section 51 standing in New York

2023To the extent that petitioners assert they have standing under General Municipal Law § 51, such assertion is unavailing ( see Matter of La Barbera v Town of Woodstock , 29 AD3d 1054, 1056 [3d Dept 2006], lv dismissed 7 NY3d 844 [2006]; Kadish v Roosevelt Raceway Assoc. , 183 AD2d at 875 ).

1998Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs. . [1] Such standing does not, however, extend to plaintiffs’ claims that the Act violates NY Constitution, article VII, § 8 (gift or loan of State money or credit), article VIII, § 12 (limits upon local indebtedness) or article X, § 5 (restriction on assumption of obligations of a public corporation), as such provisions are not linked to any voting rights (see, e.g., Schulz v State of New York, 193 AD2d 171, 177 , affd 84 NY2d 231 , cert denied 513 US 1127 ). . [1] As for Supreme Court’s finding that certain plaintiffs are entitled to standing

1998Although defendants do not appear to dispute, and we have no quarrel with the proposition, that plaintiffs indeed possess standing as voters to assert that the Act violates the public referendum requirement of NY Constitution, article VII, § 11 (see, e.g., Matter of Schulz v New York State Executive, 233 AD2d 43, 48 , affd 92 NY2d 1 [finding that the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Schulz v State of New York ( 81 NY2d 336 ) evidenced “an intent to permit voter standing in an action or proceeding predicated upon an alleged violation of any of the fundamental requirements of NY Constituti

1998Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs. . [1] Such standing does not, however, extend to plaintiffs’ claims that the Act violates NY Constitution, article VII, § 8 (gift or loan of State money or credit), article VIII, § 12 (limits upon local indebtedness) or article X, § 5 (restriction on assumption of obligations of a public corporation), as such provisions are not linked to any voting rights (see, e.g., Schulz v State of New York, 193 AD2d 171, 177 , affd 84 NY2d 231 , cert denied 513 US 1127 ). . [1] As for Supreme Court’s finding that certain plaintiffs are entitled to standing

1998Although defendants do not appear to dispute, and we have no quarrel with the proposition, that plaintiffs indeed possess standing as voters to assert that the Act violates the public referendum requirement of NY Constitution, article VII, § 11 (see, e.g., Matter of Schulz v New York State Executive, 233 AD2d 43, 48 , affd 92 NY2d 1 [finding that the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Schulz v State of New York ( 81 NY2d 336 ) evidenced “an intent to permit voter standing in an action or proceeding predicated upon an alleged violation of any of the fundamental requirements of NY Constituti

1998Although defendants do not appear to dispute, and we have no quarrel with the proposition, that plaintiffs indeed possess standing as voters to assert that the Act violates the public referendum requirement of NY Constitution, article VII, § 11 (see, e.g., Matter of Schulz v New York State Executive, 233 AD2d 43, 48 , affd 92 NY2d 1 [finding that the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Schulz v State of New York ( 81 NY2d 336 ) evidenced “an intent to permit voter standing in an action or proceeding predicated upon an alleged violation of any of the fundamental requirements of NY Constituti

1998Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs. . [1] Such standing does not, however, extend to plaintiffs’ claims that the Act violates NY Constitution, article VII, § 8 (gift or loan of State money or credit), article VIII, § 12 (limits upon local indebtedness) or article X, § 5 (restriction on assumption of obligations of a public corporation), as such provisions are not linked to any voting rights (see, e.g., Schulz v State of New York, 193 AD2d 171, 177 , affd 84 NY2d 231 , cert denied 513 US 1127 ). . [1] As for Supreme Court’s finding that certain plaintiffs are entitled to standing

1995As to the denial of the preliminary injunction, our review is limited to whether Supreme Court has either exceeded or abused its discretion as a matter of law (see, Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 ).

1994In taking this step, we are mindful of the prior holding of the Court of Appeals in Schnepel v Board of Educ. ( 302 NY 94 ) that General Municipal Law § 51 does not authorize taxpayer actions against a school district.

1993Although it is unclear whether petitioners furnished a bond as required by that provision, any failure in that regard would not be fatal inasmuch as the statutory requirement may be cured nunc pro tunc (see generally, Montes Waste Sys. v Town of Oyster Bay, 150 Misc 2d 109, 113 ).

1993We do, however, agree that petitioners arguably have alleged sufficient facts regarding the Counties’ allegedly improper use of taxpayer funds to establish standing under General Municipal Law § 51 (see generally, Matter of Korn v Gulotta, 72 NY2d 363, 371-372 ; Matter of Schulz v Warren County Bd. of Supervisors, 179 AD2d 118, 121, n 2 , lv denied 80 NY2d 754 ).