attorney who exercises challenge in Texas

2023At this step, “[t]he trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims,” because the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility, and “the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207 , 170 L.

2023At this step, “[t]he trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims,” because the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility, and “the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207 , 170 L.

2023App. 2010); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (observing that “the best evidence [on the issue of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge[]”). “‘[P]retext’ is solely a question of fact[,]” so the trial court is in the best position to make that credibility determination.

2021This step involves an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility, and the best evidence of discriminatory intent “often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (plurality op.)).

2018At this step, “[t]he trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims,” because the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility, and “the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203 (internal quotation omitted); see also Blackman v. State, 394 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (Keyes, J., dissenting), rev’d, Blackman, 414 S.W.3d at 771 .

2017At this step, “[t]he trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims,” because the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility and “the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203 (internal quotation omitted); see also Blackman v. State, 394 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. 4 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (Keyes, J., dissenting), rev’d, Blackman, 414 S.W.3d at 771 .

2018At this step, “[t]he trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims,” because the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility, and “the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203 (internal quotation omitted); see also Blackman v. State, 394 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (Keyes, J., dissenting), rev’d, Blackman, 414 S.W.3d at 771 .

2017At this step, “[t]he trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims,” because the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility and “the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S. Ct. 1203 (internal quotation omitted); see also Blackman v. State, 394 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. 4 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (Keyes, J., dissenting), rev’d, Blackman, 414 S.W.3d at 771 .

2023See Gibson v. State, 144 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim.

2018“An appellate court misapplies the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of appellate review when it substitutes its judgment for that of the trial court in deciding that the prosecutor’s facially race- neutral explanation for striking a venire member was a pretext.” Blackman, 394 S.W.3d at 272 (Keyes, J., dissenting) (citing Gibson, 144 S.W.3d at 534 ).

2020As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 , 105 S. Ct. 844, 854 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 , 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2892 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984).

2014Harris Page 23 the explanation.44 Thus, “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.”45 Because the evidence on the credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation is often vague or ambiguous, “the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”46 Thus, “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on [his] demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’”47 The Supreme Court has instructed us to accord “g

2014Harris Page 23 the explanation.44 Thus, “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.”45 Because the evidence on the credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation is often vague or ambiguous, “the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”46 Thus, “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on [his] demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’”47 The Supreme Court has instructed us to accord “g

2014Harris Page 23 the explanation.44 Thus, “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.”45 Because the evidence on the credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation is often vague or ambiguous, “the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”46 Thus, “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on [his] demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’”47 The Supreme Court has instructed us to accord “g

2014App. 2002) (“Because the trial court’s decision often turns largely on an evaluation of credibility, we give the court’s decision great deference and will not disturb it unless it is clearly erroneous”; deferring to trial judge’s finding that prosecutor’s explanation that he struck potential juror the D.A.’s investigator said “ha[d] a chip on her shoulder” and had a reputation at work for being close-minded; because the explanation was a race-neutral one that the defendant failed to rebut, the trial judge did not clearly err in denying Batson challenge); see also Grant v. State, 325 S.W.3d 655

2013As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Heinande v A/eu Yo,k 500 U S 352 365 (1991) (quoting 14’aznwiight I’J’itt 469 U S 412 428 (1985)); see also Miller—El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (“Deference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations.”).

1993As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Hernandez, — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1869 (citations omitted); see also Newsome v. State, 829 S.W.2d 260, 266 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.).

1993As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies "peculiarly within a trial judge's province." Hernandez, ___ U.S. at___, 111 S.Ct. at 1869 (citations omitted); see also Newsome v. State, 829 S.W.2d 260, 266 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1992, no pet.).