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6 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lew Morris Demolition Co. v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2011In order to constitute an acknowledgment of a debt under General Obligations Law § 17-101, a writing “must recognize an existing debt and must contain nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it” (Lew Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 NY2d 516, 521 [1976]). 1994Plaintiff’s letter on July 17, 1991 disputing the debt was not an acknowledgment pursuant to General Obligations Law § 17-101 that made the claim timely (see, Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ., 40 NY2d 516, 521 ). | 1 | 3 |
Fade v. Pugliani/Fadegreen1 sentence2015Thus, as the Supreme Court properly determined, the writing did not constitute an acknowledgment under General Obligations Law § 17-101 so as to restart the statute of limitations period (cf. George Tsunis Real Estate, Inc. v Benedict, 116 AD3d 1002, 1003 [2014]; Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d 612, 613 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
George Tsunis Real Estate, Inc. v. Benedictgreen1 sentence2015Thus, as the Supreme Court properly determined, the writing did not constitute an acknowledgment under General Obligations Law § 17-101 so as to restart the statute of limitations period (cf. George Tsunis Real Estate, Inc. v Benedict, 116 AD3d 1002, 1003 [2014]; Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d 612, 613 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2011We reject defendant’s contention that a forbearance clause in the restructuring agreement served to toll the running of the statute of limitations (see General Obligations Law § 17-103 [1], [3]; Robinson v City of New York, 24 AD2d 260, 262 [1965]; Matter of Eberhard v Elmira City School Dist., 6 AD3d 971, 973 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Eberhard v. Elmira City School Districtgreen1 sentence2011We reject defendant’s contention that a forbearance clause in the restructuring agreement served to toll the running of the statute of limitations (see General Obligations Law § 17-103 [1], [3]; Robinson v City of New York, 24 AD2d 260, 262 [1965]; Matter of Eberhard v Elmira City School Dist., 6 AD3d 971, 973 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Weadgreen1 sentence1994The facts in this case are thus analogous to those in Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ. ( 40 NY2d 516 ), in which this Court held that an executed stipulation partially settling a contractor’s claim for payment for work performed did not constitute an acknowledgment of a larger debt or partial payment of that debt within the meaning of General Obligations Law § 17-101, because the writing "did not recognize an existing debt” (id., at 521; see also, Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v Wead, 172 NY 497 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hakim v. Hakim
green
1 sentence2022The email recognized an existing debt and did not state anything inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it ( see Hon Fui Hui v East Broadway Mall, Inc. , 4 NY3d 790, 791 ; Hakim v Hakim , 99 AD3d 498, 501 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hon Fui Hui v. East Broadway Mall, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022The email recognized an existing debt and did not state anything inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it ( see Hon Fui Hui v East Broadway Mall, Inc. , 4 NY3d 790, 791 ; Hakim v Hakim , 99 AD3d 498, 501 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Banco do Brasil S. A. v. State of Antigua & Barbuda
green
1 sentence2004The motion court also correctly held that defendant’s May 1997 letter to plaintiff, stating that “[t]his income [$22,000 from the sale of a unit] would be applied [upon receipt of a no action letter from the Attorney General] to our $82,000 mortgage arrears with the City,” constituted acknowledgment within the meaning of General Obligations Law § 17-101 that restarted the statute of limitations (see Banco do Brasil v State of Antigua & Barbuda, 268 AD2d 75 [2000]). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Defreest v. . Warner
neutral
1 sentence1994We have thus not considered the degree to which plaintiff’s rights under the statute may have been affected by the fact that Piffath’s purported "acknowledgment” was made to Roslyn and not to him (see generally, Matter of Kendrick, 107 NY 104 ; DeFreest v Warner, 98 NY 217 ; cf., General Obligations Law § 17-107 [2] [b]). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
In Re the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Kendrick
green
1 sentence1994We have thus not considered the degree to which plaintiff’s rights under the statute may have been affected by the fact that Piffath’s purported "acknowledgment” was made to Roslyn and not to him (see generally, Matter of Kendrick, 107 NY 104 ; DeFreest v Warner, 98 NY 217 ; cf., General Obligations Law § 17-107 [2] [b]). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.