public safety exception in Iowa

2024E.g., State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 578 , 580–81 (Iowa 2012) (holding that the public safety exception did not apply when the defendant was Mirandized, he asked for an attorney, he was put in a squad car, and then several hours later, the officers sought to reinitiate questioning after discovering inactive components of a meth lab but no smell); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 269, 275 (Iowa 2006) (deciding that the public safety exception applied when an officer entered a home that was a suspected meth lab, detected a strong odor of 15 anhydrous ammonia, pointed his gun at the defendant, a

2024See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 (noting that the officer “asked only the question necessary to locate the missing gun”); Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 791 (declining to apply the public safety exception while noting that the officer’s questions did not reflect only the limited purpose of asking about the potential threat to public safety).

2024The Court also made clear that the public safety exception was based on an objective standard, not dependent on “the motivation of the individual officers involved.” Id. at 655–56.

2024All things considered, we believe the cases interpreting the public safety exception to Miranda provide a useful guidepost to consider when we examine whether a delay under Iowa Code section 804.20 was “necessary.” The Supreme Court spoke of “immediate necessity” in Quarles. 467 U.S. at 657 .

2024In In re J.D.F., we applied Quarles to a case involving a juvenile. 553 N.W.2d 585 , 588–89 (Iowa 1996).

2017See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984); In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa 1996). 12 B.

2024E.g., State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 578 , 580–81 (Iowa 2012) (holding that the public safety exception did not apply when the defendant was Mirandized, he asked for an attorney, he was put in a squad car, and then several hours later, the officers sought to reinitiate questioning after discovering inactive components of a meth lab but no smell); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 269, 275 (Iowa 2006) (deciding that the public safety exception applied when an officer entered a home that was a suspected meth lab, detected a strong odor of 15 anhydrous ammonia, pointed his gun at the defendant, a

2024E.g., State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 578 , 580–81 (Iowa 2012) (holding that the public safety exception did not apply when the defendant was Mirandized, he asked for an attorney, he was put in a squad car, and then several hours later, the officers sought to reinitiate questioning after discovering inactive components of a meth lab but no smell); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 269, 275 (Iowa 2006) (deciding that the public safety exception applied when an officer entered a home that was a suspected meth lab, detected a strong odor of 15 anhydrous ammonia, pointed his gun at the defendant, a

2024E.g., State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 578 , 580–81 (Iowa 2012) (holding that the public safety exception did not apply when the defendant was Mirandized, he asked for an attorney, he was put in a squad car, and then several hours later, the officers sought to reinitiate questioning after discovering inactive components of a meth lab but no smell); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 269, 275 (Iowa 2006) (deciding that the public safety exception applied when an officer entered a home that was a suspected meth lab, detected a strong odor of 15 anhydrous ammonia, pointed his gun at the defendant, a

2024E.g., State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 578 , 580–81 (Iowa 2012) (holding that the public safety exception did not apply when the defendant was Mirandized, he asked for an attorney, he was put in a squad car, and then several hours later, the officers sought to reinitiate questioning after discovering inactive components of a meth lab but no smell); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 269, 275 (Iowa 2006) (deciding that the public safety exception applied when an officer entered a home that was a suspected meth lab, detected a strong odor of 15 anhydrous ammonia, pointed his gun at the defendant, a

2024See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074 , 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding the exception applicable when the agent “asked questions he reasonably believed were necessary to secure the scene following Ochoa’s arrest”); People v. Allen, 199 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[O]ur caselaw indicates that the public safety exception applies most readily in the context of immediate, on-scene investigations of crime . . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Campbell, 347 So. 3d 653 , 653–55 (La. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that the public safety exception applied when officers responded to a chi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074 , 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding the exception applicable when the agent “asked questions he reasonably believed were necessary to secure the scene following Ochoa’s arrest”); People v. Allen, 199 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[O]ur caselaw indicates that the public safety exception applies most readily in the context of immediate, on-scene investigations of crime . . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Campbell, 347 So. 3d 653 , 653–55 (La. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that the public safety exception applied when officers responded to a chi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074 , 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding the exception applicable when the agent “asked questions he reasonably believed were necessary to secure the scene following Ochoa’s arrest”); People v. Allen, 199 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[O]ur caselaw indicates that the public safety exception applies most readily in the context of immediate, on-scene investigations of crime . . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Campbell, 347 So. 3d 653 , 653–55 (La. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that the public safety exception applied when officers responded to a chi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074 , 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding the exception applicable when the agent “asked questions he reasonably believed were necessary to secure the scene following Ochoa’s arrest”); People v. Allen, 199 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[O]ur caselaw indicates that the public safety exception applies most readily in the context of immediate, on-scene investigations of crime . . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Campbell, 347 So. 3d 653 , 653–55 (La. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that the public safety exception applied when officers responded to a chi

2012The record contains more than sufficient evidence for us to rule on the public-safety- exception issue, and it is properly before us. 32 Palmer, 791 N.W.2d at 848 (“[T]he Court in Edwards adopted a per se ban on any further questioning of a suspect without the presence of counsel, for an indefinite duration, after the suspect invokes the right to counsel.”).

1996“The Court has not extrapolated from [Quarles ] that officers can compel self-incriminating statements_ While informing the accused of his rights is not a constitutional mandate, preventing coerced self-incriminating statements clearly is.” United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 , 104 S.Ct. at 2630 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 555 ); see also United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2005 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995).

1996“The Court has not extrapolated from [Quarles ] that officers can compel self-incriminating statements_ While informing the accused of his rights is not a constitutional mandate, preventing coerced self-incriminating statements clearly is.” United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 , 104 S.Ct. at 2630 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 555 ); see also United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2005 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995).

1996See In re B.R., 133 Ill.App.3d 946 , 89 Ill.Dec. 78 , 479 N.E.2d 1084 (1985); State ex rel.

1996See In re B.R., 133 Ill.App.3d 946 , 89 Ill.Dec. 78 , 479 N.E.2d 1084 (1985); State ex rel.

1996See In re B.R., 133 Ill.App.3d 946 , 89 Ill.Dec. 78 , 479 N.E.2d 1084 (1985); State ex rel.

1996“The Court has not extrapolated from [Quarles ] that officers can compel self-incriminating statements_ While informing the accused of his rights is not a constitutional mandate, preventing coerced self-incriminating statements clearly is.” United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 , 104 S.Ct. at 2630 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 555 ); see also United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2005 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995).

1996“The Court has not extrapolated from [Quarles ] that officers can compel self-incriminating statements_ While informing the accused of his rights is not a constitutional mandate, preventing coerced self-incriminating statements clearly is.” United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 , 104 S.Ct. at 2630 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 555 ); see also United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2005 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995).