unaddressed claim in Texas

2024So, generally, the exception applies “(1) when the movant has conclusively proved or disproved a matter . . . that would also preclude the unaddressed claim as a matter of law or (2) when the unaddressed claim is derivative of the addressed claim, and the movant proved its entitlement to summary judgment on that addressed claim.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 305 S.W.3d at 73 ).

2024So, generally, the exception applies “(1) when the movant has conclusively proved or disproved a matter . . . that would also preclude the unaddressed claim as a matter of law or (2) when the unaddressed claim is derivative of the addressed claim, and the movant proved its entitlement to summary judgment on that addressed claim.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 305 S.W.3d at 73 ).

2025Yet we have said that, while “a trial court errs in granting a summary judgment on a cause of action not expressly presented by written motion, . . . the error is harmless when the omitted cause of action is precluded as a matter of law by other grounds raised in the case.” G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297-98 (Tex. 2011); see also, e.g., Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Cuevas, 593 S.W.3d 307 , 312 (Tex. 2019) (holding trial court’s grant of summary judgment on an unaddressed claim was harmless error when the ground on which summary judgment was sought “applie[d] equally” to the una

2024See id. at 297 (“Granting a summary judgment on a claim not addressed in the summary judgment motion therefore is, as a general rule, reversible error.”); Wilson, 305 S.W.3d at 73 (“[T]his Court has always required a very tight fit between what was proved or disproved in the motion and what elements the unaddressed claim, as it was alleged, required: otherwise, the exception could swallow the rule.”).

2021For the exception to apply, however, there must be “a very tight fit between what was proved or 15 disproved in the motion and what elements the unaddressed claim, as it was alleged, required: otherwise, the exception could swallow the rule.” Id., quoting Wilson, 305 S.W.3d at 73 ; see also PAS, Inc. v. Engel, 350 S.W.3d 602, 609-10 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (recognizing that the application of this exception requires “‘a very tight fit’ between what was proved or disproved in the motion and what elements must be proved or disproved for the unaddressed claim[s].”).7 This e

2021See id. at 297 (citing Wilson v. Davis, 305 S.W.3d 57, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)); see also PAS, Inc. v. Engel, 350 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“The application of an exception requires ‘a very tight fit’ between what was proved or disproved in the motion and what elements must be proved or disproved for the unaddressed claim.”).

2012See Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex. 2002); Bandera Elec.

2012See Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. , 73 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex. 2002); Bandera Elec.

2007See Alder v. Laurel, 82 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (“[E]ven though a cause of action may not be viable, a party may obtain summary judgment only on those causes of action expressly addressed in the summary judgment motion.”).

2007See Alder v. Laurel , 82 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.) ( A [E]ven though a cause of action may not be viable, a party may obtain summary judgment only on those causes of action expressly addressed in the summary judgment motion. @ ).

2026See Coterill–Jenkins, 383 S.W.3d at 592 ; see also Taylor v. TMJ Implants, Inc., No. 14-97-01194-CV, 1999 WL 351673 , *7–8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 3, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (original summary judgment evidence negated at least one essential element of new petition cause of action).

2025Yet we have said that, while “a trial court errs in granting a summary judgment on a cause of action not expressly presented by written motion, . . . the error is harmless when the omitted cause of action is precluded as a matter of law by other grounds raised in the case.” G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297-98 (Tex. 2011); see also, e.g., Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Cuevas, 593 S.W.3d 307 , 312 (Tex. 2019) (holding trial court’s grant of summary judgment on an unaddressed claim was harmless error when the ground on which summary judgment was sought “applie[d] equally” to the una

2024See Wilson, 305 S.W.3d at 73 ; see also Silver Gryphon, 529 S.W.3d at 598 (stating that new or amended summary judgment motion is not necessary when ground asserted in motion conclusively negates common element of previous and newly amended theories of liability).

2021“In such a case, a party has moved for summary judgment but omitted at least one ground or cause of action.” Sweet Water Well Serv., LLC, 2020 WL 5048356 , at *3 (citing Wilson, 305 S.W.3d at 74 ; Engel, 350 S.W.3d at 609 ; Zarzosa v. Flynn, 266 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tex. App.—El 20 Paso 2008, no pet.); Vogel v. Travelers Indem.

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293 (2011) 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1751 clearly appears that only a question of law is involved and that to an affirmative defense) that would there is no genuine issue of fact.” Gaines v. Hamman, 163 also preclude the unaddressed claim Tex. 618, 358 S.W.2d 557, 563 (1962).

2015Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983) (per curiam). in the motion and what elements the unaddressed claim, as it was alleged, Several appellate courts have recognized a limited exception required: otherwise, the exception to this general rule.

2009Compare, e.g., Rhodes, Inc. v. Duncan , 623 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ) (“liability . . . is limited to those acts which are referable to the company’s business to which the vice principal is expressly, impliedly or apparently authorized to transact”) with Goodman , 80 S.W.3d at 577 (employee’s acts must be “within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired”).

2009Compare, e.g., Rhodes, Inc. v. Duncan , 623 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ) (“liability . . . is limited to those acts which are referable to the company’s business to which the vice principal is expressly, impliedly or apparently authorized to transact”) with Goodman , 80 S.W.3d at 577 (employee’s acts must be “within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired”).

2009See Dobbs v. Camco, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 13 . • The unaddressed claim is a mere reiteration of a claim on which the movant has already shown itself entitled to summary judgment.