suspicion standard in Virginia

2026“Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Mitchell, 73 Va. App. at 246-47 (quoting Bland, 66 Va. App. at 413 ).

2026A “mere hunch” is insufficient, but “the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Id. at 246-47 (quoting Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 413 (2016)).

2026“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Glover, 589 U.S. at 380 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)).

2025A passenger seized in a traffic stop has standing to “challenge the constitutionality of the stop.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007); see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 12 (2010). -4- “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 413 (2016) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)); see also Kansas v. Glov

2023“The test is not what the officer thought, but rather whether the facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the stop were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law was occurring . . . .” Mason, 291 Va. at 368 .

2023The facts and circumstances apparent to the officer at the time of the stop “were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law [had occurred, or] was occurring.” See Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 368 (2016).

2024Reasonable suspicion “requires only ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making such a stop.” Id. (quoting Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 395 (2012)).

2021“In other words, ‘[a] “reasonable suspicion” requires only “some minimal level of objective justification” for making such a stop.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 395 (2012)).

2023While “a mere hunch” is not enough, “the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Id. at 246-47 (quoting Bland, 66 Va. App. at 413 ).

2016“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).” Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).

2017“The test is . . . whether the facts and circumstances apparent to [the officer] at the time of the stop were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law was occurring or was about to occur.” Mason, 291 Va. at 368 , 786 S.E.2d at 151 ; see also Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 .

2017“The test is . . . whether the facts and circumstances apparent to [the officer] at the time of the stop were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law was occurring or was about to occur.” Mason, 291 Va. at 368 , 786 S.E.2d at 151 ; see also Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 .

2026Importantly, “[t]he possibility that an officer ultimately may prove to be mistaken . . . does not negate, in and of itself, the officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion.” Id. at 247 (citing Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 732, 736 (2011)).

2024Importantly, “[t]he possibility that an officer ultimately may prove to be mistaken . . . does not negate, in and of itself, the officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion.” Id. at 247 (citing Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 732, 736 (2011)).

2023It “can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause . . . [and] from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

2018Furthermore, it “can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause . . . [and] from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

2024“The possibility of an innocent explanation for the suspicious conduct does not necessarily forbid an officer from making a brief, investigatory stop.” Raab v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 577, 581 (2007) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). -5- The officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Brown.

2024Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).

2024Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).

2018Id. at 368, 786 S.E.2d at 151 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).

2018To have reasonable suspicion, a police officer need only have a “‘minimal level of objective justification’ for making . . . a stop.” Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273 , 280, 720 S.E.2d 74 , 78 (2012) (quoting I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).

2016In other words, “[a] ‘reasonable suspicion’ requires only ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making such a stop.” Beasley, 60 Va.App. at 395 , 728 S.E.2d at 505 (quoting I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)).

2017“The test is not what the officer thought” but, rather, “whether the facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the [seizure] were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law [had occurred,] was occurring[,] or was about to occur.” Id.; see, e.g., Hairston, 67 Va. App. at 565 , 797 S.E.2d at 800 .

2017“The test is not what the officer thought” but, rather, “whether the facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the [seizure] were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law [had occurred,] was occurring[,] or was about to occur.” Id.; see, e.g., Hairston, 67 Va. App. at 565 , 797 S.E.2d at 800 .

2026“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Glover, 589 U.S. at 380 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)).

2025A passenger seized in a traffic stop has standing to “challenge the constitutionality of the stop.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007); see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 12 (2010). -4- “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 413 (2016) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)); see also Kansas v. Glov

2024“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause . . . .” Bland, 66 Va. App. at 413 (citation omitted) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)).

2016“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).” Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).

2025A passenger seized in a traffic stop has standing to “challenge the constitutionality of the stop.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007); see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 12 (2010). -4- “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 413 (2016) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)); see also Kansas v. Glov

2025A passenger seized in a traffic stop has standing to “challenge the constitutionality of the stop.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007); see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 12 (2010). -4- “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 413 (2016) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)); see also Kansas v. Glov

2024“The possibility of an innocent explanation for the suspicious conduct does not necessarily forbid an officer from making a brief, investigatory stop.” Raab v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 577, 581 (2007) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). -5- The officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Brown.

2023The circumstances to consider in making the determination include “the ‘characteristics of the area’ where the stop occurs, the time of the stop, whether late at night or not, as well as any suspicious conduct of the person accosted such as an obvious attempt to avoid officers or any nervous conduct on the discovery of their presence.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 23 Va. App. 598, 611 (1996) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1100, 1103 (1991)). -4- The evidence in this case established that Officer Ortiz observed a vehicle on North Main Street in the City of Danville at three o’clock in t

2023The circumstances to consider in making the determination include “the ‘characteristics of the area’ where the stop occurs, the time of the stop, whether late at night or not, as well as any suspicious conduct of the person accosted such as an obvious attempt to avoid officers or any nervous conduct on the discovery of their presence.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 23 Va. App. 598, 611 (1996) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1100, 1103 (1991)). -4- The evidence in this case established that Officer Ortiz observed a vehicle on North Main Street in the City of Danville at three o’clock in t

2023The standard for “whether the conduct of a police office is reasonable ‘is judged from the perspective of a[n objectively] reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the need of split -second decisions and without regard to the officer’s [subjective] intent or motivation.’” McArthur v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 352 , 360 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 1, 7 (2009)).

2022“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)).

2021The reasonable-suspicion determination is based “not [on] what the officer thought” but, instead, on whether the objective “facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the stop were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law [had occurred,] was occurring[,] or was about to occur.” Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 368 (2016). “[T]here are no bright line rules to follow when determining whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists . . . .” Middlebrooks, 52 Va. App. at 479 (first alteration in original)

2021It “is more than an unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Sidney, 280 Va. at 523 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000)).

2021The reasonable-suspicion determination is based “not [on] what the officer thought” but, instead, on whether the objective “facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the stop were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law [had occurred,] was occurring[,] or was about to occur.” Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 368 (2016). “[T]here are no bright line rules to follow when determining whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists . . . .” Middlebrooks, 52 Va. App. at 479 (first alteration in original)

2017“The test is not what the officer thought” but, rather, “whether the facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the [seizure] were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law [had occurred,] was occurring[,] or was about to occur.” Id.; see Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 441 , 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) (en banc).

2017“The test is not what the officer thought” but, rather, “whether the facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the [seizure] were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law [had occurred,] was occurring[,] or was about to occur.” Id.; see Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 441 , 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) (en banc).

2017This standard 4 Generally, “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015). - 10 - “requires far more than an officer’s ‘hunch’ or ‘gut feeling’ but far less than actual proof.” Mason, 291 Va. at 369 , 786 S.E.2d at 152 .

2016“Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion to justify such a detention is ‘based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances.’” Branham, 283 Va. at 280, 720 S.E.2d at 78 (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689, 695 , 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2008)).

2016“Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion to justify such a detention is ‘based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances.’” Branham, 283 Va. at 280, 720 S.E.2d at 78 (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689, 695 , 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2008)).