cruel and unusual punishments clause in California

2005We do undertake such a review on request. ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 768 , 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236 , 86 P.3d 302 ( Cleveland ).) "`The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt." [Citations.] Article I, section 17, of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 938 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 .) "To

2005We do undertake such a review on request. ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 768 , 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236 , 86 P.3d 302 ( Cleveland ).) "`The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt." [Citations.] Article I, section 17, of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 938 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 .) "To

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2016Lebrón also argues our interpretation of the statutes would violate “the cruel or unusual punishment prohibitions found in the California and United States Constitutions,” “both on its face and as applied to [defendant].” “ ‘ “ ‘The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt.” [Citations.] Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Me

2016Lebrón also argues our interpretation of the statutes would violate “the cruel or unusual punishment prohibitions found in the California and United States Constitutions,” “both on its face and as applied to [defendant].” “ ‘ “ ‘The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt.” [Citations.] Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Me

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

2001(See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn.

1998As Justice Marshall stated, "one of the primary functions of the cruel and unusual punishments clause is to prevent excessive or unnecessary penalties." ( Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 331 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (cone, opn. of Marshall, J.).) He further recognized that "a penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose." ( Ibid. ) The same is true under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.

1998As Justice Marshall stated, "one of the primary functions of the cruel and unusual punishments clause is to prevent excessive or unnecessary penalties." ( Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 331 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (cone, opn. of Marshall, J.).) He further recognized that "a penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose." ( Ibid. ) The same is true under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.

2023Applicable legal principles The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment is directed, in part, “ ‘ “against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.” ’ ” (Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 788 .) The California Constitution likewise prohibits “[c]ruel or unusual punishment.” (Cal. Const., art.

1988The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt.” (Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 801 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 1154 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 ]; see generally Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 284-295 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 645-653 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 ].) Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition.

1988The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt." ( Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 801 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 1154 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 ]; see generally Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 284-295 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 645-653 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 ].) Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition. ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479-482 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 390

1988The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt." ( Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 801 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 1154 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 ]; see generally Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 284-295 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 645-653 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 ].) Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition. ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479-482 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 390

2016Lebrón also argues our interpretation of the statutes would violate “the cruel or unusual punishment prohibitions found in the California and United States Constitutions,” “both on its face and as applied to [defendant].” “ ‘ “ ‘The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt.” [Citations.] Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Me

2016Lebrón also argues our interpretation of the statutes would violate “the cruel or unusual punishment prohibitions found in the California and United States Constitutions,” “both on its face and as applied to [defendant].” “ ‘ “ ‘The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt.” [Citations.] Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Me

2000(Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386 [ 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704 ].)

2000(Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386 [ 106 S.Ct. 689, 697 , 88 L.Ed.2d 704 ].)

1991In South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 810-812 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 876, 882-884 , 109 S.Ct. 2207 ], the court followed Booth and concluded that the presentation of argument relating to such matters was violative of those same rights and as such was improper per se.

1991In South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 810-812 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 876, 882-884 , 109 S.Ct. 2207 ], the court followed Booth and concluded that the presentation of argument relating to such matters was violative of those same rights and as such was improper per se.

1991In Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 502-509 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 440, 448-453 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 ], the United States Supreme Court concluded that the introduction of evidence concerning such matters as the victim’s personal characteristics, the emotional impact of the crime on the victim’s family, and the opinions of family members about the crime and the criminal—except to the extent it related directly to the circumstances of the crime—was violative of a criminal defendant’s rights under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, and that accordingly such evidence was inadmissible per se.

1991In Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 502-509 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 440, 448-453 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 ], the United States Supreme Court concluded that the introduction of evidence concerning such matters as the victim’s personal characteristics, the emotional impact of the crime on the victim’s family, and the opinions of family members about the crime and the criminal—except to the extent it related directly to the circumstances of the crime—was violative of a criminal defendant’s rights under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, and that accordingly such evidence was inadmissible per se.

2023I, § 17.) “ ‘ “The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant’s ‘personal responsibility and moral guilt.’ [Citations.] Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution separately and independently lays down the same prohibition.” ’ ” (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 739 .) Under the Eighth Amendment, “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences” are reviewed by first “comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” (Gra

2016The court must also consider the personal characteristics of the defendant, including . . . age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities. [Citation.] If the penalty imposed is ‘grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s individual culpability’ [citation], so that the punishment ‘ “ ‘shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity’ ” ’ [citation], the court must invalidate the sentence as unconstitutional.” (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 739-740 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 , 3 P.3d 248 ] (Lucero).) In the present case, defendant, then 37 years of age, invaded the h

2023The first appears in a dissenting opinion in People v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784 , 797: “A sentence . . . that cannot possibly be completed in the defendant’s lifetime, makes a mockery of the law and amounts to cruel or unusual punishment.” Dissenting opinions, of course, are not binding and have “ ‘no function except to express the private view of the dissenter.’ ” (Glover v. Board of Retirement (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1337 .) The second statement appears in a concurring opinion in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585 , 600-601: “A sentence of 111 years in prison is impossible for a hu

2021Noting he will not become eligible for parole until he is 130 years old, well beyond his life expectancy, defendant contends his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it offends and shocks “the conscience of rational beings” and damages “the public’s confidence in the penal system . . . .” Defendant’s contention is based on Justice Mosk’s concurring opinion in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585 , in which the late Justice articulated his view that a “sentence of 111 years in prison is impossible for a human being to serve, and therefore violates both the cruel and unusu

1991He argues in substance that the instructions as given, without the deletion, amounted to an incorrect statement of the law: (1) under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment, “the sentencer . . . [may] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death” (Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 ], italics in original (plur. opn. by Burger, C.

1991Defendant also argues he was entitled to the requested instructions under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as construed in Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586 , and its progeny.

2016(See People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 ].) We reject the argument that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.

2016(See People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 ].) We reject the argument that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.

1991Booth and Gathers "do not extend to evidence or argument concerning the nature and circumstances of the capital offense or the effect of that offense on the victim.... [Neither do they] extend to evidence or argument relating to the nature and circumstances of other criminal activity involving the use or threat of force or violence or the effect of such criminal activity on the victims. ..." ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 797, italics added.) Recently, in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. ___ [ 115 L.Ed.2d 720 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 ], the court overruled Booth and Gathers to the extent

1991Heretofore, we have found no violation as to the Fifth Amendment, with its prohibition against double jeopardy (e.g., People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 17); the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment (e.g., People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 788-789); the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (ibid.); and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (ibid.).

2014I, § 17) . . . entitle[s] a capital defendant, on request, to intracase review by this court to determine whether the death penalty is grossly disproportionate to his personal culpability.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 602 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ]; accord, People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1130 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 , 88 P.3d 498 ] (Lenart).) 26 On this record, defendant’s argument fails. “ ‘ “The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the d

2014I, § 17) . . . entitle[s] a capital defendant, on request, to intracase review by this court to determine whether the death penalty is grossly disproportionate to his personal culpability.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 602 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ]; accord, People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1130 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 , 88 P.3d 498 ] (Lenart).) 26 On this record, defendant’s argument fails. “ ‘ “The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the d

2014I, § 17) . . . entitle[s] a capital defendant, on request, to intracase review by this court to determine whether the death penalty is grossly disproportionate to his personal culpability.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 602 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ]; accord, People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1130 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 , 88 P.3d 498 ] (Lenart).) 26 On this record, defendant’s argument fails. “ ‘ “The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the d

2014I, § 17) . . . entitle[s] a capital defendant, on request, to intracase review by this court to determine whether the death penalty is grossly disproportionate to his personal culpability.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 602 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ]; accord, People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1130 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 , 88 P.3d 498 ] (Lenart).) 26 On this record, defendant’s argument fails. “ ‘ “The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the d