section 9-11-60(d) face of the record in Georgia

2017See Case v. State, 300 Ga. 208, 209-210 (1) ( 794 SE2d 93 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 5-6-35 does not require a discretionary application to appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside to correct clerical error pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (g), even though OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8) requires a discretionary application to appeal from orders denying motions to set aside based on non-amendable defects appearing on the face of the record pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)).

2017See Case v. State, 300 Ga. 208, 209-210 (1) ( 794 SE2d 93 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 5-6-35 does not require a discretionary application to appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside to correct clerical error pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (g), even though OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8) requires a discretionary application to appeal from orders denying motions to set aside based on non-amendable defects appearing on the face of the record pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)).

2013Based on the apparent purpose of Rule 15 and the fact that the same information required in the Rule 15 certificate can be found in the record, we conclude that the failure to file a Rule 15 certificate is not a nonamendable defect in the record sufficient to authorize the trial court to set aside a default judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d). 6 Cf. Hardeman v. Roberts, 214 Ga. App. 484, 485 ( 448 SE2d 254 ) (1994) (failure to notify trial court pursuant to USCR 4.8 that action was a renewed action was not a nonamendable defect appearing on the face of the record under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)) (p

2013Based on the apparent purpose of Rule 15 and the fact that the same information required in the Rule 15 certificate can be found in the record, we conclude that the failure to file a Rule 15 certificate is not a nonamendable defect in the record sufficient to authorize the trial court to set aside a default judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d). 6 Cf. Hardeman v. Roberts, 214 Ga. App. 484, 485 ( 448 SE2d 254 ) (1994) (failure to notify trial court pursuant to USCR 4.8 that action was a renewed action was not a nonamendable defect appearing on the face of the record under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)) (p

2020See Voyles, 301 Ga. at 45, n. 2 (motion to set aside the judgment for lack of sufficient notice of a hearing, where trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to set aside, construed as a motion to set aside the judgment to correct a clerical mistake under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) rather than a motion to set aside based on a nonamendable defect on the face of the record under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)). 13 have been a contributing cause to the mother’s failure to appear at the October 2 hearing, when a court considers “a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3), as opposed to (d) (2), neglig

2020See Voyles, 301 Ga. at 45, n. 2 (motion to set aside the judgment for lack of sufficient notice of a hearing, where trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to set aside, construed as a motion to set aside the judgment to correct a clerical mistake under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) rather than a motion to set aside based on a nonamendable defect on the face of the record under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)). 13 have been a contributing cause to the mother’s failure to appear at the October 2 hearing, when a court considers “a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3), as opposed to (d) (2), neglig

2020See Shields v. Gish, 280 Ga. 556, 558 (2) ( 629 SE2d 244 ) (2006); Hiner Transp., 293 Ga. App. at 706 .

2020See Shields v. Gish, 280 Ga. 556, 558 (2) ( 629 SE2d 244 ) (2006); Hiner Transp., 293 Ga. App. at 706 .

2020See Voyles, 301 Ga. at 45, n. 2 (motion to set aside the judgment for lack of sufficient notice of a hearing, where trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to set aside, construed as a motion to set aside the judgment to correct a clerical mistake under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) rather than a motion to set aside based on a nonamendable defect on the face of the record under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3)). 13 have been a contributing cause to the mother’s failure to appear at the October 2 hearing, when a court considers “a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (3), as opposed to (d) (2), neglig

2016While Williams argues that the 1994 judgment is void and should be set aside pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (a), and a collateral attack pursuant to that subsection is not subject to the discretionary appeal procedures, the Georgia Supreme Court has expressly limited judgments void on their faces under OCGA § 9-11-60 (a) to "those judgments which lack either personal or subject matter jurisdiction." Murphy v. Murphy, 263 Ga. 280, 282 ( 430 SE2d 749 ) (1993); Utica Mut.

2016While Williams argues that the 1994 judgment is void and should be set aside pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (a), and a collateral attack pursuant to that subsection is not subject to the discretionary appeal procedures, the Georgia Supreme Court has expressly limited judgments void on their faces under OCGA § 9-11-60 (a) to "those judgments which lack either personal or subject matter jurisdiction." Murphy v. Murphy, 263 Ga. 280, 282 ( 430 SE2d 749 ) (1993); Utica Mut.

1991Moreover, it should be noted that neither of these contentions were actual rulings of the superior court but were discussed in response to arguments raised by appellant and illustrated alternative methods by which the court could have considered appellant’s motion and reached the same result. “ ‘(A) judgment right for any reason must be affirmed.’ [Cits.]” Baker v. Baker, 194 Ga. App. 477, 480 (2) ( 390 SE2d 892 ) (1990). 3.

1991Moreover, it should be noted that neither of these contentions were actual rulings of the superior court but were discussed in response to arguments raised by appellant and illustrated alternative methods by which the court could have considered appellant’s motion and reached the same result. “ ‘(A) judgment right for any reason must be affirmed.’ [Cits.]” Baker v. Baker, 194 Ga. App. 477, 480 (2) ( 390 SE2d 892 ) (1990). 3.