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8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 1 courts 2010–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Teemsgreen2 sentences2020See also Teems, supra at 147 (evidence of guilt under section 3802(a)(1) sufficient where officer responding to report of disabled vehicle observed defendant sitting in driver’s seat, in lane of traffic, depressing brakes, car had lost its tires and was sitting on rims, defendant could not recall if he struck anything or when or where accident might have occurred, officer noticed strong odor of alcohol from defendant, defendant had red, glassy eyes and slurred speech, defendant failed to blow properly into PBT machine, and blood test at hospital revealed that defendant had BAC of 0.143). 2020See Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. 2013) (evidence of guilt sufficient under section 3802(a)(1) -9- where officer responding to call reporting disabled vehicle observed defendant sitting in driver’s seat of vehicle, in lane of traffic, depressing the brakes, car had lost its tires, defendant could not recall if he struck anything or when or where accident might have occurred, officer noticed strong odor of alcohol from defendant, defendant had red, glassy eyes and slurred speech, defendant failed to blow properly into portable alcohol breath test machine, and blood test at | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Hutchinsgreen2 sentences2019In Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302, 308-09 (Pa.Super. 2012), the Commonwealth offered, as evidence of his guilt under § 3802(d)(2), that the defendant was unusually calm when talking to investigating officers after having been involved in a serious accident, that the defendant had admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day, that marijuana was found in his vehicle, and that he caused the accident. 2018The need for expert testimony in a subsection 3802(d)(2) prosecution must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account not just the specific drug at issue, prescription or otherwise, but also the nature and overall strength of the Commonwealth’s evidence, viewed pursuant to the general standard expressed in Kozak, supra. Griffith, supra at 1239 . -8- J-A03033-18 In Hutchins, supra, the Commonwealth offered the following evidence of the appellant’s guilt under section 3802(d)(2): (1) the appellant was unusually calm when talking to an investigating police officer after having been | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen1 sentence2026“Courts in Pennsylvania have long held that opinions based on inadmissible evidence . . . are admissible.” Brown v. Halpern, 202 A.3d 687, 707 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 139 A.3d 208, 218 (Pa. Super. 2016), affirmed, 185 A.3d 316 (Pa. 2018)). | 1 | 1 |
Brown, J. v. Halpern, M.green1 sentence2026“Courts in Pennsylvania have long held that opinions based on inadmissible evidence . . . are admissible.” Brown v. Halpern, 202 A.3d 687, 707 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 139 A.3d 208, 218 (Pa. Super. 2016), affirmed, 185 A.3d 316 (Pa. 2018)). | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Cahill, M.green1 sentence2026See Commonwealth v. Cahill, 324 A.3d 516, 527 (Pa. Super. 2024) (finding the presence of marijuana in a vehicle helped establish sufficient evidence of guilt under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2)); see also Appellee’s Brief, at 12 (conceding that the expert testimony could be relevant). -7- We have found no cases, and neither the trial court nor Francis have cited any, that hold that a forensic scientist who authored a lab report testing for drugs is precluded from testifying because the lab report is precluded. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Leightygreen1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. 2013) (evidence of guilt sufficient under section 3802(a)(1) -9- where officer responding to call reporting disabled vehicle observed defendant sitting in driver’s seat of vehicle, in lane of traffic, depressing the brakes, car had lost its tires, defendant could not recall if he struck anything or when or where accident might have occurred, officer noticed strong odor of alcohol from defendant, defendant had red, glassy eyes and slurred speech, defendant failed to blow properly into portable alcohol breath test machine, and blood test at | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'Bryongreen1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. 2013) (evidence of guilt sufficient under section 3802(a)(1) -9- where officer responding to call reporting disabled vehicle observed defendant sitting in driver’s seat of vehicle, in lane of traffic, depressing the brakes, car had lost its tires, defendant could not recall if he struck anything or when or where accident might have occurred, officer noticed strong odor of alcohol from defendant, defendant had red, glassy eyes and slurred speech, defendant failed to blow properly into portable alcohol breath test machine, and blood test at | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cruzgreen1 sentence2016See Segida, 985 A.2d at 880 (circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish guilt under section 3802(a)(1), where defendant admitted to police officer at scene of one-vehicle accident that he had been drinking at local club and was driving himself and his brother home when he lost control of his vehicle, officer smelled strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant’s person and his breath, defendant performed very badly on field sobriety tests, blood alcohol test at hospital revealed very high blood alcohol content of 0.326 percent, and officer opined that “due to traffic on the road” it was “ | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Segidagreen1 sentence2016See Segida, 985 A.2d at 880 (circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish guilt under section 3802(a)(1), where defendant admitted to police officer at scene of one-vehicle accident that he had been drinking at local club and was driving himself and his brother home when he lost control of his vehicle, officer smelled strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant’s person and his breath, defendant performed very badly on field sobriety tests, blood alcohol test at hospital revealed very high blood alcohol content of 0.326 percent, and officer opined that “due to traffic on the road” it was “ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
1 sentence2026“Courts in Pennsylvania have long held that opinions based on inadmissible evidence . . . are admissible.” Brown v. Halpern, 202 A.3d 687, 707 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 139 A.3d 208, 218 (Pa. Super. 2016), affirmed, 185 A.3d 316 (Pa. 2018)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Griffith
green
1 sentence2018The need for expert testimony in a subsection 3802(d)(2) prosecution must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account not just the specific drug at issue, prescription or otherwise, but also the nature and overall strength of the Commonwealth’s evidence, viewed pursuant to the general standard expressed in Kozak, supra. Griffith, supra at 1239 . -8- J-A03033-18 In Hutchins, supra, the Commonwealth offered the following evidence of the appellant’s guilt under section 3802(d)(2): (1) the appellant was unusually calm when talking to an investigating police officer after having been | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Mobley
green
1 sentence2016Mobley, 14 A.3d at 890 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2010Appellant, Jennifer Ann Barton-Martin, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on January 26, 2009, as made final when Appellant’s post-sentence motions were deemed denied by operation of law, sentencing her for convictions on two counts of driving under the influence, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment) 1 and 75 Pa.C.SA. § 3802(c) (highest rate). 2 Among other claims raised on appeal, Appellant challenges the admission of blood-alcohol test results offered to establish her guilt under § 3802(c) based on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massa 2010Appellant, Jennifer Ann Barton-Martin, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on January 26, 2009, as made final when Appellant’s post-sentence motions were deemed denied by operation of law, sentencing her for convictions on two counts of driving under the influence, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment) 1 and 75 Pa.C.SA. § 3802(c) (highest rate). 2 Among other claims raised on appeal, Appellant challenges the admission of blood-alcohol test results offered to establish her guilt under § 3802(c) based on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massa | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.