section 487 attorney misconduct found in New York

2016The defendant demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that he did not “commit deceit or collusion” upon the court or any party (Judiciary Law § 487 [1]; see Tenore v Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., 121 AD3d 775 [2014]; Pui Sang Lai v Shuk Yim Lau, 50 AD3d 758 [2008]; Knecht v Tusa, 15 AD3d 626 [2005]; O’Connell v Kerson, 291 AD2d 386 [2002]).

2016The defendant demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that he did not “commit deceit or collusion” upon the court or any party (Judiciary Law § 487 [1]; see Tenore v Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., 121 AD3d 775 [2014]; Pui Sang Lai v Shuk Yim Lau, 50 AD3d 758 [2008]; Knecht v Tusa, 15 AD3d 626 [2005]; O’Connell v Kerson, 291 AD2d 386 [2002]).

2016The defendant demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that he did not “commit deceit or collusion” upon the court or any party (Judiciary Law § 487 [1]; see Tenore v Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., 121 AD3d 775 [2014]; Pui Sang Lai v Shuk Yim Lau, 50 AD3d 758 [2008]; Knecht v Tusa, 15 AD3d 626 [2005]; O’Connell v Kerson, 291 AD2d 386 [2002]).

2002For example, the penalty for attorney misconduct found in Judiciary Law § 487 is derived from former Penal Law § 273 (see, People v Connolly, 3 AD2d 943 ; Fields v Turner, 1 Misc 2d 679 ).

2002The record is devoid of any evidence of either intent by the respondents to deceive, or a chronic, extreme pattern of legal delinquency that proximately caused the appellant’s alleged damages (see, Ulrich v Hausfeld, 269 AD2d 526 ; Estate of Steinberg v Harmon, 259 AD2d 318 ; O’Connor v Dime Sav.

2002The record is devoid of any evidence of either intent by the respondents to deceive, or a chronic, extreme pattern of legal delinquency that proximately caused the appellant’s alleged damages (see, Ulrich v Hausfeld, 269 AD2d 526 ; Estate of Steinberg v Harmon, 259 AD2d 318 ; O’Connor v Dime Sav.

2002Likewise, the statutory provision for treble damages as a penalty for forcible entry and detainer (RPAPL 853) has its origin in the criminal statutes governing breach of the peace (see, Mayes v UVI Holdings, 280 AD2d 153, 159-160 ; Rental & Mgt.

2002Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the motion which was to impose a sanction on the appellant’s attorney is dismissed, as the appellant is not aggrieved by that portion of the order (see, CPLR 5511; Scopelliti v Town of New Castle, 92 NY2d 944 ); and it is further, Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the motion which was to impose a sanction on the appellant is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a portion of an order entered upon the default of the appealing party (see, CPLR 5511); and it is further, Ordered that t

2002For example, the penalty for attorney misconduct found in Judiciary Law § 487 is derived from former Penal Law § 273 (see, People v Connolly, 3 AD2d 943 ; Fields v Turner, 1 Misc 2d 679 ).

2001This Court’s decisions on prior appeals, one reversing a grant of summary judgment which had been based largely on the assailant’s statements to plaintiff’s investigator ( 246 AD2d 328 , lv dismissed 92 NY2d 876 ), and the other dismissing an action by plaintiff against defendant’s attorney under Judiciary Law § 487 on the ground that no weight could be given to the assailant’s contradictory statements as to how he gained entry to the building (Chianese v Fabiani, 269 AD2d 141 ), may not be relied upon to establish that the assailant’s statements were incredible as a matter of law, or to other

2001There was also ample evidence that defendants, both directly and through their agent Durakovic, had notice that the door was frequently left open, and foreseeability was established by the evidence of one assault and seven burglaries in the building or the adjoining buildings also owned by defendant within the two-year period immediately preceding the attack (see, Splawn v Lextaj Corp., 197 AD2d 479 ).

1996Since the plaintiff’s cause of action for return of the retainer fee seeks damages for injury to his pecuniary interests which would be recoverable under a breach of contract claim, the six-year contract limitations period applies (see, Elliott v Jacobs, 221 AD2d 889 ), and the Supreme Court thus erred in dismissing this claim as time barred.

1986At the time of the motion, the defendants were not in default in compliance with any court directive or discovery notice (cf. Shapiro v Fine, 102 AD2d 735 ).