Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
34 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greenup v. Rodmangreen2 sentences2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda 2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda | 4 | 6 |
Park v. Parkgreen2 sentences2020In granting the motion the trial court ruled, “there is little question that the conduct giving rise to the defamation claim falls under the anti-SLAPP statute.” The trial court further found, “Buckley has failed to provide any admissible 15 [moving party sufficiently showed merit through unverified answer to an unverified complaint and counsel’s under oath statement, “‘these Defendants have a very good (and certainly a justiciable) defense to the Plaintiff’s claim’”]; see In re Marriage of Park, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 346 [“facts suggest that if [moving party was] properly represented at a ne 2020In granting the motion the trial court ruled, “there is little question that the conduct giving rise to the defamation claim falls under the anti-SLAPP statute.” The trial court further found, “Buckley has failed to provide any admissible 14 [moving party sufficiently showed merit through unverified answer to an unverified complaint and counsel’s under oath statement, “‘these Defendants have a very good (and certainly a justiciable) defense to the Plaintiff’s claim’”]; see In re Marriage of Park, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 346 [“facts suggest that if [moving party was] properly represented at a ne | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stanhisergreen2 sentences2014(Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362 .) Following the default prove-up hearing, the trial court issued a minute order reading, in relevant part, as follows: “There are three other defendants not heretofore mentioned in connection with this prove-up: Dakota Holdings, Inc., Matthew Anderson, and Richard Kryza. [¶] At trial there was collateral evidence that perhaps both Messrs Kryza and Anderson had trouble with law enforcement in other venues, and possibly in connection with transactions like the one at issue in the instant litigation. 2011(Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 82 ].) Consequently, a trial court errs if it applies the usual preponderance of the evidence standard at a default prove-up hearing. | 1 | 3 |
Becker v. S.P v. Construction Co.green2 sentences2018However, a defendant is not in a position to make such a decision if he or she has not been given full notice." ( Lippel, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1166 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 290 , 801 P.2d 1041 .) It is because section 580 was "designed to insure fundamental fairness" that it must be strictly construed. ( Becker, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 494 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 825 , 612 P.2d 915 .) The statute's policy objective would "[s]urely ... be undermined if the door were opened to speculation, no matter how reasonable it might appear in a particular case, that a prayer for damages according to proof provided adequa 2018However, a defendant is not in a position to make such a decision if he or she has not been given full notice." ( Lippel, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1166 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 290 , 801 P.2d 1041 .) It is because section 580 was "designed to insure fundamental fairness" that it must be strictly construed. ( Becker, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 494 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 825 , 612 P.2d 915 .) The statute's policy objective would "[s]urely ... be undermined if the door were opened to speculation, no matter how reasonable it might appear in a particular case, that a prayer for damages according to proof provided adequa | 1 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Lippelgreen2 sentences2003At the default prove-up hearing, Finney requested $5,630 for attorney’s fees associated with partition. 8 Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 220 , 726 P.2d 1295 ] (“the Courts of Appeal have consistently read the code to mean that a default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded is void as beyond the court’s jurisdiction.”); see also Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 428, 432-433 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 808 P.2d 226 ]. 9 Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc., supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 433 . 10 In re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160, 1167 [ 276 Ca 2003At the default prove-up hearing, Finney requested $5,630 for attorney’s fees associated with partition. 8 Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 220 , 726 P.2d 1295 ] (“the Courts of Appeal have consistently read the code to mean that a default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded is void as beyond the court’s jurisdiction.”); see also Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 428, 432-433 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 808 P.2d 226 ]. 9 Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc., supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 433 . 10 In re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160, 1167 [ 276 Ca | 1 | 2 |
Adams v. Murakamigreen2 sentences2016An award of punitive damages after 2008 should not be based upon an assessment of net worth from several years before the crash.” (See Kelly v. Haag, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 915 [“A punitive damages award is based on the defendant’s financial condition at the time of trial.” (Italics added.)].) We agree with defendants that Modarres’s evidence was not sufficient as it failed to show Thomas’s financial condition at the time of the default prove-up hearing and thus did not provide “meaningful evidence of [his] financial condition” (Adams, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 109 ). 2014(Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109 [“an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial condition” at the time of trial].) 22 of action; all other parts of the Schneider judgment shall remain undisturbed. | 1 | 2 |
McAllister v. Georgegreen1 sentence2025(See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 556 [“plaintiff may recover as economic damages no more than the reasonable value of the medical services received”]; McAllister v. George (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 258, 264 [plaintiff must show that “the amounts charged were reasonable” and that the services were “reasonably required as a result of” the defendant’s tort].) But to prove his damages in a default prove-up hearing, Medina had to make only a prima facie showing. | 1 | 1 |
Howell v. HAMILTON MEATS & PROVISIONS, INC.green1 sentence2025(See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 556 [“plaintiff may recover as economic damages no more than the reasonable value of the medical services received”]; McAllister v. George (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 258, 264 [plaintiff must show that “the amounts charged were reasonable” and that the services were “reasonably required as a result of” the defendant’s tort].) But to prove his damages in a default prove-up hearing, Medina had to make only a prima facie showing. | 1 | 1 |
Sass v. Cohengreen2 sentences2024(See Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 882 [“a defendant who defaults is ‘out of court’ and not entitled to participate in the prove-up hearing”]; In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037 [default “precludes the respondent spouse from contesting the judgment or obtaining any effective relief until the default is set aside”].) Because Darlene had no right to participate in the default prove-up hearing, we cannot conceive how the claimed defect in notice could have harmed her. 2024(See Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 882 [“a defendant who defaults is ‘out of court’ and not entitled to participate in the prove-up hearing”]; In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037 [default “precludes the respondent spouse from contesting the judgment or obtaining any effective relief until the default is set aside”].) Because Darlene had no right to participate in the default prove-up hearing, we cannot conceive how the claimed defect in notice could have harmed her. | 1 | 1 |
Askmo v. Askmogreen2 sentences2024(See Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 882 [“a defendant who defaults is ‘out of court’ and not entitled to participate in the prove-up hearing”]; In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037 [default “precludes the respondent spouse from contesting the judgment or obtaining any effective relief until the default is set aside”].) Because Darlene had no right to participate in the default prove-up hearing, we cannot conceive how the claimed defect in notice could have harmed her. 2024(See Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 882 [“a defendant who defaults is ‘out of court’ and not entitled to participate in the prove-up hearing”]; In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037 [default “precludes the respondent spouse from contesting the judgment or obtaining any effective relief until the default is set aside”].) Because Darlene had no right to participate in the default prove-up hearing, we cannot conceive how the claimed defect in notice could have harmed her. | 1 | 1 |
Hearn v. Howardgreen1 sentence2022(See Hearn v. Howard, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206 [defendant’s “unsupported, subjective belief that she had not been served until” the default prove-up hearing did not “demonstrate that the default judgment was entered as result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect”]; see also Kramer, supra, 10 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 30 [defendant’s decision not to participate in a lawsuit “because [she] erroneously believed that ‘[the p]laintiff was simply prosecuting this case against a defunct entity,’ and . . . was unaware that she ‘was potentially personally liable,’” was not an ext | 1 | 1 |
| Kelly v. Haaggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Angela C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dill v. Berquist Construction Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bakkebo v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zeilman v. County of Kerngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Electronic Funds Solutions v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2022(Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1177 .) However, on remand, plaintiffs must decide whether to proceed with a new default prove-up hearing with a $77,100 damage limitation, or seek to amend their complaint to state the full amount of damages sought. 2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda | 4 | 2010–2022 |
Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026(See Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381 , 385–386.) These various procedural arguments are no more persuasive as a basis for reversal than her principal contention attacking James’s set-aside motion as unsupported under Family Code section 2122. 2026(See Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381 , 385–386.) These various procedural arguments are no more persuasive as a basis for reversal than her principal contention attacking James’s set-aside motion as unsupported under Family Code section 2122. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Techs., Inc.
green
2 sentences2025(Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1013 , 1018–1019, 1025.) Alternatively, the plaintiff can amend their complaint to specify the full amount of damages sought, which vacates the default and gives the defendant a chance to respond to the amended complaint. 2020(Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1013 (Airs I).) We gave Airs the option on remand to proceed with a new default prove-up hearing seeking up to $25,000 in damages—i.e., the jurisdictional minimum alleged in its complaint—or amend the complaint to state the full amount of damages sought. | 2 | 2020–2025 |
Washington v. Farlice
green
2 sentences2022(See Kenly v. Ukegawa (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 49, 58-59 ; Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065 ; Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777 .) Under Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c), Brahms may subpoena documents and witnesses to be available at the new default prove-up for the purpose of establishing Wilk’s financial condition, and we will direct the 9 trial court to enter an order permitting such discovery. 2016Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1286 ; Lara v. Cadag, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065 ; Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777 .) Modarres may conduct discovery, including third party discovery, and may subpoena documents and witnesses to be available at the new default prove-up hearing for the purpose of establishing Thomas’s financial condition, and, in addition, we will direct the trial court to enter an order permitting such discovery. | 2 | 2016–2022 |
Lara v. Cadag
green
2 sentences2022(See Kenly v. Ukegawa (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 49, 58-59 ; Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065 ; Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777 .) Under Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c), Brahms may subpoena documents and witnesses to be available at the new default prove-up for the purpose of establishing Wilk’s financial condition, and we will direct the 9 trial court to enter an order permitting such discovery. 2016Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1286 ; Lara v. Cadag, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065 ; Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777 .) Modarres may conduct discovery, including third party discovery, and may subpoena documents and witnesses to be available at the new default prove-up hearing for the purpose of establishing Thomas’s financial condition, and, in addition, we will direct the trial court to enter an order permitting such discovery. | 2 | 2016–2022 |
Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021(Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1301 .) Nevertheless, Singh knew the date of the default prove-up hearing because he asked the trial court to continue that date. 2021(Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1301 .) Nevertheless, Singh knew the date of the default prove-up hearing because he asked the trial court to continue that date. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Rappleyea v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2020After the default prove-up hearing, the trial court’s order stated, “[Buckley] is to calculate total damages as enumerated by the Court and submit [a] Judgment.” As in Mechling, “[a] reasonable inference from these facts [was Buckley’s] damages award would have been impacted had [Katina] presented a defense and challenged [Buckley’s] proof of causation and damages.” (29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1247.) Further, in addition to her counsel’s declaration, Katina presented the trial court with a proposed special motion to strike Buckley’s defamation cause of action as well as a declaration from her counse 2020After the default prove-up hearing, the trial court’s order stated, “[Buckley] is to calculate total damages as enumerated by the Court and submit [a] Judgment.” As in Mechling, “[a] reasonable inference from these facts [was Buckley’s] damages award would have been impacted had [Katina] presented a defense and challenged [Buckley’s] proof of causation and damages.” (29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1247.) Further, in addition to her counsel’s declaration, Katina presented the trial court with a proposed special motion to strike Buckley’s defamation cause of action as well as a declaration from her counse | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Levine v. Smith
green
2 sentences2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda 2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Stein v. York
green
2 sentences2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda 2018(Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 ; Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969−970.) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attendance at the default prove-up hearing. ( Stein, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 326−327.) This emphasis on formal notice stems from the policy goals at stake. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Dhawan v. Biring
green
2 sentences2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda 2018(Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 ; Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969−970.) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attendance at the default prove-up hearing. ( Stein, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 326−327.) This emphasis on formal notice stems from the policy goals at stake. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Rodriguez v. Nam Min Cho
green
2 sentences2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda 2018Several cases have held that a statement of damages does not satisfy section 580 if the case does not involve personal injury or wrongful death. ( Electronic Funds, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 ; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ; Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 , 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 ; *1020 Dhawan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 969-970, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 .) Stein held that section 580's formal notice requirement could not be satisfied even by the defaulting defendant's "active participation in discovery" and attenda | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Elena S. v. Kroutik
green
1 sentence2024California Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b) provides three alternatives if an appellant “intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court . . . : [¶] (1) A reporter’s transcript under rule 8.130; [¶] (2) An agreed statement under rule 8.134; or [¶] (3) A settled statement under rule 8.137.” Zinni has failed to follow any of these alternatives. “ ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct.” ’ ” (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574 .) In the absence of a record of the oral proceedings, “ ‘ “any condition of facts | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum
green
1 sentence2023(Ibid.) Butler held the trial court materially departed from the remand order, which directed reevaluation of the evidence presented at the prove-up hearing and “did not leave open the option of reconsidering prior rulings or reopening the case on the facts and allowing a trial.” (Id. at p. 982.) In Ayyad, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th 851 , the case the City most heavily relies upon, the initial appeal affirmed a judgment for the plaintiffs and order granting plaintiffs a partial new trial on specific damages issues, and remanded for proceedings limited to retrial of those damages issues. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kenly v. Ukegawa
green
1 sentence2022(See Kenly v. Ukegawa (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 49, 58-59 ; Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065 ; Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777 .) Under Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c), Brahms may subpoena documents and witnesses to be available at the new default prove-up for the purpose of establishing Wilk’s financial condition, and we will direct the 9 trial court to enter an order permitting such discovery. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Reid v. Balter
green
1 sentence2020(Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1193 .) In the instant case, the trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s case at the default prove- up hearing. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Edward W. v. Lamkins
green
1 sentence2020DISMISSAL Plaintiff contends the default prove-up hearing was effectively a hearing on an OSC re: dismissal without prior notice. “ ‘ “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 17 them an opportunity to present their objections.” ’ ” (Edward W. v. Lamkins (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 516, 529 .) When Defendant’s default was entered, Plaintiff had 45 days to obtain a default judgment or to obtain an extens | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Van Diest v. Van Diest
green
1 sentence2020A "trial court has only such jurisdiction as is defined by the terms of the remittitur." (Van Diest v. Van Diest (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 541, 545 .) In Airs I, our remittitur directed the trial court on remand to "allow Airs to (1) proceed with a new default prove-up hearing seeking up to $25,000 in damages or, in the alternative (2) amend the complaint to state the full amount of damages it seeks." Airs chose the first option, and the court awarded damages of $25,000. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Jefferson
green
1 sentence2020Yet this is no different than the effect of the trial court’s ruling before us now. “‘[R]eviewing courts have consistently declined to remand cases where doing so would be an idle act that exalts form over substance . . .’” (People v. Jefferson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 399, 408 .) 17 Lastly, Tawansy asserts that the interests of justice favor going to trial on the merits because he has “fully litigated this matter for over two years” and suffered dismissal due to a single incident of “sickness.” Accepting this assertion requires us to reweigh the evidence and to ignore the analysis we have set fo | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Tomaselli v. Transamerica Insurance
green
1 sentence2016Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1286 ; Lara v. Cadag, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065 ; Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777 .) Modarres may conduct discovery, including third party discovery, and may subpoena documents and witnesses to be available at the new default prove-up hearing for the purpose of establishing Thomas’s financial condition, and, in addition, we will direct the trial court to enter an order permitting such discovery. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Bell v. Feibush green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Chicago Title Insurance v. AMZ Insurance Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Don v. Cruz green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| County of Los Angeles v. Southern California Edison Co. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Hampton v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| In Re Marriage of Stevenot green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Uva v. Evans green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.