federal double jeopardy clause in California

2020(Id. at 3 Henderson “is one instance where . . . the state double jeopardy clause [has been interpreted] more broadly than the federal clause.” (People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 844 .) The imposition of a more severe sentence following reversal and retrial does not violate the federal double jeopardy clause.

2015F. California Constitution California’s double jeopardy clause, article I, section 15, reads in pertinent part, “Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense . . . .” In People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 844 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 ] (Monge), our Supreme Court stated, “The purpose behind the state and federal double jeopardy provisions is the same.” Just as the federal double jeopardy clause protects against successive prosecutions and punishments, so does the state’s constitutional provision. 1.

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2012(Id. at p. 670.) “Under these circumstances, where defendant failed to object at trial to the adequacy of the notice he received, any such objection is deemed waived.” (Id. at p. 671.) Due to the high court’s subsequent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ] (Apprendi), we have since concluded that the federal double jeopardy clause does bar retrial of a premeditation allegation following a determination that the evidence was insufficient.

2012(Id. at p. 670.) “Under these circumstances, where defendant failed to object at trial to the adequacy of the notice he received, any such objection is deemed waived.” (Id. at p. 671.) Due to the high court’s subsequent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ] (Apprendi), we have since concluded that the federal double jeopardy clause does bar retrial of a premeditation allegation following a determination that the evidence was insufficient.

2003We granted review to consider the circumstances under which a prosecutor's intentional misconduct that results in a mistrial precludes retrial on double jeopardy grounds under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and under article I, section 15, of the California Constitution. [1] With regard to the federal constitutional double jeopardy issue, the United States Supreme Court held in Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 ( Kennedy ) that under the federal double jeopardy clause a retrial is prohibited following the grant of a defend

2003We granted review to consider the circumstances under which a prosecutor's intentional misconduct that results in a mistrial precludes retrial on double jeopardy grounds under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and under article I, section 15, of the California Constitution. [1] With regard to the federal constitutional double jeopardy issue, the United States Supreme Court held in Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 ( Kennedy ) that under the federal double jeopardy clause a retrial is prohibited following the grant of a defend

2019(See Stone , at p. 511, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 ; see also id. at pp. 511-512, fn. 5, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Stone then distinguished at length People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107 , 426 P.2d 507 , a case predating application of the federal double jeopardy clause to the states. ( Stone , at pp. 512-514, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Although Stone then discussed several recent United States Supreme Court cases, including Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 , it also cited several of our cases in accord.

2019(See Stone , at p. 511, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 ; see also id. at pp. 511-512, fn. 5, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Stone then distinguished at length People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107 , 426 P.2d 507 , a case predating application of the federal double jeopardy clause to the states. ( Stone , at pp. 512-514, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Although Stone then discussed several recent United States Supreme Court cases, including Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 , it also cited several of our cases in accord.

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2015Thus, even if the federal double jeopardy clause does not bar successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns for the same act, sections 656 and 793 do. 6 Gonzalez further argues the civil penalty imposed by the FAA was criminal punishment under the fourth and fifth factors identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 644 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ] (Kennedy); the civil penalty served the purpose of retribution and deterrence and the behavior to which the civil penalty applied is already a crime.

2015Thus, even if the federal double jeopardy clause does not bar successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns for the same act, sections 656 and 793 do. 6 Gonzalez further argues the civil penalty imposed by the FAA was criminal punishment under the fourth and fifth factors identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 644 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ] (Kennedy); the civil penalty served the purpose of retribution and deterrence and the behavior to which the civil penalty applied is already a crime.

2008(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 120-121 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 137 , 164 P.3d 568 ]; People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 134 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 148 , 164 P.3d 578 ].) In addition, because our analysis of section 12022.53 does not create a new judicial rule, we need not address the constitutional ex post facto issue defendant raised.

2008(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 120-121 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 137 , 164 P.3d 568 ]; People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 134 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 148 , 164 P.3d 578 ].) In addition, because our analysis of section 12022.53 does not create a new judicial rule, we need not address the constitutional ex post facto issue defendant raised.

2003(Ibid.) But, relying on prior high court authority—United States v. Dinitz (1976) 424 U.S. 600, 611 [ 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081-1082 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 ] (Dinitz), which stated that retrial is barred when a prosecutor’s misconduct is “undertaken to harass or prejudice” the defendant, and Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. 470, 485 [ 91 S.Ct. 547, 557 ], which suggested that retrial would be barred if prosecutorial or judicial misconduct amounted to “overreaching”—the Oregon appellate court concluded that retrial was barred under the federal double jeopardy clause because “the prosecutor’s conduct in this case meet

2003(Ibid.) But, relying on prior high court authority—United States v. Dinitz (1976) 424 U.S. 600, 611 [ 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081-1082 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 ] (Dinitz), which stated that retrial is barred when a prosecutor’s misconduct is “undertaken to harass or prejudice” the defendant, and Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. 470, 485 [ 91 S.Ct. 547, 557 ], which suggested that retrial would be barred if prosecutorial or judicial misconduct amounted to “overreaching”—the Oregon appellate court concluded that retrial was barred under the federal double jeopardy clause because “the prosecutor’s conduct in this case meet

2003(Ibid.) But, relying on prior high court authority—United States v. Dinitz (1976) 424 U.S. 600, 611 [ 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081-1082 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 ] (Dinitz), which stated that retrial is barred when a prosecutor’s misconduct is “undertaken to harass or prejudice” the defendant, and Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. 470, 485 [ 91 S.Ct. 547, 557 ], which suggested that retrial would be barred if prosecutorial or judicial misconduct amounted to “overreaching”—the Oregon appellate court concluded that retrial was barred under the federal double jeopardy clause because “the prosecutor’s conduct in this case meet

2003(Ibid.) But, relying on prior high court authority—United States v. Dinitz (1976) 424 U.S. 600, 611 [ 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081-1082 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 ] (Dinitz), which stated that retrial is barred when a prosecutor’s misconduct is “undertaken to harass or prejudice” the defendant, and Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. 470, 485 [ 91 S.Ct. 547, 557 ], which suggested that retrial would be barred if prosecutorial or judicial misconduct amounted to “overreaching”—the Oregon appellate court concluded that retrial was barred under the federal double jeopardy clause because “the prosecutor’s conduct in this case meet

2004Because the premeditation allegation (§ 664(a)) effectively placed defendant in jeopardy for an "offense" greater than attempted murder ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; see Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 728-729, 118 S.Ct. 2246 ), the Court of Appeal's finding of evidentiary insufficiency bars retrial of the allegation under the federal double jeopardy clause. ( Burks, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 16 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 ; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) A. Double jeopardy protections The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and articl

2004Because the premeditation allegation (§ 664(a)) effectively placed defendant in jeopardy for an "offense" greater than attempted murder ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; see Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 728-729, 118 S.Ct. 2246 ), the Court of Appeal's finding of evidentiary insufficiency bars retrial of the allegation under the federal double jeopardy clause. ( Burks, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 16 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 ; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) A. Double jeopardy protections The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and articl

2014Defendant argues the federal double jeopardy clause precludes the prosecution “from adding facts to those necessarily adjudicated within a prior conviction when those additional facts are legally essential to the defendant’s sentence.” However, defendant concedes the United States Supreme Court rejected this contention in Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721 [ 141 L.Ed.2d 615 ] and Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224 [ 140 L.Ed.2d 350 ].

2014Defendant argues the federal double jeopardy clause precludes the prosecution “from adding facts to those necessarily adjudicated within a prior conviction when those additional facts are legally essential to the defendant’s sentence.” However, defendant concedes the United States Supreme Court rejected this contention in Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721 [ 141 L.Ed.2d 615 ] and Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224 [ 140 L.Ed.2d 350 ].

2007Last, defendant argues that under the high court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (Apprendi), and this court's decision in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535 , 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 179 , 100 P.3d 870 (Seel), which interpreted and applied Apprendi in the context of the federal double jeopardy clause, enhancements must be considered in connection with the multiple conviction rule.

2007Last, defendant argues that under the high court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (Apprendi), and this court's decision in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535 , 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 179 , 100 P.3d 870 (Seel), which interpreted and applied Apprendi in the context of the federal double jeopardy clause, enhancements must be considered in connection with the multiple conviction rule.

2004Because the premeditation allegation (§ 664(a)) effectively placed defendant in jeopardy for an "offense" greater than attempted murder ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; see Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 728-729, 118 S.Ct. 2246 ), the Court of Appeal's finding of evidentiary insufficiency bars retrial of the allegation under the federal double jeopardy clause. ( Burks, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 16 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 ; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) A. Double jeopardy protections The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and articl

2004Because the premeditation allegation (§ 664(a)) effectively placed defendant in jeopardy for an "offense" greater than attempted murder ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; see Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 728-729, 118 S.Ct. 2246 ), the Court of Appeal's finding of evidentiary insufficiency bars retrial of the allegation under the federal double jeopardy clause. ( Burks, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 16 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 ; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) A. Double jeopardy protections The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and articl

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2008(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 120-121 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 137 , 164 P.3d 568 ]; People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 134 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 148 , 164 P.3d 578 ].) In addition, because our analysis of section 12022.53 does not create a new judicial rule, we need not address the constitutional ex post facto issue defendant raised.

2008(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 120-121 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 137 , 164 P.3d 568 ]; People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 134 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 148 , 164 P.3d 578 ].) In addition, because our analysis of section 12022.53 does not create a new judicial rule, we need not address the constitutional ex post facto issue defendant raised.

2000In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly disagreed with the contrary holding of the Court of Appeal in People v. Thompson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1276 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .

2000In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly disagreed with the contrary holding of the Court of Appeal in People v. Thompson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1276 , 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .

2000(Id. at pp. 839-843.) Additionally, although recognizing that California had previously applied double jeopardy protections to bar the retrial of a sentence-enhancing allegation in the noncapital case of People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 78 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389 , 820 P.2d 613 ] (Marks), the court in Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826 distinguished Marks on grounds it was based on “a state constitutional rule of double jeopardy that precludes penalizing a defendant with a longer sentence following a successful appeal of his or her conviction[, and it] included no analysis of the

2000(Id. at pp. 839-843.) Additionally, although recognizing that California had previously applied double jeopardy protections to bar the retrial of a sentence-enhancing allegation in the noncapital case of People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 78 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389 , 820 P.2d 613 ] (Marks), the court in Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826 distinguished Marks on grounds it was based on “a state constitutional rule of double jeopardy that precludes penalizing a defendant with a longer sentence following a successful appeal of his or her conviction[, and it] included no analysis of the

2022(See Kansas v. Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 369 [the initiation of a civil “commitment proceeding does not constitute a . . . prosecution” under the federal double jeopardy clause]; see also Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 819, fn. 2 (Hudec) [noting, without expressing disagreement, that “Courts of Appeal have held commitment extension trials under section 1026.5 to be essentially civil in nature, rather than criminal”].) But they dispute whether, under the terms of section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), these clauses have nonetheless been incorporated into proceedings to exten

2022(See Kansas v. Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 369 [the initiation of a civil “commitment proceeding does not constitute a . . . prosecution” under the federal double jeopardy clause]; see also Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 819, fn. 2 (Hudec) [noting, without expressing disagreement, that “Courts of Appeal have held commitment extension trials under section 1026.5 to be essentially civil in nature, rather than criminal”].) But they dispute whether, under the terms of section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7), these clauses have nonetheless been incorporated into proceedings to exten

2019(See Stone , at p. 511, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 ; see also id. at pp. 511-512, fn. 5, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Stone then distinguished at length People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107 , 426 P.2d 507 , a case predating application of the federal double jeopardy clause to the states. ( Stone , at pp. 512-514, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Although Stone then discussed several recent United States Supreme Court cases, including Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 , it also cited several of our cases in accord.

2019(See Stone , at p. 511, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 ; see also id. at pp. 511-512, fn. 5, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Stone then distinguished at length People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107 , 426 P.2d 507 , a case predating application of the federal double jeopardy clause to the states. ( Stone , at pp. 512-514, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Although Stone then discussed several recent United States Supreme Court cases, including Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 , it also cited several of our cases in accord.

2019(See Stone , at p. 511, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 ; see also id. at pp. 511-512, fn. 5, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Stone then distinguished at length People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107 , 426 P.2d 507 , a case predating application of the federal double jeopardy clause to the states. ( Stone , at pp. 512-514, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Although Stone then discussed several recent United States Supreme Court cases, including Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 , it also cited several of our cases in accord.

2019(See Stone , at p. 511, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 ; see also id. at pp. 511-512, fn. 5, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Stone then distinguished at length People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 107 , 426 P.2d 507 , a case predating application of the federal double jeopardy clause to the states. ( Stone , at pp. 512-514, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 .) Although Stone then discussed several recent United States Supreme Court cases, including Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 , it also cited several of our cases in accord.