section 2 immunities clause in Michigan

1998The [highway exception to immunity] does not apply to `an installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.' A bicycle path is not designed *300 for vehicular travel, in the common sense of `vehicular' as relating to motor vehicle. [ 428 Mich. at 340 , 408 N.W.2d 783 .] * * * * * * "[T]he statute does not offer general protection to pedestrians or motorists without regard to location.

1998The [highway exception to immunity] does not apply to `an installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.' A bicycle path is not designed *300 for vehicular travel, in the common sense of `vehicular' as relating to motor vehicle. [ 428 Mich. at 340 , 408 N.W.2d 783 .] * * * * * * "[T]he statute does not offer general protection to pedestrians or motorists without regard to location.

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990“The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not require such adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose or lessen the scope plainly intended to be given the measure.” See Killeen v Dep’t of Transportation, 432 Mich 1, 9 ; 438 NW2d 233 (1989). "[The highway exception to immunity] clearly and unequivocally expresses] legislative intent that a person injured by reason of a 'failure’ 'to keep’ a highway fit for travel shall have a cause of action against a governmental agency.” The majority also suggests that the county had

1990“The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not require such adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose or lessen the scope plainly intended to be given the measure.” See Killeen v Dep’t of Transportation, 432 Mich 1, 9 ; 438 NW2d 233 (1989). "[The highway exception to immunity] clearly and unequivocally expresses] legislative intent that a person injured by reason of a 'failure’ 'to keep’ a highway fit for travel shall have a cause of action against a governmental agency.” The majority also suggests that the county had

1990In Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619, 631 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), we interpreted § 2 of the governmental immunity act 1 and stated the " 'improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel’ refers only to the traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” I agree with Justice Griffin that a plain reading of the definition of "shoulder” in the Motor Vehicle Code 2 precludes the extension of the government’s duty to road shoulders pursuant to § 2.

1990In Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619, 631 ; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), we interpreted § 2 of the governmental immunity act 1 and stated the " 'improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel’ refers only to the traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” I agree with Justice Griffin that a plain reading of the definition of "shoulder” in the Motor Vehicle Code 2 precludes the extension of the government’s duty to road shoulders pursuant to § 2.

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990Of the many cases interpreting § 2, only Zyskowski v Habelmann (On Remand), 169 Mich App 98, 103-104 ; 425 NW2d 711 (1988), suggested that immunity applies to "the physical structure of the road itself.” 8 On reconsideration, we are convinced that the language of the § 2 exception to immunity evinces an intent to limit the imposition of tort liability in highway maintenance cases.

1990Of the many cases interpreting § 2, only Zyskowski v Habelmann (On Remand), 169 Mich App 98, 103-104 ; 425 NW2d 711 (1988), suggested that immunity applies to "the physical structure of the road itself.” 8 On reconsideration, we are convinced that the language of the § 2 exception to immunity evinces an intent to limit the imposition of tort liability in highway maintenance cases.

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1989See also Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 730 ; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), discussing Malloy v Walker Twp, 77 Mich 448, 458, 462 ; 43 NW 1012 (1889), and Reardon v Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 410 ; 424 NW2d 248 (1988). [3] Killeen v Dep't of Transportation, 151 Mich App 7, 10-11 ; 390 NW2d 676 (1986). [4] Potes, supra, p 769 . [5] Killeen , n 3 supra, pp 11-12.

1989See also Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 730 ; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), discussing Malloy v Walker Twp, 77 Mich 448, 458, 462 ; 43 NW 1012 (1889), and Reardon v Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 410 ; 424 NW2d 248 (1988). [3] Killeen v Dep't of Transportation, 151 Mich App 7, 10-11 ; 390 NW2d 676 (1986). [4] Potes, supra, p 769 . [5] Killeen , n 3 supra, pp 11-12.

1989For the reasons stated, I would hold that such liability as is imposed by § 2 of the governmental immunity act does not extend to a governmental agency which has no jurisdiction over the highway at the time of the accident. [7] NOTES [1] MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), quoted in n 11. [2] See Peters v Dep't of State Hwys, 400 Mich 50 ; 252 NW2d 799 (1977); Arnold v Dep't of State Hwys, 406 Mich 235 ; 277 NW2d 627 (1979); Salvati v Dep't of State Hwys, 415 Mich 708 ; 330 NW2d 64 (1982).

1989For the reasons stated, I would hold that such liability as is imposed by § 2 of the governmental immunity act does not extend to a governmental agency which has no jurisdiction over the highway at the time of the accident. [7] NOTES [1] MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), quoted in n 11. [2] See Peters v Dep't of State Hwys, 400 Mich 50 ; 252 NW2d 799 (1977); Arnold v Dep't of State Hwys, 406 Mich 235 ; 277 NW2d 627 (1979); Salvati v Dep't of State Hwys, 415 Mich 708 ; 330 NW2d 64 (1982).

1989For the reasons stated, I would hold that such liability as is imposed by § 2 of the governmental immunity act does not extend to a governmental agency which has no jurisdiction over the highway at the time of the accident. [7] NOTES [1] MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), quoted in n 11. [2] See Peters v Dep't of State Hwys, 400 Mich 50 ; 252 NW2d 799 (1977); Arnold v Dep't of State Hwys, 406 Mich 235 ; 277 NW2d 627 (1979); Salvati v Dep't of State Hwys, 415 Mich 708 ; 330 NW2d 64 (1982).

1989For the reasons stated, I would hold that such liability as is imposed by § 2 of the governmental immunity act does not extend to a governmental agency which has no jurisdiction over the highway at the time of the accident. [7] NOTES [1] MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), quoted in n 11. [2] See Peters v Dep't of State Hwys, 400 Mich 50 ; 252 NW2d 799 (1977); Arnold v Dep't of State Hwys, 406 Mich 235 ; 277 NW2d 627 (1979); Salvati v Dep't of State Hwys, 415 Mich 708 ; 330 NW2d 64 (1982).

1989For the reasons stated, I would hold that such liability as is imposed by § 2 of the governmental immunity act does not extend to a governmental agency which has no jurisdiction over the highway at the time of the accident. [7] NOTES [1] MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), quoted in n 11. [2] See Peters v Dep't of State Hwys, 400 Mich 50 ; 252 NW2d 799 (1977); Arnold v Dep't of State Hwys, 406 Mich 235 ; 277 NW2d 627 (1979); Salvati v Dep't of State Hwys, 415 Mich 708 ; 330 NW2d 64 (1982).

1989See also Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 730 ; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), discussing Malloy v Walker Twp, 77 Mich 448, 458, 462 ; 43 NW 1012 (1889), and Reardon v Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 410 ; 424 NW2d 248 (1988). [3] Killeen v Dep't of Transportation, 151 Mich App 7, 10-11 ; 390 NW2d 676 (1986). [4] Potes, supra, p 769 . [5] Killeen , n 3 supra, pp 11-12.

1989See also Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 730 ; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), discussing Malloy v Walker Twp, 77 Mich 448, 458, 462 ; 43 NW 1012 (1889), and Reardon v Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 410 ; 424 NW2d 248 (1988). [3] Killeen v Dep't of Transportation, 151 Mich App 7, 10-11 ; 390 NW2d 676 (1986). [4] Potes, supra, p 769 . [5] Killeen , n 3 supra, pp 11-12.

1989See also Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 730 ; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), discussing Malloy v Walker Twp, 77 Mich 448, 458, 462 ; 43 NW 1012 (1889), and Reardon v Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 410 ; 424 NW2d 248 (1988). [3] Killeen v Dep't of Transportation, 151 Mich App 7, 10-11 ; 390 NW2d 676 (1986). [4] Potes, supra, p 769 . [5] Killeen , n 3 supra, pp 11-12.

1987The recent case of Davis, supra, demonstrates that the circuit court’s analysis was in error in two respects.

1975This question was negatively answered in Hobbs, supra. In Hobbs, supra, the Court of Claims dismissed plaintiffs suit for failing to file a complaint, or notice of intent, within one year pursuant to MCLA 600.6431(1); MSA 27A.6431(1) of the Court of Claims Act.

1975This question was negatively answered in Hobbs, supra. In Hobbs, supra, the Court of Claims dismissed plaintiffs suit for failing to file a complaint, or notice of intent, within one year pursuant to MCLA 600.6431(1); MSA 27A.6431(1) of the Court of Claims Act.