981Section 52-1-54(D) sets forth factors which "must" be considered in awarding an attorney fee, called mandatory factors in Keyser v. Research Cottrell Company, 84 N.M. 173 , 500 P.2d 997 (Ct.App. 1972), and called statutory requirements in Fryar v. Johnsen, supra . 1981Section 52-1-54(D) sets forth factors which "must" be considered in awarding an attorney fee, called mandatory factors in Keyser v. Research Cottrell Company, 84 N.M. 173 , 500 P.2d 997 (Ct.App. 1972), and called statutory requirements in Fryar v. Johnsen, supra . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Trujillo v. Tanuz
green
2 sentences1981Section 52-1-54(D) does not authorize a fee award based on the percentage of recovery; the authorization for an attorney fee in § 52-1-54(D) "is not based on the contingent fee standard." Trujillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35 , 508 P.2d 1332 (Ct.App. 1973). 1981Section 52-1-54(D) does not authorize a fee award based on the percentage of recovery; the authorization for an attorney fee in § 52-1-54(D) "is not based on the contingent fee standard." Trujillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35 , 508 P.2d 1332 (Ct.App. 1973). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.