absence of an express waiver in California

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

1952(Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal.App. 167, 174 [ 182 P. 333 ]; Forbes v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal.App. 781 [ 282 P. 528 ].) In construing an enactment identical in language, the Supreme Court of Idaho declared that the statute was controlling and admitted no exceptions other than those placed there by the Legislature.

1952(Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal.App. 167, 174 [ 182 P. 333 ]; Forbes v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal.App. 781 [ 282 P. 528 ].) In construing an enactment identical in language, the Supreme Court of Idaho declared that the statute was controlling and admitted no exceptions other than those placed there by the Legislature.

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2023(Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 878 .) The change was key because, with it, the juvenile would be “advised in advance whom she must avoid.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 ; see id. at p. 891 [“We agree with the Court of Appeal that in the absence of an express requirement of knowledge, the probation condition imposed upon defendant is unconstitutionally vague”].) This touched on the first of two grounds that can invalidate a parole condition as unconstitutionally vague: when the condition (1) “fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [(2) is] so sta

2023(Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 878 .) The change was key because, with it, the juvenile would be “advised in advance whom she must avoid.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 ; see id. at p. 891 [“We agree with the Court of Appeal that in the absence of an express requirement of knowledge, the probation condition imposed upon defendant is unconstitutionally vague”].) This touched on the first of two grounds that can invalidate a parole condition as unconstitutionally vague: when the condition (1) “fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [(2) is] so sta

2017(See, e.g., Mosby , supra , 33 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 [defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior conviction despite being advised of and having waived only his right to jury trial]; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 [defendant's admission of a prior prison term was voluntary and intelligent despite the absence of an express waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Sovereign (1993) 27 Cal.App.4th 317 , 321, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 [defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the

2017(See, e.g., Mosby , supra , 33 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 [defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior conviction despite being advised of and having waived only his right to jury trial]; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 [defendant's admission of a prior prison term was voluntary and intelligent despite the absence of an express waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Sovereign (1993) 27 Cal.App.4th 317 , 321, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 [defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the

2019(See Cowan , supra , 14 Cal.4th 367 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 458 , 926 P.2d 438 ; *262 Williams , supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 344, 346, & fn. 5, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 981 P.2d 42 [offering advice to place the issue on the record to forestall ineffective assistance claims, but leaving "to future courts, however, to decide the legal significance of the absence of an express waiver following conviction of a time-barred lesser offense"]; Stanfill , supra , 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 ].) It is good advice, but that advice has been largely ignored.

2019(See Cowan , supra , 14 Cal.4th 367 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 458 , 926 P.2d 438 ; *262 Williams , supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 344, 346, & fn. 5, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 981 P.2d 42 [offering advice to place the issue on the record to forestall ineffective assistance claims, but leaving "to future courts, however, to decide the legal significance of the absence of an express waiver following conviction of a time-barred lesser offense"]; Stanfill , supra , 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 ].) It is good advice, but that advice has been largely ignored.

2017(See, e.g., Mosby , supra , 33 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 [defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior conviction despite being advised of and having waived only his right to jury trial]; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 [defendant's admission of a prior prison term was voluntary and intelligent despite the absence of an express waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Sovereign (1993) 27 Cal.App.4th 317 , 321, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 [defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the

2017(See, e.g., Mosby , supra , 33 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 [defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior conviction despite being advised of and having waived only his right to jury trial]; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 [defendant's admission of a prior prison term was voluntary and intelligent despite the absence of an express waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Sovereign (1993) 27 Cal.App.4th 317 , 321, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 [defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the

2017(See, e.g., Mosby , supra , 33 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 [defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior conviction despite being advised of and having waived only his right to jury trial]; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 [defendant's admission of a prior prison term was voluntary and intelligent despite the absence of an express waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Sovereign (1993) 27 Cal.App.4th 317 , 321, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 [defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the

2017(See, e.g., Mosby , supra , 33 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 [defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior conviction despite being advised of and having waived only his right to jury trial]; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 [defendant's admission of a prior prison term was voluntary and intelligent despite the absence of an express waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Sovereign (1993) 27 Cal.App.4th 317 , 321, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 [defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent despite the

1995Nor, as we explained in In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 , would the absence of an express waiver of state constitutional appeal rights render a guilty plea invalid under California law.

1995Nor, as we explained in In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 , would the absence of an express waiver of state constitutional appeal rights render a guilty plea invalid under California law.

2024(People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666 [“[W]e presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct, ‘“[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.”’”]; accord, Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609.) At best, defendant appears to point to the absence of an express waiver of constitutional rights in his written waiver, but that is not determinative.

2024(People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666 [“[W]e presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct, ‘“[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.”’”]; accord, Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609.) At best, defendant appears to point to the absence of an express waiver of constitutional rights in his written waiver, but that is not determinative.

2023(E.g., Flowers v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 66, 79 (Flowers) [absent a specific exemption, a wage order covering “[e]very employer” was broad enough to subject public employers to a minimum wage requirement]; Sheppard v. North Orange County Regional Occupational Program (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 289 [a wage order’s general terms applied to a public employer in the absence of an exemption]; Marquez v. City of Long Beach (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 552 [same].) In other words, Krug argues, general terms like “employer” include public employers unless

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2017(See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ["a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver' "]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814 , 824, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ( Davis ) ["The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked."].) "[T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and co

2015(Id. at p. 892.) Similarly, in Turner, the trial court ordered the defendant, as a condition of probation, “‘[n]ot associate with persons under the age of 18 unless accompanied by an unrelated responsible adult.’” (Turner, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434 .) The Turner court held the probation condition was vague and overbroad because a person “may reasonably not know whether he or she is associating with someone under the age of 18.

2015(Id. at p. 892; People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 (Turner).) In Sheena K., a minor was placed on probation subject to various conditions, including that she “‘not associate with anyone disapproved of by probation.’” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 878 .) The court held that “in the absence of an express requirement of knowledge,” the probation condition was unconstitutionally vague because it “did not notify defendant in advance with whom she might not associate through any reference to persons whom defendant knew to be disapproved of by her 8. probation officer.” (Id. at

2009(North Carolina v. Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 373, fn. 4 [“a court may find an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations where the defendant did not expressly state as much”]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 752 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 ] [“An express statement of waiver is not required . . . .”]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 824 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ] [“The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked.”]; People v. Johnson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 557-558 [“ ‘[W]e cannot accept appel

2009(North Carolina v. Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 373, fn. 4 [“a court may find an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations where the defendant did not expressly state as much”]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 752 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 ] [“An express statement of waiver is not required . . . .”]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 824 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 521 , 633 P.2d 186 ] [“The absence of an express waiver does not in itself establish that the right has been invoked.”]; People v. Johnson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 557-558 [“ ‘[W]e cannot accept appel

2005Our reversal of defendant’s conviction in count 5 obviates these questions for purposes of this appeal. 7 In People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 322 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ], the court noted that the defendant was acquitted of shooting at an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246), and convicted of “the lesser included offense” of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm (§ 246.3).

2005Our reversal of defendant’s conviction in count 5 obviates these questions for purposes of this appeal. 7 In People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 322 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ], the court noted that the defendant was acquitted of shooting at an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246), and convicted of “the lesser included offense” of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm (§ 246.3).