35 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1965–2023 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Evansgreen2 sentences2023See Cope- land v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 10 , 13–14, 596 A.2d 477 (1991) (bypass under test set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), as reformulated in Golding, was inappropriate in habeas proceeding when habeas court did not rule on or decide claims), aff’d, 225 Conn. 46 , 621 A.2d 1311 (1993). 2023See Cope- land v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 10 , 13–14, 596 A.2d 477 (1991) (bypass under test set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), as reformulated in Golding, was inappropriate in habeas proceeding when habeas court did not rule on or decide claims), aff’d, 225 Conn. 46 , 621 A.2d 1311 (1993). | 2 | 3 |
Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners of Naugatuckgreen2 sentences2011The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 367 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992); see also Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 343 , 572 A.2d 323 (1990) (concluding that defendant waived claim by failing to file motion for disqualification); Massey v. Branford, 118 Conn. App. 491, 503 , 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (“[e]ven where a proper ground for disqualification exists, it must be asserted seasonably or it 2011The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 367 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992); see also Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 343 , 572 A.2d 323 (1990) (concluding that defendant waived claim by failing to file motion for disqualification); Massey v. Branford, 118 Conn. App. 491, 503 , 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (“[e]ven where a proper ground for disqualification exists, it must be asserted seasonably or it | 1 | 4 |
Copeland v. Warden, State Prisongreen2 sentences2023See Cope- land v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 10 , 13–14, 596 A.2d 477 (1991) (bypass under test set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), as reformulated in Golding, was inappropriate in habeas proceeding when habeas court did not rule on or decide claims), aff’d, 225 Conn. 46 , 621 A.2d 1311 (1993). 2023See Cope- land v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 10 , 13–14, 596 A.2d 477 (1991) (bypass under test set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), as reformulated in Golding, was inappropriate in habeas proceeding when habeas court did not rule on or decide claims), aff’d, 225 Conn. 46 , 621 A.2d 1311 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Stepney, LLC v. Town of Fairfieldgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Stepney, LLC v. Fair- field, 263 Conn. 558, 563 , 821 A.2d 725 (2003). ‘‘The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law. . . . 2023See, e.g., Stepney, LLC v. Fair- field, 263 Conn. 558, 563 , 821 A.2d 725 (2003). ‘‘The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Copeland v. Wardengreen2 sentences2023See Cope- land v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 10 , 13–14, 596 A.2d 477 (1991) (bypass under test set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), as reformulated in Golding, was inappropriate in habeas proceeding when habeas court did not rule on or decide claims), aff’d, 225 Conn. 46 , 621 A.2d 1311 (1993). 2023See Cope- land v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 10 , 13–14, 596 A.2d 477 (1991) (bypass under test set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973), as reformulated in Golding, was inappropriate in habeas proceeding when habeas court did not rule on or decide claims), aff’d, 225 Conn. 46 , 621 A.2d 1311 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Berka v. Middletowngreen1 sentence2022See Berka v. Middletown, 205 Conn. App. 213, 218 , 257 A.3d 384 , cert. denied, 337 Conn. 910 , 253 A.3d 44 , cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 351 , 211 L. | 1 | 1 |
Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Examiners of Embalmers & Funeral Directorsgreen2 sentences2021See Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Exam- iners of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 291 Conn. 242 , 261–62, 967 A.2d 1199 (2009). 2021See Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Exam- iners of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 291 Conn. 242 , 261–62, 967 A.2d 1199 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Gillis v. Gillisgreen2 sentences2011The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 367 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992); see also Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 343 , 572 A.2d 323 (1990) (concluding that defendant waived claim by failing to file motion for disqualification); Massey v. Branford, 118 Conn. App. 491, 503 , 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (“[e]ven where a proper ground for disqualification exists, it must be asserted seasonably or it 2011The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 367 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992); see also Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 343 , 572 A.2d 323 (1990) (concluding that defendant waived claim by failing to file motion for disqualification); Massey v. Branford, 118 Conn. App. 491, 503 , 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (“[e]ven where a proper ground for disqualification exists, it must be asserted seasonably or it | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. School Board of Seminole Countygreen1 sentence2007Anderson v. School Board of Seminole County, 830 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. App. 2002), review denied, 845 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2003); Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Committee, 142 Vt. 400, 410 , 457 A.2d 1368 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Henderson v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2002The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Department of Motor Vehicles , 202 Conn. 453 , 462 , 521 A.2d 1034 (1987); see also Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners , 223 Conn. 354 , 367-68 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992). 1996"The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof." Henderson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 202 Conn. 453 , 462 (1987). | 6 | 1991–2009 |
Church v. Pearne
green
2 sentences1970“Under modern criminal procedure, the failure to raise a claim of lack of jurisdiction of the person until after the entry of a plea of . . . not guilty is strong evidence of a consent to the jurisdiction of the person or, to use the language of Church v. Pearne, 75 Conn. 350, 355 , ... of a Voluntary submission’ to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. 1967“Under modern criminal procedure, the failure to raise a claim of lack of jurisdiction of the person until after the entry of a plea of guilty or not guilty is strong evidence of a consent to the jurisdiction of the person or, to use the language of Church v. Pearne, 75 Conn. 350 , 355 ... , of a Voluntary submission’ to the jurisdiction of the court over the person.” State v. Licari, 153 Conn. 127, 130 . | 3 | 1965–1970 |
Newland v. Commissioner of Correction
neutral
2 sentences2022In the absence of such a showing, a court will not reach the merits of the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Newland v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 331 Conn. 546, 553 , 206 A.3d 176 (2019). ‘‘A respon- dent seeking to raise an affirmative defense of proce- dural default must file a return to the habeas petition responding to the allegations of the petitioner and alleg- [ing] any facts in support of any claim of procedural default . . . . 2022In the absence of such a showing, a court will not reach the merits of the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Newland v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 331 Conn. 546, 553 , 206 A.3d 176 (2019). ‘‘A respon- dent seeking to raise an affirmative defense of proce- dural default must file a return to the habeas petition responding to the allegations of the petitioner and alleg- [ing] any facts in support of any claim of procedural default . . . . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2019The court left ‘‘open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the ‘cause’ and ‘preju- dice’ standard, and note[d] . . . only that it is narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia, [supra, 372 U.S. 391 ] . . . .’’ Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, 87 . ‘‘Thus was born the Wainwright ‘cause-and- prejudice’ standard for habeas review.’’ Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 413 , 589 A.2d 1214 (1991). 2019The court left ‘‘open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the ‘cause’ and ‘preju- dice’ standard, and note[d] . . . only that it is narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia, [supra, 372 U.S. 391 ] . . . .’’ Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, 87 . ‘‘Thus was born the Wainwright ‘cause-and- prejudice’ standard for habeas review.’’ Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 413 , 589 A.2d 1214 (1991). | 2 | 2014–2019 |
McCleskey v. Zant
green
2 sentences2006If [the] petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim.” Id., 494-95 . 1997Thus, in McCleskey , the court stated that, "If petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim." Id. 495 . | 2 | 1997–2006 |
Pietrorazio v. Santopietro
green
2 sentences1996We note that the Supreme Court has recently granted certification to consider whether it should reconsider its holding in Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, 185 Conn. 510 , 441 A.2d 163 (1981), that the failure to raise a claim in a motion to set aside a verdict limits the court to plain error review of that claim. 1996We note that the Supreme Court has recently granted certification to consider whether it should reconsider its holding in Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, 185 Conn. 510 , 441 A.2d 163 (1981), that the failure to raise a claim in a motion to set aside a verdict limits the court to plain error review of that claim. | 2 | 1995–1996 |
State v. Licari
green
2 sentences1970State v. Licari, 153 Conn. 127, 129 . 1967“Under modern criminal procedure, the failure to raise a claim of lack of jurisdiction of the person until after the entry of a plea of guilty or not guilty is strong evidence of a consent to the jurisdiction of the person or, to use the language of Church v. Pearne, 75 Conn. 350 , 355 ... , of a Voluntary submission’ to the jurisdiction of the court over the person.” State v. Licari, 153 Conn. 127, 130 . | 2 | 1967–1970 |
Fay v. Noia
red
1 sentence2019The court left ‘‘open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the ‘cause’ and ‘preju- dice’ standard, and note[d] . . . only that it is narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia, [supra, 372 U.S. 391 ] . . . .’’ Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, 87 . ‘‘Thus was born the Wainwright ‘cause-and- prejudice’ standard for habeas review.’’ Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 413 , 589 A.2d 1214 (1991). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Wainwright v. Sykes
green
2 sentences2019In Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), "the Supreme Court held that a petitioner who raises a constitutional claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding must show: (1) cause for the procedural default, i.e., for the failure to raise the claim previously; and (2) prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. 2019In Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), "the Supreme Court held that a petitioner who raises a constitutional claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding must show: (1) cause for the procedural default, i.e., for the failure to raise the claim previously; and (2) prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Tart v. Commissioner of Correction
neutral
2 sentences2015Since 1991, it has become bedrock habeas jurisprudence that in order to be eligible for habeas relief, a petitioner who raises a constitutional claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding must show cause for the failure to raise the claim previously and preju- dice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.’’ (Citation omitted.) Tart v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 94 Conn. App. 134, 139 , 892 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 904 , 896 A.2d 106 (2006). 2015Since 1991, it has become bedrock habeas jurisprudence that in order to be eligible for habeas relief, a petitioner who raises a constitutional claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding must show cause for the failure to raise the claim previously and preju- dice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.’’ (Citation omitted.) Tart v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 94 Conn. App. 134, 139 , 892 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 904 , 896 A.2d 106 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Preston
neutral
1 sentence2015Since 1991, it has become bedrock habeas jurisprudence that in order to be eligible for habeas relief, a petitioner who raises a constitutional claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding must show cause for the failure to raise the claim previously and preju- dice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.’’ (Citation omitted.) Tart v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 94 Conn. App. 134, 139 , 892 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 904 , 896 A.2d 106 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
American States Insurance Company v. Allstate Insurance Company
neutral
1 sentence2015Since 1991, it has become bedrock habeas jurisprudence that in order to be eligible for habeas relief, a petitioner who raises a constitutional claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding must show cause for the failure to raise the claim previously and preju- dice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.’’ (Citation omitted.) Tart v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 94 Conn. App. 134, 139 , 892 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 904 , 896 A.2d 106 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2013Later, in Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 132 , 629 A.2d 413 (1993), our Supreme Court applied the cause and prejudice standard to the failure to raise a claim on direct appeal. 2013Later, in Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 132 , 629 A.2d 413 (1993), our Supreme Court applied the cause and prejudice standard to the failure to raise a claim on direct appeal. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2013“Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropriety claimed in the habeas petition. . . . [T]he cause and prejudice test is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for reasons of tactics, inadvertence or ignorance . . . .” 8 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 168 , 37 A.3d 811 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012). 2013“Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropriety claimed in the habeas petition. . . . [T]he cause and prejudice test is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for reasons of tactics, inadvertence or ignorance . . . .” 8 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 168 , 37 A.3d 811 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2013“Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropriety claimed in the habeas petition. . . . [T]he cause and prejudice test is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for reasons of tactics, inadvertence or ignorance . . . .” 8 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 168 , 37 A.3d 811 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012). 2013“Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropriety claimed in the habeas petition. . . . [T]he cause and prejudice test is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for reasons of tactics, inadvertence or ignorance . . . .” 8 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brunetti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 168 , 37 A.3d 811 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Massey v. TOWN OF BRANFORD
green
2 sentences2011The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 367 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992); see also Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 343 , 572 A.2d 323 (1990) (concluding that defendant waived claim by failing to file motion for disqualification); Massey v. Branford, 118 Conn. App. 491, 503 , 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (“[e]ven where a proper ground for disqualification exists, it must be asserted seasonably or it 2011The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 367 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992); see also Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 343 , 572 A.2d 323 (1990) (concluding that defendant waived claim by failing to file motion for disqualification); Massey v. Branford, 118 Conn. App. 491, 503 , 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (“[e]ven where a proper ground for disqualification exists, it must be asserted seasonably or it | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Massey v. TOWN OF BRANFORD
green
2 sentences2011The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 367 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992); see also Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 343 , 572 A.2d 323 (1990) (concluding that defendant waived claim by failing to file motion for disqualification); Massey v. Branford, 118 Conn. App. 491, 503 , 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (“[e]ven where a proper ground for disqualification exists, it must be asserted seasonably or it 2011The failure to raise a claim of disqualification with reasonable promptness after learning the ground for such a claim ordinarily constitutes a waiver thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 367 , 613 A.2d 254 (1992); see also Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 343 , 572 A.2d 323 (1990) (concluding that defendant waived claim by failing to file motion for disqualification); Massey v. Branford, 118 Conn. App. 491, 503 , 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (“[e]ven where a proper ground for disqualification exists, it must be asserted seasonably or it | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Moore v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2010Given our deferential review over claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the petitioner’s conviction, we cannot conclude that, under these facts and circumstances, the failure to raise this claim amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 “While an appellate advocate must provide effective assistance, he is not under an obligation to raise every conceivable issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 119 Conn. App. 530, 543 , 988 A.2d 881 , cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902 , 991 A.2d 1103 (2010). 2010Given our deferential review over claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the petitioner’s conviction, we cannot conclude that, under these facts and circumstances, the failure to raise this claim amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 “While an appellate advocate must provide effective assistance, he is not under an obligation to raise every conceivable issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 119 Conn. App. 530, 543 , 988 A.2d 881 , cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902 , 991 A.2d 1103 (2010). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Satchwell v. Commissioner of Correction
green
1 sentence2010Given our deferential review over claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the petitioner’s conviction, we cannot conclude that, under these facts and circumstances, the failure to raise this claim amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 “While an appellate advocate must provide effective assistance, he is not under an obligation to raise every conceivable issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 119 Conn. App. 530, 543 , 988 A.2d 881 , cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902 , 991 A.2d 1103 (2010). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Kurzatkowski
green
1 sentence2010Given our deferential review over claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the petitioner’s conviction, we cannot conclude that, under these facts and circumstances, the failure to raise this claim amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 “While an appellate advocate must provide effective assistance, he is not under an obligation to raise every conceivable issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 119 Conn. App. 530, 543 , 988 A.2d 881 , cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902 , 991 A.2d 1103 (2010). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Committee
green
2 sentences2007Anderson v. School Board of Seminole County, 830 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. App. 2002), review denied, 845 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2003); Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Committee, 142 Vt. 400, 410 , 457 A.2d 1368 (1983). 2007Anderson v. School Board of Seminole County, 830 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. App. 2002), review denied, 845 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2003); Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Committee, 142 Vt. 400, 410 , 457 A.2d 1368 (1983). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Williams v. Manson green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Crawford green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Parker v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Golding green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Hurtado v. Hurtado green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Timm v. Timm green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Lizotte green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Hinckley green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.