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9 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Quarlesgreen2 sentences2025The public safety exception permits admission of custodial statements not preceded by Miranda warnings when police reasonably believed questioning was “necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public.” New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984). 2025Id. “[I]t obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it.” Id. ¶ 29 The Court described the public safety exception as “narrow.” Id. at 658 . | 5 | 8 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2025To date, the Illinois Supreme Court has addressed the public safety exception just once. ¶ 37 In People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48 (1996), our supreme court, relying on Quarles, found the exception applied to the facts in that case. 2021See also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677-78 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8) (rather than focusing on the officers’ subjective motivation, the exception applies as long as the questioning “ ‘relate[s] to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger’ ”). ¶ 31 In People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48 (1996), our supreme court similarly recognized the public safety exception. | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Sewn Newtongreen2 sentences2025The exception, however, does not apply when officers pose “questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.” Id. at 658-59 . ¶ 30 The State cites federal appellate decisions where the public safety exception was applied to circumstances akin to those before us, such as in United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004). 2021See also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677-78 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8) (rather than focusing on the officers’ subjective motivation, the exception applies as long as the questioning “ ‘relate[s] to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger’ ”). ¶ 31 In People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48 (1996), our supreme court similarly recognized the public safety exception. | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Tonnie Franklin Williamsgreen2 sentences2025See United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding response to the question, “ ‘is there anything we need to be aware of?’ ” admissible); see also United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2003) (the same for whether a defendant had “ ‘anything on him that [could] hurt [the officer] or anyone on [the] field team’ ”). - 11 - No. 1-23-0639 ¶ 32 Although the Newton court found admissible the responses to questions asked before the gun was found, the court determined the public safety exception did not extend to the unwarned questioning that occurred after. 2021See United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 505-07 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying the public safety exception when a defendant was handcuffed in his home pursuant to search warrant, was asked whether weapons were in the house, and stated an automatic weapon was under a dresser); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678-79 (applying the public safety exception when the defendant was handcuffed in apartment and asked whether he had “ ‘contraband,’ ” where officers knew a firearm was present and the family was involved in a domestic dispute); United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying the pu | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Aregreen2 sentences2025In United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2009), police obtained a warrant to arrest Antwan Daniels for drug conspiracy. 2 After being admitted to his home, officers handcuffed Daniels and brought him to the living room along with his wife and two young children. 2021See United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 505-07 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying the public safety exception when a defendant was handcuffed in his home pursuant to search warrant, was asked whether weapons were in the house, and stated an automatic weapon was under a dresser); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678-79 (applying the public safety exception when the defendant was handcuffed in apartment and asked whether he had “ ‘contraband,’ ” where officers knew a firearm was present and the family was involved in a domestic dispute); United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying the pu | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hannahgreen2 sentences2025This court applied Newton’s distinction in People v. Hannah, 2013 IL App (1st) 111660, ¶ 47 , finding the public safety exception did not apply when police asked, “ ‘whose gun is this?’ ” after already recovering a firearm. 2021Accordingly, Miranda is not triggered when officers conduct “general investigatory on-the- scene questioning as to the facts surrounding a crime.” People v. Hannah, 2013 IL App (1st) 111660, ¶ 42 ; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78 (differentiating between general questioning and the “compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation”). ¶ 27 Here, even assuming that defendant was in custody when he made his initial statement to Jeffrey, the questioning falls under the public safety exception to Miranda established in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). ¶ 28 In | 1 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2025We find Rainey’s statements should have been suppressed, as they were obtained during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) and were not admissible under the public safety exception. 2021Accordingly, Miranda is not triggered when officers conduct “general investigatory on-the- scene questioning as to the facts surrounding a crime.” People v. Hannah, 2013 IL App (1st) 111660, ¶ 42 ; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78 (differentiating between general questioning and the “compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation”). ¶ 27 Here, even assuming that defendant was in custody when he made his initial statement to Jeffrey, the questioning falls under the public safety exception to Miranda established in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). ¶ 28 In | 1 | 2 |
People v. Roundtreegreen2 sentences2025See People v. Roundtree, 135 Ill. 1993App. 3d 338 (where a motion to suppress statements was allowed, the State waived the public safety exception argument by not raising it below); People v. Roundtree (1985), 135 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Nicholasgreen2 sentences2021Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress defendant’s statement preceding the Miranda warnings. ¶ 38 Defendant next contends that his post-Miranda statement should have been suppressed because Jeffrey used an unconstitutional “question first, warn later” interrogation technique. ¶ 39 “A confession is voluntary if it is the product of free will, rather than the product of the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station.” People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104 , 118 - 12 - No. 1-19-2295 (2005). 2007As defendant notes, the State has the obligation to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a statement is voluntary. 725 ILCS 5/114--11(d) (West 2004); People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 118 (2005). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Gregory J. Edwardsgreen1 sentence2025Id.; see United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that questioning a known drug dealer about whether they possess a gun falls within the public safety exception). ¶ 35 Our research reveals, however, that Newton and Are do not fully represent the federal appellate courts’ view of the public safety exception. | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Ramon Reyes, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellantgreen1 sentence2025See United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding response to the question, “ ‘is there anything we need to be aware of?’ ” admissible); see also United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2003) (the same for whether a defendant had “ ‘anything on him that [could] hurt [the officer] or anyone on [the] field team’ ”). - 11 - No. 1-23-0639 ¶ 32 Although the Newton court found admissible the responses to questions asked before the gun was found, the court determined the public safety exception did not extend to the unwarned questioning that occurred after. | 1 | 1 |
California v. Behelergreen1 sentence2020California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). ¶ 22 The State argues that the public safety exception to Miranda applies here. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McAdriangreen2 sentences1988(Holloway, 86 Ill. 2d at 91-92 ; see also People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 254 , 287 N.E.2d 688 .) Had the State timely raised the issue of the public safety exception, defendant might have been able to produce evidence to show that it did not apply to this situation. 1988(Holloway, 86 Ill. 2d at 91-92 ; see also People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 254 , 287 N.E.2d 688 .) Had the State timely raised the issue of the public safety exception, defendant might have been able to produce evidence to show that it did not apply to this situation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Orozco v. Texas
green
2 sentences2007Ed. 2d 311 , 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969), as a case in which the public safety exception was inapplicable because exigent circumstances did not exist. 2007In reaching its holding, the Court in Quarles distinguished Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 , 89 S.Ct. 1095 , 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969), as a case in which the public safety exception was inapplicable because exigent circumstances did not exist. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Benard
green
1 sentence2025Other courts have found the exception does not apply in comparable situations, as in United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2012). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Fort
green
1 sentence2021See United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 505-07 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying the public safety exception when a defendant was handcuffed in his home pursuant to search warrant, was asked whether weapons were in the house, and stated an automatic weapon was under a dresser); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678-79 (applying the public safety exception when the defendant was handcuffed in apartment and asked whether he had “ ‘contraband,’ ” where officers knew a firearm was present and the family was involved in a domestic dispute); United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying the pu | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Nau
green
1 sentence1993(See, e.g., People v. Nau (1988), 167 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Harris v. New York
green
1 sentence1993Ed. 2d 1, 4 , 91 S. Ct. 643, 645 .) Similarly, noncoerced statements are admissible under the public safety exception established in New York v. Quarles (1984), 467 U.S. 649 , 81 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Kunkel
green
2 sentences1993However, we are persuaded by the Kunkel decision that the companion to the public safety exception must be a private safety exception, whether labelled as such or as a “rescue doctrine.” (Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d at 189 , 404 N.W.2d at 76 .) The Quarles Court only theorized about the risk a missing gun might present to the public, suggesting that an accomplice might make use of it or that, later, a customer or an employee might come upon it. 1993However, we are persuaded by the Kunkel decision that the companion to the public safety exception must be a private safety exception, whether labelled as such or as a “rescue doctrine.” (Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d at 189 , 404 N.W.2d at 76 .) The Quarles Court only theorized about the risk a missing gun might present to the public, suggesting that an accomplice might make use of it or that, later, a customer or an employee might come upon it. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Coles v. Bowen
green
1 sentence1993Ed. 2d 256 , 108 S. Ct. 297 .) Faced with similar facts, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals adopted the “rescue doctrine” as a limited “companion” exception to the public safety exception. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Holloway
green
1 sentence1988(Holloway, 86 Ill. 2d at 91-92 ; see also People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 254 , 287 N.E.2d 688 .) Had the State timely raised the issue of the public safety exception, defendant might have been able to produce evidence to show that it did not apply to this situation. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.