public safety exception in New York

2026The public safety exception to the Miranda requirement permits law enforcement to ask necessary questions to secure a police officer's safety or the safety of the public ( see New York v Quarles , 467 US 649 [1984]; People v Jenkins , 208 AD2d 459, 460 [1st Dept 1994] [ Miranda warnings not required when officer conducting a pat-down of defendant asked him whether he had anything on his person that might cut the officer]).

2025The volatile circumstances we referenced in Huffman are more relevant, instead, to a public safety exception to the Miranda rule ( see New York v Quarles , 467 US 649 [1984]).

2015The officers’ question concerning the location of the gun did not constitute interrogation (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 22-23 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1018 [1980]; People v Roseboro, 124 AD3d 1374, 1375 [2015]) and moreover, the public safety exception to the Miranda rule applied to that question (see People v Gucla, 18 AD3d 478, 479 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]).

2015The officers’ question concerning the location of the gun did not constitute interrogation (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 22-23 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1018 [1980]; People v Roseboro, 124 AD3d 1374, 1375 [2015]) and moreover, the public safety exception to the Miranda rule applied to that question (see People v Gucla, 18 AD3d 478, 479 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]).

2014The questioning, therefore, fell squarely within the public safety exception to Miranda, as it was aimed at minimizing risks to the police officers and the general public (see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649, 655-656 [1984]; People v Gause, 50 AD3d 1392, 1394 [2008]).

2014The questioning, therefore, fell squarely within the public safety exception to Miranda, as it was aimed at minimizing risks to the police officers and the general public (see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649, 655-656 [1984]; People v Gause, 50 AD3d 1392, 1394 [2008]).

2015We further conclude that the court properly refused to suppress the gun seized from defendant’s backpack during a search incident to defendant’s lawful arrest (see People v Smith, 59 NY2d 454, 458-459 [1983]; People v Johnson, 86 AD2d 165, 166-167 [1982], affd 59 NY2d 1014 [1983]).

2015We further conclude that the court properly refused to suppress the gun seized from defendant’s backpack during a search incident to defendant’s lawful arrest (see People v Smith, 59 NY2d 454, 458-459 [1983]; People v Johnson, 86 AD2d 165, 166-167 [1982], affd 59 NY2d 1014 [1983]).

2015The officers’ question concerning the location of the gun did not constitute interrogation (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 22-23 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1018 [1980]; People v Roseboro, 124 AD3d 1374, 1375 [2015]) and moreover, the public safety exception to the Miranda rule applied to that question (see People v Gucla, 18 AD3d 478, 479 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]).

2015The officers’ question concerning the location of the gun did not constitute interrogation (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 22-23 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1018 [1980]; People v Roseboro, 124 AD3d 1374, 1375 [2015]) and moreover, the public safety exception to the Miranda rule applied to that question (see People v Gucla, 18 AD3d 478, 479 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]).

2015The officers’ question concerning the location of the gun did not constitute interrogation (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 22-23 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1018 [1980]; People v Roseboro, 124 AD3d 1374, 1375 [2015]) and moreover, the public safety exception to the Miranda rule applied to that question (see People v Gucla, 18 AD3d 478, 479 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]).

2015The officers’ question concerning the location of the gun did not constitute interrogation (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 22-23 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1018 [1980]; People v Roseboro, 124 AD3d 1374, 1375 [2015]) and moreover, the public safety exception to the Miranda rule applied to that question (see People v Gucla, 18 AD3d 478, 479 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]).

2015We further conclude that the court properly refused to suppress the gun seized from defendant’s backpack during a search incident to defendant’s lawful arrest (see People v Smith, 59 NY2d 454, 458-459 [1983]; People v Johnson, 86 AD2d 165, 166-167 [1982], affd 59 NY2d 1014 [1983]).

2015We further conclude that the court properly refused to suppress the gun seized from defendant’s backpack during a search incident to defendant’s lawful arrest (see People v Smith, 59 NY2d 454, 458-459 [1983]; People v Johnson, 86 AD2d 165, 166-167 [1982], affd 59 NY2d 1014 [1983]).

2014Thus, regardless of whether defendant was, as she asserts, in custody during the standoff (see generally People v Bower, 27 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; People v Scott, 269 AD2d 96, 98 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 892 [2000]; cf. People v Simpson, 235 AD2d 960, 962 [1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1100 [1997]), suppression of her statements was not required by the failure to apprise her of her Miranda rights (see People v Simpson, 235 AD2d at 961-962 ).

2014Thus, regardless of whether defendant was, as she asserts, in custody during the standoff (see generally People v Bower, 27 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; People v Scott, 269 AD2d 96, 98 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 892 [2000]; cf. People v Simpson, 235 AD2d 960, 962 [1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1100 [1997]), suppression of her statements was not required by the failure to apprise her of her Miranda rights (see People v Simpson, 235 AD2d at 961-962 ).

2014Thus, regardless of whether defendant was, as she asserts, in custody during the standoff (see generally People v Bower, 27 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; People v Scott, 269 AD2d 96, 98 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 892 [2000]; cf. People v Simpson, 235 AD2d 960, 962 [1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1100 [1997]), suppression of her statements was not required by the failure to apprise her of her Miranda rights (see People v Simpson, 235 AD2d at 961-962 ).

2014Thus, regardless of whether defendant was, as she asserts, in custody during the standoff (see generally People v Bower, 27 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; People v Scott, 269 AD2d 96, 98 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 892 [2000]; cf. People v Simpson, 235 AD2d 960, 962 [1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1100 [1997]), suppression of her statements was not required by the failure to apprise her of her Miranda rights (see People v Simpson, 235 AD2d at 961-962 ).

2014Thus, regardless of whether defendant was, as she asserts, in custody during the standoff (see generally People v Bower, 27 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; People v Scott, 269 AD2d 96, 98 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 892 [2000]; cf. People v Simpson, 235 AD2d 960, 962 [1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1100 [1997]), suppression of her statements was not required by the failure to apprise her of her Miranda rights (see People v Simpson, 235 AD2d at 961-962 ).

2014Thus, regardless of whether defendant was, as she asserts, in custody during the standoff (see generally People v Bower, 27 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]; People v Scott, 269 AD2d 96, 98 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 892 [2000]; cf. People v Simpson, 235 AD2d 960, 962 [1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1100 [1997]), suppression of her statements was not required by the failure to apprise her of her Miranda rights (see People v Simpson, 235 AD2d at 961-962 ).

2011Inasmuch as I “cannot say with certainty that the erroneous suppression ruling played no part in defendant’s decision to plead guilty,” I conclude that the plea must be vacated (People v Self, 213 AD2d 998, 998 ; see People v Coles, 62 NY2d 908, 909-910 ).

2011Inasmuch as I “cannot say with certainty that the erroneous suppression ruling played no part in defendant’s decision to plead guilty,” I conclude that the plea must be vacated (People v Self, 213 AD2d 998, 998 [1995]; see People v Coles, 62 NY2d 908, 909-910 [1984]).

2017Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials concerning the location of a gun, prior to having received Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), as well as the gun recovered as a result of those statements. *781 Under the circumstances of this case, in which the location of the weapon was unknown when the defendant was apprehended, and there was reason to believe that it may have been discarded in a location where it could have been discovered

2000In any event, even if defendant had been subjected to custodial interrogation, we would nevertheless conclude that the public safety exception to the Miranda rule would apply to render the statements admissible (see, New York v Quarles, 467 US 649 ; People v Oquendo, 252 AD2d 312, 315-316 , lv denied 93 NY2d 901 ).

2011The correction officer testified at the hearing that it was his practice to ask inmates whether they “had anything on” them before any pat frisk so that he would not “get stuck or cut.” Although the correction officer admitted that he asked the question in part to obtain information about a possible violation of inmate rules, the question was “ ‘reasonably prompted by a concern to secure the safety of the investigating officer[ ] . . . and was not solely motivated for the purpose of eliciting testimonial evidence’ ” (People v Taylor, 302 AD2d 868, 868-869 [2003], lv denied 99 NY2d 658 [2003] [

2010Although the police questioned defendant about the location of the knife while he was in custody and prior to administering Miranda warnings, defendant’s responses were admissible under the public safety exception to the Miranda rule (see People v Allah, 54 AD3d 632 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 755 [2009]; People v Taylor, 302 AD2d 868 [2003], lv denied 99 NY2d 658 [2003]).

2026Officer Zubyk's question regarding the pocketknife falls within the public safety exception to the Miranda rule and the defendant's statement in response is therefore admissible ( see People v Ingram , 177 AD2d 650, 651 [2d Dept 1991] [defendant's response admissible where question was "prompted by a concern to secure the safety of the investigating officers and the safety of the public and was not solely motivated for the purpose of eliciting testimonial evidence"]).

2003The question asked by the police concerning the location of the murder weapon falls within the public safety exception to the Miranda rule, inasmuch as it was “reasonably prompted by a concern to secure the safety of the investigating officers * * * and was not solely motivated for the purpose of eliciting testimonial evidence” (People v Ingram, 177 AD2d 650, 651 , lv denied 79 NY2d 858 ).

2011Inasmuch as I “cannot say with certainty that the erroneous suppression ruling played no part in defendant’s decision to plead guilty,” I conclude that the plea must be vacated (People v Self, 213 AD2d 998, 998 ; see People v Coles, 62 NY2d 908, 909-910 ).

2011Inasmuch as I “cannot say with certainty that the erroneous suppression ruling played no part in defendant’s decision to plead guilty,” I conclude that the plea must be vacated (People v Self, 213 AD2d 998, 998 [1995]; see People v Coles, 62 NY2d 908, 909-910 [1984]).

2008Where the police were confronted with five individuals, one of whom already had a gun, it was reasonable for the police officers’ own safety to ask the defendant if he had a gun prior to patting him down (see People v Johnson, 46 AD3d 276 [1st Dept 2007]; People v Scotchmer, 285 AD2d 834 [3d Dept 2001]).

2008The public safety exception to the Miranda rule has been applied where law enforcement officials have posed questions motivated by a concern for their own safety and that of the general public, such as to ascertain the location of a weapon in a public area, and not for the purpose of obtaining an incriminating response (see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649, 655-656 [1984]; People v Johnson, 46 AD3d 276, 277 [2007]; People v Scotchmer, 285 AD2d 834, 836 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 942 [2001]; People v Sanchez, 255 AD2d 614, 615 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1053 [1999]).

2008Where the police were confronted with five individuals, one of whom already had a gun, it was reasonable for the police officers’ own safety to ask the defendant if he had a gun prior to patting him down (see People v Johnson, 46 AD3d 276 [1st Dept 2007]; People v Scotchmer, 285 AD2d 834 [3d Dept 2001]).

2008The public safety exception to the Miranda rule has been applied where law enforcement officials have posed questions motivated by a concern for their own safety and that of the general public, such as to ascertain the location of a weapon in a public area, and not for the purpose of obtaining an incriminating response (see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649, 655-656 [1984]; People v Johnson, 46 AD3d 276, 277 [2007]; People v Scotchmer, 285 AD2d 834, 836 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 942 [2001]; People v Sanchez, 255 AD2d 614, 615 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1053 [1999]).

2026Footnotes Footnote 1 The People's assertion that the subject question triggered the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement, for emergency circumstances ( see generally People v Doll , 21 NY3d 665, 670-671 [2013], cert denied 572 US 1022 [2014]), is raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore not properly before us ( see People v Allen , 132 AD3d 1156, 1158 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1107 [2016]; People v Betancourt , 153 AD2d 750, 752-753 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 767 [1989]).

2026Footnotes Footnote 1 The People's assertion that the subject question triggered the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement, for emergency circumstances ( see generally People v Doll , 21 NY3d 665, 670-671 [2013], cert denied 572 US 1022 [2014]), is raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore not properly before us ( see People v Allen , 132 AD3d 1156, 1158 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1107 [2016]; People v Betancourt , 153 AD2d 750, 752-753 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 767 [1989]).

2026The public safety exception to the Miranda requirement permits law enforcement to ask necessary questions to secure a police officer's safety or the safety of the public ( see New York v Quarles , 467 US 649 [1984]; People v Jenkins , 208 AD2d 459, 460 [1st Dept 1994] [ Miranda warnings not required when officer conducting a pat-down of defendant asked him whether he had anything on his person that might cut the officer]).

2026Footnotes Footnote 1 The People's assertion that the subject question triggered the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement, for emergency circumstances ( see generally People v Doll , 21 NY3d 665, 670-671 [2013], cert denied 572 US 1022 [2014]), is raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore not properly before us ( see People v Allen , 132 AD3d 1156, 1158 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1107 [2016]; People v Betancourt , 153 AD2d 750, 752-753 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 767 [1989]).